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ABSTRACT 
During the early twentieth century American cotton-producing areas rapidly expanded 
beyond the “Old South” cotton belt, an area extending from Virginia to East Texas.  By the 
1920s farmers had plowed fields and established new cotton centers in western Oklahoma, 
the High Plains of Texas, and among the large irrigated farms of California, Arizona, and 
New Mexico.  By the 1940s the dominant areas of American cotton production were 
California and West Texas. 
While historians have examined many aspects of cotton production in the South, the 
same cannot be said of the western cotton belt.  This study profiles the newer cotton farming 
areas from Central Texas to California and their evolutionary development into the “Cotton 
West.” 
Several conditions influenced the establishment and expansion of the Cotton West.  
Water and irrigation were key ingredients.  New settlers in many areas produced relatively 
little until the federal government built a major irrigation system through the reclamation 
program; other farmers depended on underground water to sustain their crops. 
Central players in the development of the western cotton industry were the researchers 
and scientists of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and their partners in state land-
grant colleges and agricultural experiment stations.  The USDA was particularly eager to 
establish a new cotton industry in the West—one that would supplement instead of duplicate 
that of the South.  Researchers sought and improved varieties of long-staple and Acala 
cottons, which they bred to suit each region of the Cotton West. 
With appropriate varieties of cotton available to farmers, the march toward 
mechanization became the next important area of study for farmers and researchers alike.  
Changes in technology and the available labor force were constant challenges for western 
cotton producers needing seasonal, sometimes migratory, labor at particular times of the 
year.  Federal immigration policy affected which ethnic groups were available.  The shift to 
mechanical harvesting after World War II marked a significant step toward completing  
mechanization and shifting the labor needs for cotton growing.  Once the Cotton West 
became well established, the contrasts between the West and the South began to disappear. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The cotton-producing areas of the United States rapidly expanded in the early twentieth 
century.  Up to that time cotton was produced only in the “Old South” cotton belt from 
Virginia to East Texas.  By 1900 farmers were quickly crossing toward the 100th meridian in 
Texas, and over the next twenty years they established the beginnings of new cotton centers 
in western Oklahoma, the Southern Plains of Texas, and large irrigated farms in California, 
Arizona, and New Mexico.  By the end of World War II the dominant areas of American 
cotton production were California and West Texas. 
While the ins and outs of the Southern cotton belt have been thoroughly examined 
from many perspectives, the same cannot be said of the newer Western cotton belt.  Many 
short articles and a few theses and dissertations have offered regional glimpses into this area.  
Unfortunately, to date no one has considered the common development and similarities of the 
region as a whole—unlike the cotton industry itself, which has met in the Western Cotton 
Production Conference and other similar gatherings since 1951.  This monograph corrects 
that oversight—to study and profile the newer cotton farming areas from Central Texas and 
Oklahoma to California and their evolutionary development as the “Cotton West.” 
The Cotton West 
What constitutes the cotton growing areas of the West and the South?  Where does one 
leave the South and enter the West?  The potential answers can be quite complex but are 
critical in differentiating how newer cotton production in the West differs so much from the 
older areas of the South.1  To define the “Cotton West,” one should first determine what is 
the “Cotton South.” 
                                                 
1
 The author first developed the definitions of the Cotton West and Cotton South for a 1999 presentation 
at the Agricultural History Society symposium, which was subsequently developed for publication.  Much of 
the material in this section comes from that work.  Cameron L. Saffell, “When Did King Cotton Move His 
Throne (And Has It Moved Back)?”, Agricultural History 74(2) (Spring 2000): 293-308. 
 2 
The Bureau of the Census defines the South as the states of Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Georgia, 
Florida, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia (fig. 1).2  Most 
historians refer to this as the “Census South.”  This definition functions fairly well, although 
it includes several non-cotton-producing states. 
Figure 1.  Definitions of the South 
Source:  Compiled by the author. 
R. Douglas Hurt, in the most recent history of American agriculture, defines the 
“Cotton Kingdom” South as running from “Virginia and North Carolina to Texas [and] from 
Tennessee to Louisiana and Florida,” as depicted in figure 1.  Gilbert Fite, in his 
comprehensive study of southern agriculture, Cotton Fields No More, “arbitrarily” defines 
the South as the eleven states of the Confederacy from the American Civil War.  This, he 
admits, leaves out some critical cotton areas in Kentucky, Oklahoma, and southern Missouri.  
The latter two are significant cotton-producing regions in the twentieth century.  James 
                                                 
2
 As an example see the geographic map divisions for “Cotton—Acreage, By States: 1909,” in U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910, Volume V: Agriculture 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1913), 683. 
 3 
Street, in The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy, defines the South three ways, 
including a “Southeast” grouping similar to Fite’s minus Oklahoma and Texas.3  All of these 
definitions of the Cotton South (by states) are fairly suitable as long as one is considering 
production prior to 1900.  Up to that time American cotton farming extended across the 
region defined by Hurt plus southern and eastern Oklahoma. 
In the twentieth century cotton farming expanded into the American West.  Through 
most of the nineteenth century cotton farming did not extend west of the Blackland Prairies 
that range across Central Texas.  Growth followed the line of furthest Anglo settlement as the 
pioneers slowly advanced toward West Texas and into Oklahoma.  Farmers in these recent 
agricultural additions did not raise more than small experimental plots of cotton until the 
1910s, when experiment station researchers developed varieties and growing methods 
adapted to the semi-arid environment and when producers built the first cotton gins on the 
High Plains.4 
The first two decades of the twentieth century also saw the establishment of cotton 
farming in the American Southwest.  The irrigation canals of public and private water 
projects opened previously dry lands to farming for the first time.  USDA researchers 
experimented with long-staple cotton varieties that produced greater fiber yields in the longer 
growing season.5  They also met their goal of establishing an alternative, domestic source of 
long-staple Egyptian cotton for American mills.  Further, these areas were free of the dreaded 
boll weevil that was then sweeping across the Cotton South.  Production began in the 
Imperial Valley of California and in nearby Arizona.  As successful growing methods and 
varieties were determined, production expanded to the San Joaquin Valley of California and 
                                                 
3
 R. Douglas Hurt, American Agriculture: A Brief History (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994), 
120-21; Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture, 1865-1980 (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1984), xi; James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy: Mechanization and Its 
Consequences (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), viii. 
4
 Cameron Lee Saffell, “Working in the Cotton Fields of the South Plains [of Texas], 1910-1990” 
(Master’s thesis, Texas Tech University, 1996), 24-28. 
5
 Many observers describe cotton—specifically the varieties or types being grown—by its staple length.  
The fiber length of cotton is the key trait to buyers.  Generally the longer the fiber, the more desirable it is for 
spinning and weaving into fabric.  Cotton is usually either short-staple (fibers less than 1 1/2 inches in length) or 
long-staple (fibers longer than 1 1/2 inches). 
 4 
the river valleys of Arizona and southern New Mexico.  These areas and the new sections of 
western Oklahoma and Texas may be said to constitute the Cotton West.6 
The westward expansion of cotton production poses some problems for trying to define 
the West from the South simply by states.  Logically, cotton grown in western Oklahoma and 
Texas cannot be included as part of the South because it is in a new and climatically different 
region from the rest of the traditional Cotton Belt.  Somewhere in between, a finer line must 
be drawn for where the Cotton West begins. 
Several sources offer possible delineation lines (fig. 2).  The first is simply a line west 
of the 1899 production areas, as reported in the 1900 decennial census.  Many of these areas 
are in the Blackland Prairie of Central Texas, depicted in figure 2 based on a map in Rebecca 
Sharpless’ 1999 book profiling farm women of that region.  Another definition comes from a 
1933 Census Bureau report that suggests the western boundary of cotton growing runs along 
the 20 to 23 inch annual rainfall line in “western Texas.”  That boundary falls between the 
98th and 100th meridians in Texas.  An additional defining landmark is physical geography.  
Across Texas and into Oklahoma, moving from south to northwest the land changes from the 
coastal Gulf-Atlantic Plain to the Rolling Plains and then to the High Plains.  Each of these 
regions is marked by relatively sharp changes in elevation.  The transition from coastal plain 
to interior plains (the Rolling Plains) occurs at approximately one thousand feet above sea 
level. All four differently defined lines fall in the same area across almost the entire state of 
Texas.7 
These lines are not as congruent as they cross into Oklahoma.  The boundary between 
Indian and Oklahoma Territories prior to statehood in 1907, however, provides a convenient 
and consistent line across the state, as areas to the west developed similarly to the Texas 
                                                 
6
 John Turner, White Gold Comes to California (Bakersfield: California Planting Cotton Seed 
Distributors, 1981), 29-40. 
7
 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census of the United States, Taken in the Year 1900 Volume VI: 
Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1902), 412-14; Rebecca Sharpless, Fertile Ground, Narrow Choices: 
Women on Texas Cotton Farms, 1900-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 5; Foster 
F. Elliott, Fifteenth Census of the United States. Census of Agriculture: Types of Farming in the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1933), 152; “Average Annual Precipitation (Inches),” in U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Climate and Man: Yearbook of Agriculture, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1941); Goode’s World 
Atlas, 18th ed., s.v. “United States and Canada: Physiography,” “Central U.S.A.,” and “Western Gulf Region of 
U.S.A. and Part of Mexico,” 62-63, 104-7.  Note that the 100th meridian (100oW) includes the north-south 
border between Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle (fig. 2). 
 5 
Figure 2.  Where Does the South End and the West Begin? 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from sources listed in footnote 7. 
High Plains.  Together, from the Rio Grande Valley to south central Kansas, these lines 
denote the approximate boundary between the Cotton South and the Cotton West. 
While this study focuses on the common features and development of the Cotton West 
as a whole, it is helpful for one to understand the major cotton producing regions within the 
Cotton West.  Figure 3 indicates a breakdown of these broad regions.  Their borders were 
determined after extensive consultation of experiment station publications, trade magazines, 
soil surveys, and topographic and county maps.  There are no exact and definite boundaries 
in reality; these are approximations with which most people, in and out of the cotton 
industry, would concur. 
 6 
Figure 3.  Cotton-Producing Regions of the United States in the Twentieth Century 
Source:  Compiled by the author. 
The West contains four major production regions.  The West Texas region runs from 
the boundary with the Cotton South to the western edge of the High Plains, just short of the 
Pecos River.  On the other side are the irrigated farms in New Mexico (Rio Grande and Pecos 
Rivers) and Arizona and California (Colorado River and tributaries).  The San Joaquin River 
region of California’s Central Valley is in the Far West.  The final region, the Lower Rio 
 7 
Grande Valley (including the Winter Garden area), fits within the rainfall definition but not 
the elevation definition in Texas.  However, the Lower Rio Grande Valley clearly falls in the 
West because of its use of irrigation similar to that of the southwestern regions.  More details 
about these regions and their development appear in Chapter Two. 
Brief Overview of Cotton Farming in the West and the South 
The period between 1899 and 1944 was a critical period for American cotton 
production.  The era saw the beginning of cotton production in the West, the ravages of the 
boll weevil across the South, and increased production associated with two world wars.  The 
greatest output came in the 1920s “golden age” before the Great Depression struck both the 
South and the West in 1934. 
Cotton production in the West got off to a slow start.  Except for a period of prosperity 
in West Texas in the 1920s, production remained relatively flat and small with only slow 
gains.  The lack of a mid-1910s census leaves us to speculate how much of an impact 
American-Egyptian long-staple cotton production had in Arizona during World War I.  
Remarkably, the Great Depression had little impact in the West, as cotton production stayed 
level in all the regions except in West Texas, which gave back its gains of its first two 
decades during the drought of the 1934 census year.  Only West Texas increased its 
production during World War II while the other regions, including the large farms of 
California, actually saw slight declines.  A shortage of labor for hand harvesting crops as 
men went to war and women took factory jobs explains the latter drop.8 
The post-war period saw major changes in cotton production in the United States.  In 
the five years after the end of World War II, cotton production in the West sharply increased, 
in large part due to the use of mechanized cotton harvesters.  Having used tractors for 
plowing, planting, and cultivating since almost the beginning of western cotton farming, 
producers found that adding a harvester in a large operation was not only easy, it was 
desirable.  With cotton growing and harvesting mechanized, western farmers quickly 
                                                 
8
 One probably would expect all production to have declined during the Great Depression because of 
drought and financial difficulties.  One would then expect a recovery during World War II as production 
resumed to supply the war effort. 
 8 
expanded their acreage to take advantage of the profits.  By mid-century much of the Cotton 
West had become firmly established and fairly stable.9 
But while the early twentieth century marked a period of industry building for the 
Cotton West, it was a period of industry instability and transition for the producers of the 
Cotton South.  Historians have extensively examined every facet of southern cotton 
production, rural life, and the economy.  One article goes so far as to suggest that “the 
agricultural history of the South has been worked and reworked so that the subject is nearly 
as worn as the region’s tired soils.”10 
Farming in the South changed little from the 1870s to the 1930s.  The region lagged 
behind the rest of the nation in mechanizing, adopting improved methods of cultivation, 
applying science to agricultural production, and utilizing capital in farm operations.  The act 
of farming itself was labor intensive.  Both black and white farmers became embroiled in 
sharecropping, the crop-lien system, and other kinds of tenancy, virtually committing 
themselves to produce the only thing that brought in cash—cotton—and trapping them in an 
unending cycle of debt.  Raising cotton without crop rotations depleted the soil of nutrients, 
and farmers put even marginal lands into production to try to break out of debt.  Thus cotton 
acreage and output continued to increase, despite low (and dropping) market prices, poor 
financial returns to growers, and even the invasion of the Mexican boll weevil after 1892.  
Little went to the hundreds of thousands of white and black tenants and sharecroppers, who 
barely lived at the subsistence level.  Absentee landowners, gin owners, and market operators 
in the community fared much better than the average southern cotton farmer.11 
As cotton production expanded and the market economy intensified after 1870, 
outsiders and government officials began calling for the diversification of southern 
agriculture and the introduction of science and efficiency in farming.  Proponents argued that 
the cotton farmer came out on the short end if he concentrated on raising cotton and then 
went to buy all his meat and commodities at the store—a practice of credit debt that kept him 
                                                 
9
 Gilbert C. Fite, “Mechanization of Cotton Production Since World War II,” Agricultural History 54(1) 
(January 1980): 194-203. 
10
 Moses S. Musoke and Alan L. Olmstead, “The Rise of the Cotton Industry in California: A 
Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Economic History 42(2) (June 1982): 385. 
11
 Gilbert C. Fite, “Southern Agriculture Since the Civil War: An Overview,” Agricultural History 53(1) 
(January 1979): 4-8. 
 9 
constantly at the behest of merchants and landlords.  Diversified farming would rebuild soils, 
helping to improve production and ease the transition into other crops and markets.  
Advocates of change also called upon farmers to apply the benefits of science and technology 
to improve their methods of production and begin to utilize equipment to extend workers’ 
productivity, thus lowering the net costs of labor.  Farming could be more efficient, they 
argued.  With the growth of land-grant colleges and scientific research, a new chorus of state 
agriculture college and experiment station researchers joined in the calls to change.  They 
offered information and advice to farmers in farm journal articles, extension bulletins, and 
farmers’ institutes.  The USDA joined the efforts when it sent Seaman Knapp to show 
southern farmers how to increase their income by adopting better production methods, which 
he endeavored to show through demonstration farms operated by cooperating farmers.  Some 
proponents believed that the spread of the boll weevil would force cotton farmers to diversify 
and improve their practices.  Despite all these efforts, though, by the eve of World War I 
southern agriculture still looked very much the same as it had forty years earlier.12 
Since the problems continued, diversification advocates kept pushing for changes.  
After about 1909 the USDA and state experiment stations made a concerted effort to develop 
a beef cattle industry in the South.  The spreading damage caused by the boll weevil was one 
major justification for shifting their research and publicity efforts.  In the mid-1910s a shift in 
labor caused more problems for farmers and landowners.  With low cotton prices and 
depressed economic conditions, southern sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and unemployed 
laborers (particularly African Americans) began moving north to work in industrial jobs in 
Midwestern cities, jobs no longer being filled by European immigrants who had been coming 
to the U.S. prior to World War I.  Alarmed at the problems of southern agriculture and their 
inability to influence changes, the USDA and state experiment stations began economic 
studies to identify what was going on, including the relationships between farm size, 
ownership, productivity, and low incomes.  Not surprisingly, they found that rural poverty 
was closely associated with “uneconomic farm units.”  Most farmers, though, had no 
alternative but to continue raising cotton the way they always had.  They were still in no 
                                                 
12
 Fite, Cotton Fields No More, 68-82. 
 10 
position to diversify production or take advantage of the scientific and management advice 
coming from the USDA, agriculture colleges, and experiment stations.13 
Meanwhile, the expansion and changes to the cotton industry in the West began 
showing their influence in the South.  The 1920s experiments on the Texas High Plains with 
primitive cotton sled harvesters caught the attention of one Mississippi planter.  In 1927 he 
wrote Dean A. H. Leidigh of Texas Technological College and declared, “It looks as if you 
fellows are going to make us produce cheap cotton or no cotton at all.”  Farm and political 
leaders in the South decided that if they could not change the farm, perhaps they could 
change the market.  They concluded that farmer cooperatives, with financial backing from 
the federal government, could help raise prices and maybe break the cycle.  While this may 
have helped stabilize markets, the lack of reliable and nearby places to sell other farm 
products—vegetables, fruits, poultry, and dairy products—did little to help advocates 
encourage diversification away from cotton farming.  Government researchers continued 
their study of the economy and rural life, but were successful only in painting a clear picture 
of what farm life was like and why farmers continued to be stuck in poverty.  Only a handful 
of farmers did well and enjoyed a relatively good living, largely because they took advantage 
of information coming from the colleges, experiment stations, and the USDA.  By 1930 
southern cotton farming was still stuck in its unending cycles.14 
With the onset of the Great Depression, the meager standard of living of so many 
southern cotton farmers dropped even further.  The worst features of the tenant and 
sharecropping systems intensified.  Despite some of the lowest market prices ever for cotton, 
farmers continued to plant as much acreage as they previously had.  “At least cotton would 
bring in some money [cash].  It always had.”  Even the thought of diversifying was not 
palatable, as all crop and livestock prices were very low.  With the onset of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration came some relief.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
and parity pricing tried to reduce cotton surpluses, raise market prices, and pay landowners 
not to grow cotton.  The Soil Erosion Service tried to help rebuild soil fertility and take 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 96-101. 
14
 Ibid., 109-119.  The letter to Dean Leidigh is quoted in Donald E. Green, Fifty Years of Service to 
West Texas Agriculture: A History of Texas Tech University’s College of Agricultural Sciences, 1925-1975 
(Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1977), 30. 
 11 
marginal lands out of production.  Congress established the Tennessee Valley Authority as a 
broad-based approach to remaking agriculture and rural life along the Tennessee and 
Cumberland rivers.  Its goals included soil conservation, flood control, improvement of 
agricultural practices, and the expansion of low-cost electricity.  It became evident, however, 
that only large farmers and landowners would benefit from New Deal agricultural legislation.  
Not everything trickled down to tenants and sharecroppers, many of whom became 
unemployed; some began leaving agriculture and the region.  These programs did begin to 
shake apart the foundations of cotton farming and how it had been done in the South for 
decades.15 
Those that stayed in cotton farming and agriculture in general took the first tentative 
steps toward mechanization and improved labor practices.  With a large supply of cheap 
labor, no one had an incentive to purchase machinery.  In addition, most southern farms had 
been too small and too irregular to use a tractor effectively.  Once again the USDA 
encouraged producers to reduce their costs and improve efficiency by improving their 
machinery.  Mechanization reorganized farm operations, changed the relationship between 
land and people, and employed better management and business skills.  It also meant that 
small family farms and more sharecroppers and day laborers were displaced, but advocates 
said the changes had to occur.  With better and more stable cash flow because of New Deal 
programs and federal farm capital programs, those farmers who wanted to modernize and 
mechanize found they could do so.  Soon the South began mirroring the decreasing numbers 
of farms and increasing average farm sizes economists were seeing in other parts of the 
country.  The old system of southern farming began to change.16 
The circumstances surrounding World War II heavily influenced the final transition of 
cotton farming in the South.  Demand from American textile mills increased substantially, as 
did market prices for cotton.  Other crops and livestock became more profitable as well, 
helping to encourage more producers to diversify.  Soybeans and peanuts became popular as 
southern farmers tried to meet the calls by wartime agencies for oil-producing crops.  As with 
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other parts of the country, agricultural labor shortages began to increase, but women, 
children, and urban residents helped fill in as cotton harvesters.  At the same time farmers 
began utilizing machines to help with their growing cotton.  With more opportunities for 
non-farm work, even for those supplementing their livelihood on a farm, the cycle of 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers finally eased, as did rural poverty.  The economic and 
industrial recovery of the World War II extended into the postwar years.  Although the 
changes came, they had come slowly but surely.  Even though in the immediate post-World 
War II period the Cotton South had not caught up with the Cotton West, it was well on its 
way.  By then the problems for one were usually the problems for all in the cotton industry.17 
Historiography Review 
In American agricultural history, there is a firm and well-established literature 
regarding the Cotton South both before and after the American Civil War.  Numerous aspects 
of cotton agriculture have been examined, both on a regional level and as a whole, and for 
narrow and broad time ranges.18  Perhaps the best overview of the post-Civil War Cotton 
South is Gilbert Fite’s Cotton Fields No More (1984).  In his introduction, Fite states that “no 
general history of southern farming since the end of slavery” had been written.  He suggests 
that the economic pressures, the evolution of rural poverty, tenancy, and sharecropping, the 
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devastation of the boll weevil and other infestations, and overall conditions uniformly 
affected the Cotton South and could be described in a unified context.  Fite’s history 
examines southern agriculture mostly from economic or commercial perspectives.  However, 
his general description of the Cotton South provides a good overview from which one can 
compare it to the Cotton West.19 
Unfortunately, there is little in the existing literature to make this comparison.  No 
historian has assembled a comprehensive monograph of the Cotton West, even though a great 
many of the factors that shaped the evolutionary development of the region—land and water 
issues, cotton seed varieties, mechanization, and labor—are common to almost every 
producer who began growing cotton in the West.  Such an overview would bring a 
historiographical unity to a subject that interpretation to date has not recognized.  It also 
provides numerous points to expand existing analyses of major issues in the development of 
the American West. 
The literature of the South has been quite thorough, perhaps because of its focal nature 
of North versus South in the traditional history of the United States.  Thus, as Fite 
demonstrated in Cotton Fields No More and in other literature since, there are overwhelming 
numbers of articles, theses, and monographs on almost every aspect of cotton farming and 
rural life in the South.  To this point, however, the same has not been true for the Cotton 
West.  While several historians and economists have authored short studies—mostly articles 
and a handful of theses—they can be characterized as being very specific in topic and/or 
geography.  Taken together, one can begin to assemble a loose picture of the Cotton West, 
but it is a historiography that is full of holes. 
Several students have written theses and dissertations about agriculture and cotton in 
West Texas from the center of that producing area—Texas Tech University (formerly Texas 
Technological College).  These works have examined everything from particular machine 
components to entire industries and economies.  Students from several disciplines have 
written on South Plains cotton, including researchers in business, agricultural economics, 
home economics, engineering, and atmospheric science.20  Not surprisingly the most material 
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has originated in the Tech history department.  The broadest examination is Delmar Hayter’s 
“South Plains Agriculture: 1880-1950.”  He focuses not only on cotton but also on other 
early commodities of the area and provides insight into the early settlement of the region and 
the development of the regional economy.21  A good follow-up is Joseph Gordon’s 
dissertation, “The History and Development of Irrigated Cotton on the High Plains of 
Texas,” which provides an in-depth analysis of the development of irrigation technology and 
methods and its introduction in cotton farming practices in the region.22  Leota Matthews 
provides an excellent history of the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station’s Lubbock 
Substation.  This institutional study discusses the station’s research on grain sorghum, cotton, 
mechanization, and irrigation from its opening to the 1950s.23  A complement to the 
Matthews history is Richard Arnold’s thesis on cotton varieties.  The development of storm-
proof cotton varieties involved not only the Lubbock Substation but also local farmers and 
seed companies who tested and bred strains of cotton best suited to the area.  The evolution 
of storm-proof cotton was a key ingredient to creating mechanized cotton farming on the 
South Plains, especially for mechanical harvesting.24  Taken as a whole, the theses of South 
Plains agriculture create a good description of cotton growing in that region, but all lack any 
reference or connection to the shared issues of the Cotton West. 
Moving beyond West Texas, perhaps one of the most significant histories assembled 
on cotton varieties is Joseph McGowan’s “History of Extra-Long Staple Cottons.”  
McGowan contends that the historical relationship of Pima cotton and foreign long-staple 
cottons is so close that a full account of both had to be written concurrently.  Thus, he spends 
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as much time profiling the international demand for long-staple cotton as he does the 
subsequent results of the USDA establishing the present Pima cotton industry in Arizona.25 
Although there are a couple of short articles and theses, only one comprehensive study 
has been done of the Arizona cotton industry.26  Erik-Anders Shapiro’s 1989 thesis, “Cotton 
in Arizona: A Historical Geography,” examines the expansion and distribution of cotton 
production in the region, from prehistoric Hohokam cotton farms to late twentieth century 
agribusiness enterprises.  Shapiro considers cultural, biological, and physical factors in 
commercial cotton production, including the interrelated business linkages between banks, 
farm implement and chemical dealers, and ginners and cottonseed producers.  His holistic 
approach results in a comprehensive view of the entire cotton production process—not just 
the “on the farm” issues involved.  However, while it fulfills Shapiro’s important goals for 
the study itself, it fails to link any of those developments or issues to those shared by the 
cotton producers of the neighboring areas of the Cotton West.27 
As with the Texas South Plains, several monographs and theses have been compiled on 
the California cotton industry.  Two come from key participants.  Retired cotton breeder John 
Turner spent nineteen years directing the U.S. Cotton Research Station at Shafter, where 
California’s official certified Acala variety was bred.  In White Gold Comes to California 
(1981), he provides a general overview of technical developments—such as the introduction 
of a particular cotton variety or the establishment of a producer association—that make up 
the basis of cotton production in the Central Valley.  However, his scientific background 
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leaves his book lacking a historical analysis of factors influencing California cotton 
production, including irrigation, mechanization, and labor issues, much less placing them in 
the broader context of issues and developments in the rest of the Cotton West.28 
A similarly well-placed observer of an earlier period of the California cotton industry 
was Wofford B. Camp.  Camp began his career as a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
cotton breeder, eventually helping to establish California’s One-Variety Cotton Law in the 
mid-1920s.  Camp’s biography and observations have been published in two large works.  
First, Camp granted a series of interviews with the University of California-Berkeley’s 
Bancroft Library Regional Oral History Office, which published a lengthy transcript in 1971 
titled Cotton, Irrigation, and the AAA.  Later William Briggs and Henry Cauthen compiled a 
biography, The Cotton Man: Notes on the Life and Times of Wofford B. (“Bill”) Camp 
(1983).  Like Turner’s White Gold, both works are essential in understanding the timeline of 
developments and first-hand observations of a key player in California cotton farming, but 
both lack any analysis or connections to other parts of the Cotton West, other than those 
offered directly by Camp himself in his comments.29 
The most recent and most comprehensive examination of the California cotton industry 
is Mark Stemen’s environmental history of the plant, “Genetic Dreams.”  Stemen examines 
some of the same areas that this dissertation will consider—particularly the development of 
new cotton varieties bred specifically for California at the behest of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  However, he looks at a similar set of facts through a slightly different lens: the 
interactions between the land and the people.  Stemen reaches a similar conclusion as I will 
suggest—the federal government played a critical role in establishing a cotton economy, 
much as it has in other aspects of the American West such as reclamation water projects.  
Stemen also considers the role of irrigation, in part for its social impacts and in part for its 
presence—or lack thereof—as a genetic consideration in breeding cotton varieties.30 
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“Genetic Dreams” does much to explain the importance of the cotton plant to 
California and, to a lesser extent, to the very early Arizona industry and how it evolved into 
the state’s major agribusiness of the 1950s.  To be completely comprehensive, it would 
require an examination of labor matters, mechanization, and a deeper look at irrigation 
issues.  Further, Stemen does not take the next step to link all of these issues to the common 
and parallel developments— frequently along similar lines—as what was taking place in 
Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas, and western Oklahoma.  My dissertation will build on 
his significant work for California and expand similar arguments, plus others, into a 
consideration of the whole Cotton West and how it relates to the historiography of the 
American West.31 
While the western cotton industry itself has seen limited study, many other key subject 
areas in the American West have been examined.  In many of these studies, cotton is only a 
background player in the assessment or argument being presented.  These studies, however, 
provide key linkages in connecting a study of the Cotton West with the general research of 
the American West. 
One of these topical areas is technological history.  My 1996 master’s thesis, “Working 
in the Cotton Fields of the South Plains, 1910-1990,” a material-culture study of cotton 
farming implements of West Texas, is a rare assemblage of the history and evolution of 
cotton farming in a region based on its machinery.  Through a detailed technological 
overview of cotton farming, one can gain insight into the mechanization of the Cotton West.  
The type of implements and scale of farming seen on the South Plains are very similar to that 
found in other areas of the Cotton West.  Another regional technological history is Farmers, 
Workers and Machines (1965), which examines technology developments and their social 
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impacts in the Arizona citrus, lettuce, and cotton industries.  The authors examine several 
aspects of labor types, needs, and machinery to assess the impact of technological change. 
This policy study, published at the end of the Bracero Program-era, suggests how technology 
and immediate issues of farm labor should be shaped in the immediate future.  The value of 
this study in researching the Cotton West is understanding the impact and ripple effects of 
mechanization in the industry and to its workers.  A near-contemporary technological history 
focuses on the mechanization of the entire American cotton industry.  In The New 
Revolution in the Cotton Economy (1957), James Street uses the cotton industry as an 
example of the overall process of mechanization of any industry. His observations, however, 
prove useful in balancing the technical and economic designs of mechanization with labor 
issues and economies of scale that are common throughout the Cotton West.32 
Many farm labor studies allude to the cotton industry.  Only a few focus specifically on 
it, and most of those relate to union efforts in California.33  One of the best is Devra Weber’s 
                                                 
32
 Cameron Lee Saffell, “Working in the Cotton Fields of the South Plains, 1900-1990” (Master’s thesis, 
Texas Tech University, 1996); Harland Padfield and William E. Martin, Farmers, Workers and Machines: 
Technological and Social Change in Farm Industries of Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965), 
iv-viii, 1; James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy: Mechanization and Its Consequences 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957).  Another thesis on technological matters is Moses S. 
Musoke, “Technical Change in Cotton Production in the United States, 1925-60” (Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 1976). 
33
 Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State (Philadelphia, Pa.: 
Temple University Press, 1982); several articles in J. C. Foster, ed., American Labor in the Southwest: The First 
One Hundred Years (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982); Philip G. Olson, “Agricultural Laborers: A 
Study of a Minority Group in a Small Arizona Community” (Master’s thesis, University of Arizona, 1956); 
Geta LeSeur, Not All Okies Are White: The Lives of Black Cotton Pickers in Arizona (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2000); Cletus E. Daniel, Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers, 1870-1941 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981); Ernesto Galarza, Farm Workers and Agri-Business in California, 
1947-1960 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Edwin Charles Pendleton, “History of 
Labor in Arizona Irrigated Agriculture” (Ph.D. diss, University of California, Berkeley, 1950); Herbert B. 
Peterson, “A Twentieth Century Journey to Cíbola: Tragedy of the Bracero in Maricopa County, Arizona, 1917-
21” (Master’s thesis, Arizona State University, 1975).  Several recent, critically acclaimed books help frame the 
discussion of cotton labor; both are tangential to this study, as they both deal mainly with farming in the Texas 
Blackland Prairie region, the outer edge of the Cotton South.  They are Rebecca Sharpless, Fertile Ground, 
Narrow Choices; Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Richard Steven Street, Beasts of the Field: A Narrative 
History of California Farmworkers (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004); Emilio Zamora, The 
World of the Mexican Worker in Texas (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993); Harry Schwartz, 
Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States: With Special Reference to Hired Workers in Fruit and Vegetable and 
Sugar-Beet Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Juan L. Gonzales Jr., Mexican and 
 19 
Dark Sweat, White Gold (1994), a comprehensive examination of the relationships between 
cotton growers, processors, investors, laborers, unions, and government officials in the 
formative period from 1919 to 1939 just prior to the start of contract labor programs like the 
Bracero program.34  One of the most recognized is Carey McWilliams Factories in the Field 
(1939), a frequently republished account by a newspaper writer recounting efforts to unionize 
Mexican cotton pickers in the Central Valley.35  McWilliams subsequently went on to write 
several more books and numerous articles about Mexican immigrants, Braceros, and migrant 
labor in the Southwest.  These monographs, coupled with general studies of Mexican labor 
and repatriation efforts of the early 1930s, such as Francisco Balderrama’s and Raymond 
Rodríguez’s Decade of Betrayal (1995), are important in establishing the labor needs, 
market, and workers of the Cotton West from the establishment of production to the Great 
Depression period.36 
The economic crisis of the 1930s and the shift from Mexican to American migrant 
labor marks a common, major change in the labor supply for the Cotton West.  In 1995 
historian Marsha Weisiger published Land of Plenty, a study of displaced Oklahoma 
farmers—so-called “Okies”—who migrated to and harvested cotton in Arizona during the 
Great Depression.  She concludes that socioeconomic class, rather than race, was key to the 
exploitation of agricultural workers and that the Arizona cotton industry played a major role 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mexican American Farm Workers: The California Agricultural Industry (New York: Praeger, 1985); and 
Wayne D. Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, USDA Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics Agriculture Monograph No. 13 (1951).  Among those rare exceptions of cotton labor examinations 
are Ruth Alice Allen, “The Labor of Women in the Production of Cotton”, University of Texas Bulletin No. 
3134 (Austin: University of Texas, 1931; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1975); and Charles E. Gibbons and 
Clara B. Armentrout, Child Labor Among Cotton Growers of Texas: A Study of Children Living in Rural 
Communities in Six Counties in Texas (New York: National Child Labor Committee, 1925). 
34
 Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
35
 Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Boston, 
Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1939; latest reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
36
  Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).  Other books of a similar vein include Mark 
Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940 (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976); Padfield and Martin, Farmers, Workers and Machines; Camille Guerin-
Gonzales, Mexican Workers and American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 
1900-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994); and David Montejano, Anglos and 
Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987). 
 20 
in enticing Oklahomans westward.  Weisiger builds her study in part on the earlier work of 
James Gregory in American Exodus (1989), which critically examines the Dust Bowl 
migration and transference of Okie culture to California.  Taken together, along with New 
Deal and other contemporary labor studies of the period, like Paul Taylor’s On the Ground in 
the Thirties, these works help frame the discussion and common labor issues of the Cotton 
West in the 1930s in the post-Mexican repatriation period.37 
The “gathering clouds of war” marks yet another shift in the labor issues for western 
cotton producers in the late 1930s.  Surprisingly, while a great deal has been written about 
the disappearance of rural labor to urban factories and the subsequent emergence of the 
Bracero Program—which was at first tied to the Emergency Farm Labor Program during 
World War II—few historians or researchers have explored the relationship of Braceros and 
cotton production.  Outside of the Anglo migrant experience, the continuity of labor needs 
and use in the Cotton West has yet to be examined in great detail or placed in a greater 
context.38 
Water issues in the American West have been widely studied, but, on this subject in 
particular, the presence or role of cotton farming is rarely brought out.  Historian Donald 
Pisani has done the most extensive work, with a focus on the developments leading to and 
ramifications of the federal Reclamation Act of 1906.  It is featured in his trilogy 
monographs—To Reclaim a Divided West (1992), Water, Land, and Law in the West (1997), 
and Water and the Government (2002)—as well as in numerous articles like “Reclamation 
and Social Engineering the Progressive Era” and his first book, From the Family Farm to 
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Agribusiness (1984).39  Through these works, Pisani has charted the evolution of public 
policy, irrigation, and large water projects in the West.  Other writers like Marc Reisner 
(Cadillac Desert, 1986) and Donald Worster (Rivers of Empire, 1985) profile the critical 
place of water, its management, and its conservation in the social development of the 
American West.40  None of these books give any insight into the Cotton West per se, but 
provide the evolutionary backdrop against which many of the developments of the Cotton 
West occurred.  Without the shifts in American public policy and the examination of issues 
of water management, no cotton farming could effectively take place in much of the Cotton 
West. 
While most of the water issue pertains to federal reclamation policy or developments, 
some areas had similar problems through a different source—underground aquifers.  For 
example, Donald Green discusses in Land of the Underground Rain (1973) how the 
development of irrigation sources is key to the settlement of the Texas High Plains and 
surrounding areas and its implementation of a farming economy.41 
As with the spotty patchwork of cotton history narratives, all these topical areas fail to 
relate much detail with regard to the cotton industry or place their issues and concerns into a 
greater agricultural context.  Rather than simply retelling or expanding on any one of these, 
this dissertation seeks to assemble a comprehensive view of the establishment and evolution 
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of farming in the Cotton West, using many of the same secondary sources and incorporating 
additional information from first-hand accounts, extension publications, and government 
reports. 
A very important source of primary information is the bulletins and reports of the state 
agricultural experiment stations.  Each state system played an influential role in the 
development of cotton farming in its regions.  For example, the Texas Agricultural 
Experiment Station (TAES) was instrumental in developing nearly every facet of cotton 
farming on the High Plains and in West Texas—from the development of storm-proof cotton 
varieties to the stripper harvester and several planter mechanisms (including the shallow-
furrow planter).42  Their bulletins include excellent descriptions of equipment, variety, and 
planting tests and the relevant findings.  Similarly, the Arizona Agricultural Experiment 
Station did extensive work developing cotton varieties that grew very well in the different 
arid, irrigated farm areas around Phoenix, Tucson, Yuma, and Southeastern Arizona. 
Similarly important was the research work of the federal experiment stations.  Federal 
scientists at several Texas posts helped select the initial outgrowths of the Mexican Acala 
cotton that became a genetic basis for much of the western cotton industry.  The federal 
station at Shafter, California, was for many years responsible by state law for producing and 
improving the officially certified Acala variety for the Central Valley under California’s one-
variety laws.  Federal scientists frequently reported their research results were frequently 
reported in USDA bulletins, circulars, and special publications of the Bureau of Plant 
Industry and other USDA agencies.  Federal researchers from other agencies also explored 
mechanization, economic, and labor issues, which increased substantially during the New 
Deal period.  Taken as a whole, these state and federal agricultural publications, the station 
farms, and their demonstration work were undoubtedly valuable to ascertaining and 
spreading knowledge among farmers as the western cotton culture developed. 
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Earlier I discussed the published recollections of scientist-farmer Wofford Camp.  His 
name is one among the many government researchers who were principal players in 
developing the Cotton West.  A small group of these men are each responsible for publishing 
a few dozen extension bulletins, circulars, or articles which, as a body, constitute a major 
resource for this study.  One of the first and probably most important of these men was O. F. 
Cook of the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry.  Originating his career in the late 1880s and 
coming up through the USDA Bureau of Entomology, Cook first became involved with 
cotton research while seeking plants resistant to the boll weevil, including his early 1900s 
trips to Guatemala and southern Mexico.  By the 1910s he was one of Plant Industry’s 
prolific proponents of western cotton breeding and production, including the advocating of 
one-variety communities throughout the cotton belt—West and South.  A 1950 bibliography 
indicates that Cook published well over one hundred times on matters relating to cotton, 
making him one of the “front men” in federal efforts to establish a western cotton industry.43 
One of Cook’s key partners was Thomas Kearney, a Bureau of Plant Industry 
researcher working in Arizona.  Kearney was the first scientist performing cotton 
experiments there in the early 1900s.  His initial successes helped convince the USDA to 
expand the effort and led to the extensive federal involvement in establishing an Arizona 
cotton industry.  Kearney’s background was in alkali soils and drought resistant plants, the 
subject area in which Kearney first began collecting long-staple cotton varieties from Egypt 
in 1902.  Like Cook, Kearney became a frequent author of agricultural bulletins and circulars 
on the development of cotton varieties in Arizona.44 
The work of Cook, Kearney, their colleagues in the Bureau of Plant Industry, and other 
federal researchers like Wofford Camp was critical—even groundbreaking—in their 
scientific breeding work.  Their presence was most noticeable in California and Arizona, but 
their methods and their breeding material had far reaching impacts on scientists in state 
experimental stations nationwide.  Though several dozen men published in the Cotton West 
in the first half of the twentieth century, a handful of them were particularly important and 
prolific, as Cook and Kearney were at the federal level.  E. D. Tetreau of the University of 
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Arizona Agricultural Experiment Station did extensive research on labor issues and 
requirements for cotton and other irrigated crops during the critical 1930s period when 
migratory labor patterns shifted so much.45  Don L. Jones, superintendent of the TAES’s 
Lubbock substation from 1925 to 1957, was a leading researcher on cotton variety 
development and responsible for helping establish West Texas’ stormproof varieties and later 
versions adapted to stripper harvesters.  Jones authored or co-wrote over forty articles on 
these subjects.  Jones worked frequently with Texas A&M professor and TAES researcher H. 
P. Smith, whose research focused on mechanizing cotton production and harvesting.  His 
book Farm Machinery and Equipment was likely the authoritative book on the subject, 
judging by its being published in five editions.46  As will be shown, regional partners such as 
Tetreau, Jones, and Smith played as important a role as the federal scientists in developing 
and improving the Cotton West.47 
This Study 
This dissertation fills a large void in the history of the American cotton industry and 
contributes to interpretations of several topical areas of western history.  To this point no one 
has assembled a comprehensive monograph on the introduction and spread of cotton farming 
in the American West.  There have only been, as noted above, sporadic regional accounts that 
do not link to each other or the larger history of the industry.  Further, many of the subject-
based histories of the West fail to seek or establish connections between one area and 
another.  As will be seen in this study, some of these are necessarily dependent links.  
Without development of cotton breeding, for example, no farms need manual laborers.  Or if 
there were no cotton farming efforts some of the West’s irrigation projects would have been 
failures. 
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In the subsequent chapters of this study, the reader will discern a couple of basic 
premises behind understanding the Cotton West.  At the heart of this is, regardless of where 
one was in the West, most cotton producers dealt with the same sets of common problems— 
having water to irrigate fields, planting a particular variety of cotton, creating economies of 
scale and mechanization, and finding laborers to work in those fields, particularly prior to the 
development of the mechanical harvester.  This study demonstrates that western farmers 
broached these problems and found solutions—often ones that were common or similar from 
one region of the Cotton West to another. 
Ultimately all these developments occurring concurrently in the West contrast to what 
was going on in the traditional Cotton South.  Faced with his own problems and stuck in 
longtime patterns of farming culture, one does not see more uniformity in the experiences of 
an American, rather than a Southern or Western, cotton farmer until after World War II. 
In addition, this study will repeatedly point to the significant role played by federal and 
state researchers in the evolutionary development of the Cotton West.  Their motivations and 
suggestions largely influenced the course that farmers followed, whether it is in establishing 
a one-variety community for the Central Valley of California or the significant base of 
Mexican Acala cotton in the genetic makeup of varieties in every state.  Further, as many 
historians have already demonstrated in showing the federal role in reclamation projects and 
western irrigation, the federal influence is just as strong and significant in cotton farming.  In 
similar fashion, one can point to parallel interpretations in the existing literature of other 
western fields within the development of the Cotton West. 
This dissertation will be presented largely in topical fashion.  It begins with a profile of 
how the cotton growing areas of the West first developed and became irrigated.  Then, 
building from the plant itself and the evolution of many cotton varieties used across the 
Cotton West, subsequent chapters will add layers examining cotton mechanization, cultural 
practices, and labor.  By the time the reader reaches the concluding chapter, a complete 
picture of the history of the Cotton West will be assembled, whereupon one can offer some 
final comparisons to the history of the Cotton South and the connections to the 
historiography of the Cotton West.
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CHAPTER II   
SETTLEMENT AND IRRIGATION OF THE COTTON WEST 
In the last chapter, I briefly defined the Cotton West as being made up of four major 
production regions: West Texas; the irrigated river areas of Southern California, Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Far West Texas; the San Joaquin Valley of Central California; and the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley.  These are the generalized production regions, larger groupings 
that the cotton industry has used.  Each larger region contains several smaller, more specific 
sub-regions.  This chapter will delve deeper into these sub-regions, briefly outlining the 
historical settlement and evolution of irrigated cotton farming and providing the context for 
discussions in subsequent chapters. 
A 1930 USDA bulletin generally described the characteristics of the Southwest farm 
regions.  The population was sparse and spread out.  Annual rainfall was low.  Overall, only 
a small percentage of land could be tilled and irrigated, but that which could tended to be 
very fertile.  While most of the Southwest could be called arid or semi-arid, the climatic 
conditions at any one place varied widely.  Annual rainfall ranged from three inches in the 
Imperial Valley of Southern California to seven inches in the Salt River Valley near Phoenix, 
with summer temperatures that could reach above 110oF.  The mountainous parts of Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Far West Texas with their long, winding river valleys tended to be more 
moderate, with precipitation between ten and twenty inches a year, but sometimes had 
shorter growing seasons due to the elevation.  In West Texas the precipitation levels 
increased above twenty inches a year, but the temperature extremes through the year ranged 
from subzero to above 100oF, with only the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas having a 
reliable twelve-month growing season.  In short, summer temperatures were high and the 
crop-growing season was generally long, but in these arid lands farmers had to irrigate.1 
Irrigation was not new to the Greater American Southwest.  USDA scientists noted that 
the Pueblo Indians and Spanish colonists had long recognized the value of water to nourish 
crops and constructed systems to bring water to their fields.  The arrival of federal water 
projects after about 1899, however, quickly transformed irrigation practices and reclaimed 
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significant expanses of desert lands for farming.  “The most striking advantages of irrigation 
agriculture are to be expected in the Southwest because of the climatic conditions that enable 
crops to be grown through the whole 12 months of the year,” said cotton scientist O. F. Cook 
in 1913.  Commenting on the first decade of reclamation work in the Southwest, Cook noted 
that “Irrigation facilities have been provided largely with a view to other crops that have been 
considered more profitable than cotton.  The present indications are that cotton will be 
recognized eventually as the chief agricultural resource of many enterprises” because cotton 
was a more dependable source of income compared to the speculative nature of specialty 
truck or fruit crops.  Cook added that the dry southwestern climate “affords protection 
against the boll weevil and many other insect enemies and diseases that often reduce or 
destroy the cotton crop in the East.”  The drier late fall and winter weather during harvest 
time also left cotton to be gathered and marketed in better condition as compared to southern 
cotton farms.  By 1928 USDA officials proclaimed that “cotton is now one of the leading 
irrigated crops of the United States and is responsible for the present prosperity of many 
farmers in the irrigated sections of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas” (fig. 4).2 
Figure 4.  USDA Map of Irrigated Cotton-Growing Areas of the Southwest in the 1920s 
Source:  Marr and Hemphill, Irrigation of Cotton, 2. 
Note:  This map does not include those areas of West Texas just starting to use underground water for irrigation 
and dryland farmers of western Texas and Oklahoma that are part of the Cotton West. 
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West Texas and Oklahoma 
A 1913 USDA Bureau of Plant Industry observed that “So new is the agriculture of the 
great Southwest, including western Oklahoma and Texas, that the amount of reliable data on 
the best agricultural practices for this region is relatively small.”  Its Field Instructions for 
Farmers’ Cooperative Demonstration Work further described the target audience as those 
farmers in areas where annual rainfall was thirty inches or less: “As we go west conservation 
of moisture becomes of more and more importance.  Whenever we reach a territory where 
the conservation of moisture becomes the primary object of farm practices we may say that 
we have reached a semiarid section.”3 
This general publication also described the eastern edge of this semiarid territory.  
Author Bradford Knapp said the boundary in Oklahoma was west of the 98th meridian, 
running through Oklahoma City.  From there it cut south to near Wichita Falls and thence 
toward Austin.  While Knapp described their line as generally the thirty-inch rainfall line, he 
cited examples from across the region that most of the area had rainfall of just above twenty 
inches.  This varied greatly from year to year, he noted, with some areas averaging closer to 
fifteen inches and dry years of as little as ten inches.  Knapp noted, “All of these facts have a 
very important bearing on the kind of farming to be undertaken, the character of the crops to 
be grown, and especially upon the farm practices to be pursued.”4 
Against this backdrop, federal and state extension agencies began setting up field 
research stations across western Oklahoma, the Texas High Plains and South Plains, and the 
Rolling Plains off the Caprock of Northwest Texas and Southwestern Oklahoma (fig. 5).  The 
USDA Division of Dry Land Agriculture established a station at Lawton, Oklahoma, in 1915.  
Located near the eastern edge of the Rolling Plains, station officials suggested that Lawton 
was representative of a fairly large area of southwestern Oklahoma and northern Texas.  “No 
other extensive area in the Great Plains is directly comparable or similar to that in which the 
Lawton station is located.”  The average annual precipitation of thirty-one inches was more 
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Figure 5.  Map of the High Plains, Rolling Plains, and Texas South Plains 
Source:  Compiled by the author. 
irregular than sub-humid areas further east, thus sharing characteristics more common to the 
semiarid areas to the west.5 
This region soon became a small but important cotton-producing area; farmers became 
dependent on the annual crop for much of their income.  “Although cotton production is 
widely distributed over central, southeastern, southern, and western Oklahoma, a group of 13 
counties in the southwestern part of the State produced an average of approximately 43 per 
cent of the total State crop from 1916 to 1930.”  In cooperation with the Oklahoma 
Agricultural Experiment Station, the Lawton Field Station conducted continuous cotton field 
tests for two decades.  Their researchers examined every aspect of production, from varieties 
planted and planting dates to spacing tests and crop rotation patterns.  They also noted that in 
only one year was the cotton crop damaged seriously by insects—grasshoppers in 1924—
though there were occasional occurrences of the cotton-leaf worm, the bollworm, and 
webworm.  As farming practices and knowledge improved, the region began to take on many 
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of the characteristics of its neighbors further west on the Texas South Plains.  This eventually 
included the use of sled harvesters in the 1920s and the use of stripper-varieties of cotton, 
which I will discuss in greater detail in later chapters.  Thus in the end, southwestern 
Oklahoma and the immediately neighboring areas of North Texas fell into the general 
practices and classifications of the greater West Texas/High Plains region of cotton farming.6 
The High Plains of Texas was the last region of the state to be permanently settled by 
Anglo Americans.  After the U.S. cavalry defeated the last American Indian bands in the 
region in the mid-1870s, the Texas Legislature created the final fifty-four counties of the 
state on the northwest frontier, which included all of the South Plains, and offered public 
lands for sale or lease.  The coming of the railroad to the South Plains after 1907 opened the 
region to major development.  Although large expanses had been part of cattle ranches, the 
railroads brought new settlers to the region responding to advertising, boosterism, and cheap 
land.  By the 1910s farmers replaced ranchers as the major agricultural producers.  Most 
early farms practiced subsistence farming, but after some experimenting farmers focused on 
cotton as their major cash crop.7 
The first cotton experiments in the region began in the 1880s on the Spur Ranch, on the 
Rolling Plains of Texas.  Successful growers were unable to market their cotton locally, 
however, and had to haul it by wagon to the Dallas area to sell it.  Thus, cotton farming did 
not become more widespread until local transportation improved and a local market 
developed.  As more farmers reached the region, they realized cotton’s potential in the area 
as a cash crop.  Many farmers came from the cotton regions of the South or East Texas and 
were eager to see cotton do well on the South Plains.  Observers described average yields of 
the early crops as “very satisfactory,” and farmers showed interest in experimenting with 
different seed varieties.8 
The Texas Agricultural Experiment Station opened two substations in the region in 
1909.  Substation Number 7 at Spur examined farming issues for the Rolling Plains, while 
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Substation Number 8 at Lubbock did the same for the South Plains.  Both stations 
immediately started extensive reviews in their first five years of forty-six cotton varieties, as 
well as began tracking issues surrounding the growing season and the shortage of water.  The 
growing season between the first and last freeze was barely long enough to permit most 
cotton varieties to fully develop.  Thus, any problem that postponed planting or required 
replanting might mean that the crop did not reach full maturity.  Scientists and settlers also 
found that the annual rainfall, ranging from almost twenty inches in the Rolling Plains of 
Texas to about twelve in Eastern New Mexico, was less than what they were used to.  
Irrigating from underground with windmills was not practical, so most farmers simply 
learned to best utilize moisture when it was available.  Fortunately, most of the rainfall came 
between April and June, the best time to give cotton seedlings a good start before the hot 
summer months ensued.9 
Before 1920 early speculators and farmers experimented with pump irrigation on the 
High Plains.  High expense and inexperience with irrigation techniques and early internal-
combustion engines hindered any early acceptance of the concept.  Further, a variety of 
factors combined to make pump irrigation economically unfavorable for a number of years.10 
West Texas and southwestern Oklahoma were well suited for power machinery and 
large implements.  Land was fertile and farm plots were relatively large, both factors 
conducive to large-scale farming.  Being settled relatively recently, the region was not mired 
in long established customs.  Instead, it fostered the “progressive nature of a pioneering type 
of farmer,” one who was young and very interested in laborsaving mechanical devices.  Farm 
organizations and business methods to sell tractors and power equipment were new in the 
area, whereas they had to be reinvented in other established areas of the country.11  Farmers 
were interested in tractors and tractor-drawn equipment in the late 1920s and 1930s, though 
not all could afford it.  While the Great Depression slowed the transition from horse-drawn to 
mechanized equipment, the situation eased and the shift to tractors quickly took place by 
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World War II.  Once able to obtain these new technologies, farmers applied them to larger 
farms and increased overall production.12 
To complete the transition from subsistence to commercial farming, producers had to 
employ large-volume pumps capable of lifting water from deep wells sunk into the Ogallala 
Aquifer hundreds of feet below.  The drought associated with the Dust Bowl, along with new 
developments in irrigation technology, combined to make irrigation more favorable to 
producers.  The number of wells on the Texas High Plains blossomed from only 170 in 1930 
to over 2,100 ten years later.  In the 1940s and early 1950s, irrigation expanded outward from 
the old “shallow-water” area to encompass much of the region.  By 1948 over 7,500 farmers 
irrigated 1.4 million acres of cotton, wheat, and grain-sorghum crop fields.  As with many 
other residents of the West, most High Plains producers thought of their underground aquifer 
as a never-ending source of water.13 
The development of large-scale irrigation began to seriously deplete these underground 
oases.  By World War II the increasing problems of High Plains and Winter Garden region 
(along the Lower Rio Grande Valley) producers encouraged state administrators to believe 
that additional administrative controls of groundwater were needed.  A groundswell of 
concern brought legislative proposals to the forefront in 1947.14 
Many irrigation interests in West Texas opposed any state control or regulation of 
groundwater.  Some feared that new regulations would favor industries and municipalities.  
Others saw no need for controls on underground water, citing a recent rise in the water table 
in some areas.  High Plains farmers and businessmen began lobbying against any such 
legislation.  If regulation were absolutely necessary, the group supported vesting authority in 
a local entity rather than in some state water agency.  The strong opposition was enough to 
help defeat the proposed legislation in 1947, but the controversy continued.15 
Concerned that “certain industrial and conservation groups” were preparing new 
groundwater control legislation for the 1949 session, High Plains irrigators began work on a 
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countermeasure.  They crafted a measure calling for organization of groundwater districts to 
promote conservation, provide information to farmers, and prevent water waste.  The districts 
would issue permits for new wells in order to regulate the placement of wells and the size of 
well pumps.  They could also have authority to regulate the pumping of groundwater if the 
supply reached a critical level.16 
Not everyone in the state agreed with this approach.  The Texas Water Conservation 
Association advocated a bill that would do away with the concept of private ownership of 
groundwater, issuing well permits through the state engineer’s office and prioritizing 
groundwater for municipalities and manufacturers over groundwater for irrigators.  Just 
before the legislature convened, West Texans and the Texas Water Conservation Association 
met and negotiated a compromise, manifested in the subsequently adopted Texas 
Underground Water Law (1949).  Through this legislation, the state implemented a 
groundwater policy that did not require its direct supervision and included most of the 
provisions desired by West Texas agricultural producers.17 
Following the procedures outlined in the Underground Water Law, farmers from West 
Texas formed one of the state’s first underground water conservation districts.  Covering all 
of the Ogallala Aquifer south of the Canadian River—which included the entire South Plains 
cotton production area—the High Plains Underground Water Conservation District 
(HPUWCD) quickly established itself as a significant player in West Texas water use and 
development.  The organization pursued legal actions on behalf of farmers with the federal 
Internal Revenue Service to establish its groundwater as a depletable natural resource, similar 
to mining, eligible for federal income tax deductions.  The HPUWCD also called attention to 
the fact that farmers were rapidly lowering underground water levels.  Through educational 
campaigns and institution of water-conservation farming techniques and irrigation 
equipment, the HPUWCD worked to slow and even reverse the drop in the Ogallala Aquifer.  
Some of their innovations included the introduction of center-pivot irrigation systems, to 
limit the amount of water routed through open ditches to where it was needed, and the 
subsequent conversion of those systems from open air sprinklers to low-pressure drop lines 
that deposit water directly between the rows.  The HPUWCD also introduced innovations in 
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row-crop equipment to create small dams to retain water in rows, called furrow diking.  
These changes have materially affected the way many farmers approached and practiced 
cotton farming in the region, and the water-conservation work of the HPUWCD continues 
today.18 
The development of irrigation and large-scale farming in the West Texas region 
between 1930 and 1950 quickly raised the region to the forefront of national cotton 
production.  According to a review of census figures, western Texas and Oklahoma 
producers more than quadrupled their output and reached similar figures as the Mississippi 
River Valley in annual production.  Several individual counties from West Texas became 
regular fixtures on the top one hundred cotton-producing counties in the United States 
starting in the 1944 census, a trend that has continued to the present.19 
New Mexico and Far West Texas 
Moving across the Cotton West, the next production regions encountered are in New 
Mexico and Far West Texas.  As shown in figure 6, the largest areas of irrigated farming 
occur in the Pecos Valley, from Roswell, New Mexico, to near Fort Stockton, Texas, and in 
the Rio Grande Valley, largely on the lands of the Rio Grande Reclamation Project, in the 
Mesilla and Rincon valleys of New Mexico and the El Paso Valley of Texas.  Small areas of 
irrigated farming also became established near Deming, New Mexico; Balmorhea, Texas; 
and along the Rio Grande near Presidio, Texas. 
The Mesilla Valley of southern New Mexico includes an area of 123,500 acres, varying 
in width from one-half to five miles.  Although American Indians and Spanish colonists 
traveled through the region along the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro, no one established 
permanent settlements until the mid-nineteenth century.  The residents of several small towns 
had small irrigation systems based on Spanish acequias, but with the extension of railroads 
through the valley in 1881 came more settlers and increased demand for water for irrigation.  
A small private irrigation system began about 1908; the Reclamation Bureau subsequently 
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Figure 6.  Principal Cotton Growing Areas of New Mexico and Far West Texas 
Source:  Excerpted from map in Anderson, Clayton & Co., California Acala ([1941]). 
took it over as part of one of its first projects in the country.  The completion of the Elephant 
Butte Dam (fig. 6) in 1916 established control over the Rio Grande, eliminating periodic 
floods, and making agriculture a stable and profitable venture.20 
Shortly after its creation in 1904, the new federal Reclamation Service drafted the 
objectives for the Rio Grande Project.  The efforts to form a private irrigation district in New 
Mexico Territory in the 1890s caused much discord with neighboring Texas and Mexico, 
both of which pressed their water-right claims to the Rio Grande.  The Reclamation Service 
recommended the building of Elephant Butte Dam about seventy miles north of Las Cruces 
to create a reservoir to provide irrigation water for the Mesilla, El Paso, and Juarez valleys.  
The United States guaranteed Mexican water claims in the Juarez Valley by treaty in 1906.  
Farmers on the American side formed water users associations in the 1910s to meet 
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requirements of the federal Reclamation Act for water deliveries.  The Elephant Butte 
Irrigation District included farmers in New Mexico, while the El Paso County Water 
Improvement District No. 1 coordinated irrigation for El Paso Valley farmers in Texas.21 
In the heart of the Mesilla Valley lies the city of Las Cruces.  Today at the southern 
edge of the town is New Mexico State University and the related railroad siding and 
community of Mesilla Park.  In the early 1900s the New Mexico College of Agriculture and 
Mechanic Arts was three miles south of Las Cruces, referred to geographically as simply 
State College, New Mexico. 
Being the home of the land-grant college opened in 1889, State College was also the 
home for the bulk of the staff and research work of the New Mexico Agricultural Experiment 
Station (NMAES).  Scientists there included cotton among their tested crops at State College 
as early as 1891.  They did little in-depth research, though, until the mid-1910s.  Up to that 
point the only successful cotton-growing areas of New Mexico had been in the Carlsbad area 
along the Pecos Valley.22 
In 1916 station officials decided to begin comprehensive trails and testing at State 
College, as well as with some local cooperators in the Roswell area, north of Carlsbad.  
Researchers determined that the climate and soil of the Pecos and Mesilla valleys are very 
similar, despite some difference in elevation.  This early work by the NMAES established a 
pattern for cotton testing and development employed for several decades—the central, major 
experiments at State College with a separate set of tests near Roswell to customize the 
Mesilla Valley results for Pecos Valley producers.23 
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Much of the development of cotton farming knowledge for these areas came from New 
Mexico scientists.  The Texans, however, established an agricultural experiment substation at 
Pecos during their research expansion in 1909-10.  The Pecos station’s purpose was to 
investigate varieties of several field crops.  In one of their first major reports, researchers 
reported that cotton was one of the most successful crops tested at the Pecos Substation.  
“The late spring in no way favors the crop, but it seems peculiarly suited to the extreme heat 
of the summer,” they reported.  They also noted that the large amount of work and irrigation 
needed to raise cotton paid off in the end.24 
As cotton growing and research began in earnest in the 1910s, some USDA officials 
expressed concern about fields in the Rio Grande Valley—specifically the possibilities of a 
similar cotton culture emerging across the river in Mexico, where regulations were much 
more lax.  Government officials thought that Mexican farmers might plant cotton infested 
with the pink bollworm in the Juarez Valley, thus creating a bridge of sorts to infest 
American fields that could then spread both west and east to other cotton-growing sections of 
the United States.  This would have been similar to how the boll weevil spread northward 
from Mexico near Brownsville, Texas, and subsequently moved across the Cotton South.  
“The [U.S.] Department of Agriculture feels justified in discouraging cotton growing in the 
Rio Grande Valley.  It is believed that farmers in that region, realizing the risk not only to 
themselves but to the entire cotton industry of the country, will not make an effort to develop 
a cotton industry there.”  Even if it was made with some frequency, the suggestion fell on 
deaf ears.  No doubt the relative proximity of the New Mexico A&M College and its 
extensive cotton tests gave plenty of reasons why Rio Grande Valley farmers thought they 
could make a go of cotton farming in this area in the long run.25 
The impact of the Rio Grande Reclamation Project on agriculture in the region cannot 
be understated.  Cotton fields occupied only 0.4 percent of the total crop acreage in 1919, 
shortly after completion of the Elephant Butte Dam.  By 1927 it had expanded to 59 percent.  
Geographer Edwin Foscue noted that the rapid rise of cotton acreage caused “more 
                                                 
24
 J. W. Jackson, Progress Report, Substation No. 9, Pecos, Texas, Texas AES Bulletin No. 221 (1917), 
7-11. 
25
 “Making the Southwest Safe for Cotton,” Reclamation Record 8(11) (November 1917): 517-18.  The 
article’s subheading elaborated: “Some precautions which may be urged in dealing with a booming industry.” 
 38 
conservative farmers” to fear that the Mesilla Valley would evolve into a one-crop area.  
Farmers saw cotton as a more stable source of income as compared to other possible crops.  
A 1928 study reported that cotton averaged $29 profit per acre, but there was some risk 
involved; the costs of production were almost twelve cents per pound of ginned cotton at a 
time when market prices fluctuated between ten and twenty-five cents per pound.26 
Geographer Bärbel Schönfeld LaMar conducted an in-depth assessment of the changes 
in landownership and water development and use in the Mesilla Valley in her 1984 
dissertation.  Shortly after the railroad arrived, an influx of Anglo-American settlers came to 
the area, purchasing Hispanic community grant properties with rights to the local irrigation 
system or homesteading available public lands.  The latter were frequently complete quarter-
sections of land (160 acres) that were too large to be cleared, leveled, and irrigated by one 
family, at least until word of the pending Rio Grande Reclamation Project began to spread in 
1905.  “The mere prospect of improved water supply conditions attracted new people and 
stimulated land transactions.”  At that point in time, Schönfeld LaMar states that virtually all 
Mesilla Valley farmers were generally subsistent, growing small amounts of alfalfa, wheat, 
or corn for sale or barter.  With the completion of Elephant Butte Dam and improved canal 
delivery systems, farmers shifted from fields of alfalfa to cotton.27 
Schönfeld LaMar separates the relative newcomers from the longer established 
landowners.  Newcomers, being more financially strapped because of their investment in 
high-priced land, were more determined to plant cotton, often plowing up existing alfalfa, 
orchards, or vineyards.  The longtime local farmers usually owned their property outright and 
had more long-term investments like orchards, dairies, and vineyards.  Thus they were slower 
to make the transition to cotton farming.  Nonetheless, Schönfeld LaMar’s research indicates 
that by 1930 almost 90 percent of Mesilla Valley farmers grew at least some cotton and over 
75 percent derived most of their income from cotton.  Cotton was both a blessing and a curse.  
While it was a good cash crop that covered the high production costs, it also encouraged the 
emergence of a monocrop farm culture that was susceptible to dramatic fluctuations in 
market prices.  This instability resulted in cotton acreage shrinking to 51 percent of the total 
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cultivated lands in 1935.  The federal cotton acreage control programs during the New Deal 
became a lasting influence on how much land was planted to cotton in any given year.28 
By World War II the cotton-producing areas of New Mexico had become fairly 
stabilized.  Of the approximate 133,000 acres of cotton in the state, about 54,000 acres were 
in the Pecos Valley and fifty-nine thousand were in the Rio Grande Valley.  Although New 
Mexico cotton acreage expanded to over 200,000 acres in the 1950s, even with the additional 
acreage in the Pecos and El Paso/Rio Grande valleys in Texas, the production of the New 
Mexico/Far West Texas region was relatively small compared to the rest of the Cotton West.  
The region has proven to be far more influential for its development of the Acala 1517 cotton 
variety (see more in Chapter Three).29 
Arizona 
Cotton growing in present-day Arizona goes back the farthest of any of the regions of 
the Cotton West.  Archaeological evidence suggests that several pre-Columbian American 
Indian cultures—the Hakataya, Mogollon, Anasazi, and Hohokam—all raised a type of Old 
World cotton called Gossypium hirsutum.  The Hohokam Indians were the largest producers, 
having settled in the Salt and Gila river valleys about 300 B.C.  Archaeological evidence 
shows they were raising cotton by A.D. 500 with small dams and canals, followed by larger 
irrigation canal systems around A.D. 800.  Spanish explorers in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries noted cultivated cotton plants in numerous Arizona river valleys; Spanish Jesuit 
missionaries first noted production in Pima Indian villages, as did later Anglo visitors in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Pima cotton raising declined sharply after Arizona became part of 
the United States and virtually ended by 1900.30 
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Experiments with modern cotton production began during Arizona’s territorial period.  
Settlers test-planted several varieties of cotton brought from the southeastern U.S. in the 
1860s and 1870s in the Salt River Valley.  Mormon colonists from Utah also produced cotton 
in their new settlements in the Salt and Upper Gila regions, following official church decrees.  
Significant production, however, was not feasible because there was no way to export the 
crop to outside markets.  Thus there was no commercial cotton farming until the completion 
of the Salt River Reclamation Project and the introduction of long-staple cotton varieties 
about 1910.31 
Figure 7.  Principal Cotton Growing Areas of Arizona and California 
Source:  Excerpted from map in Anderson, Clayton & Co., California Acala ([1941]). 
The most significant cotton farming areas in twentieth century Arizona (fig. 7) are the 
Salt River Valley in Maricopa County south of Phoenix, portions of the Gila River in the 
Tucson area, and the lower Gila River where it empties into the Colorado River at the 
southwestern corner of the state.  The latter is discussed below in conjunction with the 
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Imperial Valley and Southern California.  According to 1930 census figures, only 0.8 percent 
of the land area of Arizona was irrigated.  This represented about 575,000 acres, with an 
estimated potential addition of about 250,000 acres.  Of these amounts, 87 percent of the 
irrigated areas were along the Gila River (or its tributaries) and 10 percent came directly 
from the Colorado River.  Farmers were raising cotton on 204,000 acres, representing about 
1 percent of the total U.S. crop, but contributing 40 percent of the state’s agricultural 
income.32 
Geographer Erik-Anders Shapiro suggested in his 1989 thesis that Arizona producers 
became locked into a system that “almost demands” the growing of cotton.  Since it 
generated the most cash, producers raised cotton to recapture the costs of reclamation 
projects and to generate capital to pay rent and borrowed loans.  Shapiro believed that this 
was not necessarily planned.  “Reclamation often proceeds independently and cotton gets 
planted as a necessary consequence.”  He identified several factors that influenced the spread 
of cotton farming.  These included the depth to available groundwater (for areas outside of 
active reclamation projects), the distance to market (usually by railroad), and climate and 
elevation.  Groundwater pumping became a small, but significant, addition to the major 
cotton growing areas of Arizona, such as in Pinal County (described below in the discussion 
of the Casa Grande Valley and the San Carlos Project).33 
The core area of the Salt River Valley lies in central Arizona, an area about fifty miles 
long and twenty miles wide that encompasses much of the modern Phoenix metropolitan 
area.  Before the extensive urbanization of the area, the Salt River Valley included more than 
200,000 acres of lands irrigated through the reclamation project.  Average rainfall of just 
over seven inches a year falls during a short period in the summer and another in the winter.34 
Researchers suggested the “modern development” of the valley began with the 
construction of the Swilling Ditch in 1867, which became a development model for about a 
dozen other canals in the 1870s and 1880s.  The early associations behind each project were 
more cooperative than communal, often preempting the doctrine of prior appropriation (“first 
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in time, first in right”) and eventually leading in the 1890s to many lawsuits about water 
rights of Salt River Valley residents.  Meanwhile, much of the irrigation infrastructure was 
more temporary than engineered, often resulting in washouts and destruction during annual 
floods.  Some organization came about when several of the canal systems on the north side of 
the Salt River incorporated as the Arizona Water Company in 1898, which eventually passed 
to the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association after the reclamation project began.35 
Members of Arizona’s congressional delegation and Salt River Valley residents 
lobbied Congress extensively during the debates that led to the passage of the Reclamation 
Act in 1902.  The newly formed Reclamation Service quickly identified the Salt River as an 
early project for their new mission.  It labeled the articles of incorporation of the Salt River 
Valley Water Users’ Association, completed in early 1903, as a model for other reclamation 
projects to follow.  The Secretary of the Interior authorized the Salt River Project later that 
year, as well as the construction of Roosevelt Dam to hold irrigation water for project users.  
In 1910 builders completed the dam, the first large-scale irrigation engineering project for the 
Reclamation Service.  With the accompanying hydroelectric development, farming expanded 
by several thousands of acres—both within the project boundaries and outside it, where 
cheap electricity powered underground water pumping for surface irrigation.36 
The Pima Indians had practiced irrigation in the Casa Grande Valley south of Phoenix 
along the Gila River in prehistoric times.  When they arrived, Anglo settlers began irrigating 
in modern canal systems, not unlike the developments of the Salt River Valley.  However, in 
the 1890s the water supply became inadequate for the growing populace of residents.  This 
led to the sinking of wells to pump irrigation water for area farms.  Farmers formed electrical 
districts to obtain cheaper power for their pumping efforts.  The farms, however, were little 
more than subsistent until the construction of Coolidge Dam by the federal government in 
1929 as part of the San Carlos Project.  Built as much to support Indian reservations as white 
settlers, the San Carlos Project brought a total of 100,000 acres of desert land into the 
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irrigation system—split evenly between Indians and non-Indians.  Only about 65 to 70 
percent of the land, however, was actually irrigated due to lack of available water.  Farmers 
outside the San Carlos Project remained dependent on groundwater to irrigate their crops.37 
The first federal research facility in the area was the United States Field Station at 
Sacaton, Arizona, in 1907.  The station began as a cooperative venture between the federal 
Office of Indian Affairs and the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry.  Its main function was to 
study agricultural problems of the Southwest, giving particular attention to crops that might 
be of value to the Pima Indians of the nearby Gila River Reservation.  While testing a broad 
range of crops, the Sacaton Field Station also assisted with questions or problems of 
agriculture in neighboring valleys.  This included the early Pima cotton industry in the Salt 
River Valley.  As I will discuss in the next chapter, early cotton testing at Sacaton yielded the 
Pima variety of cotton in the early 1910s. 
Sacaton Field Station also maintained a separate farm for the purpose of providing pure 
seed of crop plants developed there for distribution to Indians on the reservation and, in 
lesser amounts, to local growers and seed dealers for multiplication for other Arizona 
farmers.  This became particularly important after the completion of the Coolidge Dam, 
which transformed Indian agriculture.  Sacaton researchers conducted extensive testing of 
Pima, new upland Acala varieties, and the older American-Egyptian varieties as central 
Arizona producers shifted from raising only one type of cotton to growing all three.  
Scientists also identified and began testing on several diseases and insects that could harm 
cotton, including a native-Arizona weevil similar to the Mexican boll weevil that had ravaged 
the Cotton South in the first three decades of the century.38 
The University of Arizona is the designated land-grant school for the state.  Its 
scientists collaborated with USDA facilities for cotton research and testing through the 
Arizona Agricultural Experiment Station (AAES).  The state operated experiment farms in 
the Salt River Valley, the Yuma Valley, and the “home base” in Tucson, as well as 
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cooperative farms in Greenlee and Maricopa counties.  Based on the state’s publications, the 
AAES seemed mostly content to follow Sacaton Field Station’s lead and focused much of 
their program on crop practices and variety tests for each specific locale up to about World 
War II.  After that and the closure of the Sacaton Field Station, Arizona researchers shifted 
their attention to labor and mechanization issues in cotton farming.  I will examine several of 
those issues in subsequent chapters.39 
By the 1950s non-Indian farmers were growing cotton on nearly every farm in Pinal 
County.  Not including reservation farmland, the average farm size was about four hundred 
acres, and farms exceeding one thousand acres not uncommon.  Statewide production peaked 
at around 400,000 acres.  Arizona cotton production declined steadily after that until it 
bottomed out in 1967.  Long able to avoid most insect infestations based on strict state and 
federal quarantine policies, the pink bollworm escaped and surged across the state in 1965, 
helping to bring cotton production to a virtual standstill.  The modern Arizona cotton 
industry, rebuilt in large part by the popularity of fine, long-staple Pima cotton, as promoted 
by the SuPima Association of America, has produced cotton at the same consistent amounts 
since World War II.40 
Western Arizona and Southern California 
The Yuma Valley of Arizona, along the Colorado River, and the Imperial Valley of 
California, on an expanse of Colorado River delta (fig. 7), share much of a common climate 
and history.  Even though they often appeared separately in state and federal research project 
reports, the two valleys are linked from the earliest experiments with long-staple cotton.  In 
one of the first comprehensive reports on Egyptian cotton and the prospects for growing it in 
the United States in 1908, researchers Thomas Kearney and William Peterson compared 
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traditional Egyptian cotton-growing regions to the Southwest.  They determined that 
Egyptian cotton varieties were best adapted for irrigated farming in areas where there is 
practically no rainfall during the growing season.  After analyzing the Southwest for these 
similar conditions, they concluded “that the greatest success with Egyptian cotton is to be 
expected in southern Arizona and southeastern California.”  They also noted that it was more 
desirable to introduce a distinctive cotton as compared to that grown in the traditional 
southern cotton belt.  Thus, in conjunction with the Office of Western Agricultural Extension 
Investigations, the USDA began its first cotton experiments in the Yuma and Imperial valleys 
about 1902.41 
The natural conditions in this area of the country are very rugged.  Average rainfall was 
less than four inches annually, an amount that one report labeled as “not a factor in crop 
production.”  Summer temperatures regularly peaked above 110oF, and the winters were 
mild.  The growing season between the last and first killing frosts of winter averaged over 
259 days.  In its favor, though, the area was free of any cotton pests.  Protecting this was a 
particular concern of USDA officials.  In the early experimental period, researchers said that 
“Planters in the region are urged to consider the question carefully before committing 
themselves to growing Upland varieties [from the Cotton South]….  The introduction of the 
cotton boll weevil would be ruinous to the industry at the very outset.”42 
The settlement and development of irrigation in the Yuma and Imperial valleys is a 
fascinating contrast in methodology and evolution.  The Yuma Valley is relatively small, 
approximately 55,000 acres bounded on the north and west by the Colorado River and on the 
east by a bench terrace referred to locally as the “Yuma Mesa,” all lying between the 
community of Yuma, Arizona, and the Mexican border.  Prior to the arrival of Anglo settlers 
in the valley, American Indians customarily planted melons, squash, beans, and corn in 
certain areas following the annual spring floods.  Between 1886 and 1907 new settlers and 
several private irrigation companies began constructing ditches to convey water from the 
banks of the Colorado River to their nearby fields.  These efforts were of mixed success 
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because of the lack of a dam to control water elevation in the river, the silty character of the 
soil, and problems maintaining the ditches.43 
With the passage of the National Reclamation Act in 1902, federal officials began 
examining conditions in the Yuma Valley concurrent to their analysis of the Salt River 
Valley.  The Secretary of the Interior created the Yuma Project in 1904; the next year the 
Reclamation Service began constructing the Laguna Dam.  The Reclamation Service also 
purchased the existing pumping plants and canals, which they operated through 1912 when 
gravity-flow water became available to Arizona farmers from the Laguna Dam.  Whereas 
before no more than 2,500 acres of farmland were under irrigation, the completed Yuma 
Project immediately supplied water to more than 27,000 acres.  Engineers thought it could be 
expanded to as much as 130,000 acres, including land in California outside the Yuma 
Valley.44 
Several miles across the Colorado River from Yuma lies the Imperial Valley of 
California, a portion of the river delta about thirty miles wide and forty-five miles long that 
extends south into Mexico.  Technically a desert because of the low annual rainfall, the 
Imperial Valley had very good alluvial soil capable of supporting agriculture, provided 
someone could supply irrigation water.  Campaigns to raise financing for an Imperial Valley 
irrigation canal from the Colorado River date back as far as the 1850s, but it was mostly talk 
until a couple of companies formed in the 1890s to undertake the effort.  About 1900 
promoters began selling water certificates to settlers who filed homestead claims.  With this 
funding, the California Development Company (CDC) constructed the first main canal artery 
in 1901.  It ran for several miles parallel to the Colorado River, crossed over into Mexico, 
then came back up a dry riverbed formerly known as the Alamo River.  By 1906 settlers had 
transformed over 130,000 acres of valley land into fields of crops.45 
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The irrigation canal was not without its problems.  The silt-laden Colorado River began 
building up sediment in the canals and slowed the flow from the intake canal.  When the river 
level dropped in 1904, the CDC had to suspend water deliveries several times.  Instead of 
dredging the main canal, company officials ordered a cutoff be built from the river to bypass 
the clogged section of canal.  With the winter floods later that year, Mother Nature 
intervened.  The Colorado River shifted its course and began running back through the cutoff 
and the canal system, flooding much of the Imperial Valley and creating the Salton Sea at the 
low north end of the valley.  The CDC mounted several efforts to dam the river and restore it 
to its normal course.  It took until February 1907 before their efforts were successful.  The 
costs were great—$1.6 million dollars to redivert the river and at least that much in lawsuit 
awards against the CDC.  The flood proved beneficial in one aspect, however.  Before, 
irrigation water had nowhere to drain out, so salinity levels were rising in farm fields.  The 
flood flow widened and deepened shallow stream channels, which farmers used to create 
drainage outlets for their fields.  Thus, the salinity of the soil began to fall as the salty water 
gathered in the Salton Sea.46 
In the wake of the Salton Sea disaster, federal officials stepped in to provide as much 
assistance as they could, encouraging further colonization and investment in the Imperial 
Valley.  Farmers organized their own Imperial Irrigation District and took over the assets of 
the California Development Company, putting control of their farms in their hands without 
the influence of speculators and water developers.  The Reclamation Service came in and 
agreed to build a new canal entirely on the U.S. side of the border—the All-American 
Canal—to serve the new irrigation district.  In the end, like other parts of the American West, 
the Imperial Valley had a publicly owned and operated irrigation system—though a local one 
instead of a federal project.47 
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Against the backdrop of the settlement and irrigation development of the Yuma and 
Imperial valleys, USDA officials began their cotton experiments.  Research scientists had a 
significant presence in the Yuma Valley from the beginning.  Arizona Territory had a small 
experiment station and worked with area farmers for a couple of years prior to 1902, the year 
of the first cooperative testing by the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry.  A short time later the 
USDA opened its first Yuma Field Station on the Arizona side near Somerton in conjunction 
with the Reclamation Service.  With the opening of Yuma Reclamation Project lands on the 
California side in 1910, the USDA relocated to a 160-acre tract adjacent to Bard in the 
northeastern portion of the Yuma Valley.  Researchers variously referred to this facility as 
the Yuma Reclamation Project Experiment Farm or the United States Yuma Field Station.  
Although it investigated many kinds of irrigated crops, much of the Yuma Fields Station’s 
work was on varieties, irrigation, and production practices for cotton farmers.  It was here 
that researchers developed the short-lived Yuma variety of long-staple cotton, which is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.48 
Station researchers published an almost annual series of “Work of the Yuma 
Reclamation Project Experiment Farm” reports in the 1910s and early 1920s.  Cotton was a 
featured part of every report.  “There is needed in the Yuma Valley a crop that will bring in a 
large cash return per acre and that can be grown in rotation with alfalfa,” wrote the 
Committee on Southwestern Cotton Culture in 1913.  It strongly encouraged farmers to 
consider adding cotton to their fields, and farmers took to the suggestion.  By 1920 they had 
69 percent of their cultivated acreage in cotton.  Despite encouragement to focus on only one 
variety, Yuma Valley farmers planted a mix of Upland, American-Egyptian, and Pima 
varieties of cotton.49 
When the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry began cotton-growing experiments in 1902, 
they were mostly cooperative ventures with local farmers or at small research facilities in the 
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Yuma Valley and Calexico (in the Imperial Valley).  The CDC also operated its own 
experimental farm at Calexico and co-sponsored many of the early farmers’ institutes in the 
valley.  San Diego County established a horticultural district for the Imperial Valley in 1905 
(taken over by the newly formed Imperial County in 1907), and the University of California 
established an experimental farm in Meloland.  The USDA opted not to open its own 
separate research facility for the Imperial Valley, instead relying on the results from the 
Yuma Field Station to answer the questions of both valleys.50 
An additional small river valley in Southern California is worth brief mention here.  
The Coachella Valley lies north of the Salton Sea in Riverside County, some seventy-five 
miles or so northeast of the Imperial Valley.  The area has similar climatic conditions as the 
Imperial Valley, with desert conditions, hot summers, and lands that generally are below sea 
level.  Farmers in the Coachella Valley pumped their irrigation water from wells rather than 
from gravity surface flows through canals.  The USDA conducted experiments here between 
1908 and about 1910, but farmers’ initial enthusiasm for cotton growing waned with low 
prices and problems marketing their crop.  A second wave of commercial production began 
about 1918, again influenced by developments by the USDA at its Experiment Date Garden 
near Indio.  Valley farmers quickly embraced the new Acala cotton in 1920 and formed a 
one-variety community association, a group dedicated to raising solely Acala variety cotton.  
This group coalesced with a county one-variety ordinance in 1924, which became a first step 
towards a statewide one-variety law the next year.  These developments will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Three.  This situation becomes a curious point of comparison with 
the nearby Imperial Valley, where the lack of conformity on a single variety became the basis 
for its exclusion in the new state law.  According to a 1927 bulletin, the Acala variety raised 
in the Coachella Valley in the early 1920s from the field work at the United States 
Experiment Date Garden was the seed stock subsequently used to develop the Acala cotton 
varieties raised throughout the rest of the Southwest with the exception of the San Joaquin 
Valley.  Although the Coachella Valley is less mentioned in the development of cotton 
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farming in the West, particularly as compared to the nearby Yuma, Imperial, and San Joaquin 
valleys, it does occupy an interesting and noteworthy place in its history.51 
In the long run cotton did not last in the Imperial Valley.  With the region self-
exempting itself from California’s one-variety law, the lack of local cooperation from 
farmers led to a quick decline in cotton quality.  Insect infestations also were a major 
concern.  The boll weevil and the pink bollworm were both common pests in Mexico.  With 
the Imperial Valley topographically extending into Mexico, it became difficult to quarantine 
infestations from Mexican fields or keep the pests from blowing in on a strong storm.  
Tenancy was also higher in the Imperial Valley than in other farm areas of the Southwest, a 
factor that USDA officials believed discouraged building a long-term commitment toward 
cotton production.  Many farmers shifted from cotton to alfalfa or winter vegetables and 
fruits.  With almost frost-free winters, Imperial Valley farmers could usually count on being 
the first to market their truck crops nationally.  By 1926 lettuce acreage exceeded that of 
cotton in the Imperial Valley, and the decline continued for several more years.  Meanwhile, 
cotton farming continued its progressive development in the river valleys of Arizona and 
central California.52 
San Joaquin Valley 
The Central Valley of California is three hundred miles long and forty miles wide.  The 
northern portion around the Sacramento River is the Sacramento Valley.  The longer 
southern section, crossing six counties, is the San Joaquin Valley (figs. 7 & 8).  Several rivers 
traverse the valley, including the Kern, Kaweah, Kings, Merced, and San Joaquin rivers.  The 
climate of the region includes dry, hot summers and limited rainfall, most of which occurs 
between harvesting and planting times.  Average annual precipitation varies from six to 
eleven inches through the valley.  While the rivers carry heavy drainage flows from the 
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Sierra Nevada range, they flow through a desert land.  Thus, irrigation is essential to farming 
in the San Joaquin Valley.53 
 
Figure 8.  Principal Cotton-Producing Areas of the San Joaquin Valley in 1930 
Source:  Beckett and Dunshee, Water Requirements of Cotton, 5. 
Some of the earliest Anglo cotton production in California occurred in the San Joaquin 
Valley.  Newspaper accounts and census figures indicate that farmers raised small amounts 
of cotton in the mid-1800s.  While state and local officials were optimistic that a cotton 
industry could be successfully developed, cotton cultivation came to a virtual end by the 
1880s because of the continual shortage of labor to harvest the crop, no local market to 
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consume it, the lack of knowledge and experience in raising it, and competition from other 
crops that were more profitable.54 
With the expansion of the Southern Pacific Railroad through the valley in 1874, a 
period of canal building by new settlers ensued.  Conflicts over water rights during the 
drought of 1877-78 brought riparian owners and appropriators to state court, climaxing in the 
famous Lux v. Haggin decision (1886), involving water rights for the two largest landowners 
in the San Joaquin Valley.  The California legislature enacted the Wright Act (1877) to allow 
local landowners to organize irrigation districts.  By 1893 there were fifty districts, but only 
twelve survived to 1910; most failed because construction and maintenance costs for 
irrigation systems far exceeded what farm income could support.55 
The more successful option for most irrigators in the late nineteenth century was 
pumping underground water.  The state’s irrigated land increased by more than 500 percent 
during the 1880s, mostly in the San Joaquin Valley and in Southern California.  The 
increases slowed for a period while technology to pump larger and deeper wells caught up.  It 
was not until these improvements with electric and gasoline engines became more 
widespread and the introduction of cotton in the valley in the 1920s that cotton farming 
began to take off.  By then one-third to one-half of all valley irrigation came from 
underground sources.  Statewide, the amount of land irrigated from underground increased 
from 32,539 to 299,841 acres; most of the increase came from land in the San Joaquin 
Valley.  Pumping became so prevalent that state officials became concerned about declining 
water tables.56 
Water shortages between 1917 and 1924 sparked a new period of irrigation 
development in California, as a half-dozen major reservoir projects began.  Irrigation districts 
made a comeback.  By 1926 they included 3.6 million acres of land, over twice the acreage 
of all the federal reclamation projects and small-sized farms throughout the entire American 
West.  This was also the period for the state’s first comprehensive water plan proposal, the 
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Marshall Plan of 1919.  A geographer and amateur naturalist, Robert Marshall proposed a 
massive vision for storage reservoirs and canals stretching throughout the Central Valley.  If 
enacted, the Marshall Plan would have reclaimed twelve million acres for agriculture and 
reduced irrigation costs from as high as $15 an acre to less than a dollar.  Although it never 
was put into motion, the Marshall Plan foreshadowed future state water plans and eventually 
the Central Valley Project of the 1930s, which had broad ramifications on San Joaquin 
Valley agriculture.57 
As developed and put to state voters in 1933, the Central Valley Project and State 
Water Plan called for building a system to divert San Joaquin River flows to the south (up 
valley), replacing those waters with a canal flow from the Sacramento River.  Federal 
officials joined the efforts by authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to help fund and build 
the project.  Small farmers advocated continuing the restriction of a 160-acre maximum to be 
irrigated under the terms of the 1902 Reclamation Act, while large landowners lobbied to do 
away with the requirement.  In the 1940s nearly half the irrigable land in Madera, Tulare, and 
Kern counties was owned by less than three percent of all landowners, yet they contained 
more than half of the total cotton acreage in California.  On the other side of the valley, it 
was unusual for a cotton producer to have less than 640 acres of land.  The restriction was 
not overturned; instead, the Bureau of Reclamation required irrigation users to divest 
themselves of “surplus” acreage, but enforcement was lax except on the largest of farm 
operations.  This controversy aside, small cotton farmers in the San Joaquin Valley had a 
sure source of inexpensive water for their fields, while larger operations benefited indirectly 
as the increased water supply of the Central Valley Project ensured a steady underground 
water supply for their pump irrigating.58 
Historian Mark Stemen suggests that the USDA provided the initiative for San Joaquin 
Valley farmers to try cotton farming again.  Experiments with cooperative farmers took place 
near Bakersfield as early as 1909.  The University of California also began conducting 
variety trails at their facilities in Kearney and Glendale.  Trials expanded with the arrival of 
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USDA researcher Wofford Camp in 1916-17 on four acres of land donated to the government 
in Bakersfield and a number of test plots for Egyptian cotton throughout the region.  
Although he was officially attached to the USDA facility at Bard (in the Yuma Valley), 
Camp spent most of his time in the late 1910s in the San Joaquin Valley trying to establish a 
cotton farming industry.  His efforts paid off; by 1920 over 21,000 acres of fields were in 
cotton.  To help gin cotton samples, the USDA and the University of California split the costs 
to erect a gin at the Kearney Station that year.59 
In 1919 Camp hedged his bets and began planting small plots of the new Acala 8 
variety.  The crash of the Egyptian long-staple cotton market and the success of the early 
Acala plantings led to a quick shift in interest.  The continuing support among farmers led the 
USDA to work out a deal to establish a San Joaquin Valley experiment station for cotton 
work.  In 1922 the U.S. Cotton Research Field Station at Shafter opened.  It quickly went to 
work expanding the research and development of the Acala variety.  For the next fifty-five 
years, the Shafter Station would be the most significant player in the California cotton 
industry and the home of the state’s official Acala cotton variety.  The development of 
California Acala and the role of Shafter Station will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Three.60 
Cotton became California’s biggest crop commodity in 1947.  The state’s largest cotton 
producer, Russell Giffen, operated three “ranches” covering a total of 86,000 acres—an area 
about 44 percent larger than the entire Yuma Reclamation Project.  The introduction of the 
mechanical harvester marked the end for small farmers in the valley.  Producers needed 
between one and two hundred acres of cotton to harvest annually to make the large financial 
investment cost effective.  As in West Texas several counties in the San Joaquin Valley 
began taking regular positions in the top one hundred cotton-producing counties in the 
United States after World War II.  With large farms and mechanization, the San Joaquin 
Valley surged to become the second or third largest production region in the country, 
approximately tied with West Texas behind the Mississippi River Valley of the Cotton South.  
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Driven by strong growth in the late 1960s and 1970s in the San Joaquin Valley, the Cotton 
West exceeded cotton production in the South for the final three decades of the twentieth 
century.61 
Lower Rio Grande Valley 
Statistically the smallest of the Cotton West production areas, the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley of Texas shares many of the characteristics of western instead of southern cotton 
agriculture.  Cotton farming occurred in the extreme southern end of the valley for many 
years on a small scale.  Here, near Brownsville, the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil crossed the 
border about 1892 and began its destructive spread across the southern cotton belt.  Once the 
boll weevil arrived, cotton production in the valley suffered for a great period of time until 
new weevil-resistant varieties became available.62 
As far back as the earliest Spanish explorations into the area, settlers in the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley knew that irrigation was absolutely necessary for successful farming. An early 
USDA report noted that rainfall is “extremely varied and uncertain”; the maximum annual 
rainfall was over sixty inches, the minimum just under nine inches, and the mean average 
about twenty-eight inches.  Spanish and Mexican residents had small ditches and acequias, 
but it was not until the 1890s that irrigation companies began building larger canal systems.  
Railroads expanding into the valley mounted some ventures, but large-scale land developers 
initiated later ones, trying to capitalize on increased settlement after 1900.  Since the Rio 
Grande was an international boundary, any reservoir project had to be approved in advance 
by treaty between the United States and Mexico.  Though several inquiries took place, it was 
not until 1944 that the countries worked out such an agreement, which in part called for the 
construction of the Falcon Dam, completed in 1953.63 
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Upstream north of Laredo lies the Winter Garden district.  Known chiefly for its 
production of vegetable and truck crops (and the associated use of Mexican field laborers for 
harvesting), there are small patches of cotton grown as part of the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
region, particularly in Frio County.  As alluded to earlier in the discussion of underground 
water use on the High Plains, the Winter Garden district was the other area of Texas that 
heavily utilized artesian wells and underground pumping for its agriculture.64 
The Texas Agricultural Experiment Station did not open a research facility for the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley until 1923.  The Weslaco Experiment Station’s primary purpose 
was to research citrus fruit production, but it extended its mission to include research on the 
adaptability and culture of other crops, including cotton.65 
The number of farms in the Lower Rio Grande Valley tripled between 1900 and 1930.  
Irrigated farmland acreage increased from 50,000 to over 536,000 acres between 1900 and 
1950.  With its close proximity to the border, one might expect that Lower Rio Grande 
Valley farmers might have been among the last to convert from hand to mechanical 
harvesting because of the availability of cheap Mexican laborers.  Instead, it was among the 
quickest areas to convert to use of mechanical cotton pickers in the early 1950s.  Through the 
use of irrigation production and advanced mechanization, the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
continues today to be very advanced in its cotton agriculture and a significant part of the 
Texas cotton industry and that of the Cotton West.66 
Summary 
The unifying theme of this chapter is the farmer’s struggle for water to irrigate his 
cotton fields.  In some places, he redirected surface waters; in others, he pumped water from 
below the surface.  Federal, state, and sometimes local agencies organized water projects to 
aid and support cotton farming.  The laws and concerns differed widely from one region to 
another.  Whatever the specific concern, the water problem was and is a universal concern of 
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everyone in the Cotton West.  In contrast, the entire Cotton South regularly gets much more 
rainfall and very rarely has to delve into the realm of irrigation. 
Another point of contrast between the West and the South based largely on geography 
is the lack of cotton pests.  The scourge of the South—the Mexican boll weevil—spread 
eastward from Texas to the Carolinas between 1892 and the 1920s.  The lack of natural pests 
and diseases was a major factor favoring the introduction and spread of cotton in the West.  
While the West eventually had its own cotton problems—with pink bollworm or verticillium 
wilt—their emergence several decades later permitted cotton agriculture to become firmly 
established in the West. 
With the West identified as an ideal place to expand American cotton production, the 
discussion of the evolutionary development of cotton varieties, labor to cultivate and harvest 
the crop, and progressive mechanization of production will establish a complete picture of 
the introduction and spread of cotton farming in the production regions of the Cotton West. 
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CHAPTER III   
COMMON ROOTS 
The beginning of the twentieth century marked a critical period of development for the 
American cotton industry.  Farmers, scientists, and government officials saw in the fertile 
plains and river valleys of the West numerous opportunities to introduce cotton agriculture 
and expand this vital economic resource.  Cotton mills in the eastern United States had 
increasing needs for all types of cotton, particularly the long-staple Egyptian cotton.  At the 
same time, the quick spread of the boll weevil from Mexico into southern Texas and thence 
eastward threatened the rural economies that depended on cotton agriculture. 
Responding to opportunity and crisis, scientists and an expanding system of 
experiment stations began intensive research on cotton varieties.  Their introduction or 
“discovery” of either foreign or “new” varieties became the common roots of many modern 
cotton varieties planted in the United States today.  As this chapter will show, many of the 
western Upland cotton varieties during the period of this study are all related to each other 
because of the common and shared work of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
state researchers.  Some of the same individuals are responsible for the developments in what 
becomes Pima long-staple cottons, but in a much smaller area geographically.  For both types 
of cotton, these men’s opinions about one-variety communities also influenced the legal and 
distribution structure of the industry, particularly in California and Arizona.  Thus, the 
underlying story behind the varieties themselves is the role and power of the USDA and local 
researchers, within a state or region, in establishing the agricultural communities of the 
Cotton West.1 
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Making More Cotton Fields 
The economic importance and impact of agriculture was a prime consideration of 
politicians and the leadership of the U.S. Department of Agriculture as the twentieth century 
began.  The annual reports of the Secretary of Agriculture in the 1890s and early 1900s make 
this clear.  James Wilson discussed this at some length in his 1904 report under the heading 
“Agriculture as a Source of National Wealth.”  Producing an aggregate wealth of almost $5 
billion in 1904, a healthy “farming element of the people” offset an industrial depression and 
saved the country from “severer conditions that must otherwise have befallen.”  Wilson’s 
report also discussed the importance of agriculture in foreign trade, farm capital, and the 
financial health of the banking system. All of the reports for this period describe the 
extensive research and efforts to protect and expand agriculture in all forms. 2 
The initial emphasis was on production of long-staple cotton varieties, particularly 
Egyptian types.  Manufacturers considered long-staple cotton the most desirable because its 
longer fiber lengths were easier to spin into thread and were much stronger than shorter 
staple lengths.  At the dawn of the twentieth century, much of the world’s long-staple cotton 
came from Egypt, with lesser amounts coming from the American southeast coast (Sea Island 
varieties) and a small area of the Mississippi River valley region (long-staple Upland 
varieties).  Egyptian cotton was becoming damaged by disease and cross-contamination in 
breeding.  In addition, rising world tensions that ultimately would lead to World War I 
threatened to limit or cut off the supply of true Egyptian cotton.  The spread of the Mexican 
boll weevil across the South all but wiped out many cotton-producing areas for several years, 
including those that grew the long-staple Upland varieties.  Thus, the federal government 
wanted to promote new areas of cultivation of long-staple cotton.3 
Establishing a Domestic Long-Staple Cotton Industry in the West 
Prior to 1861 American Sea Island cotton, grown almost entirely along the East Coast 
from the Carolinas to Florida, was one of the nation’s most exported products, with much of 
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it going to English textile mills.  But with the onset of the American Civil War, Great Britain 
helped Egypt establish and expand its cotton production to fill the void left by the blockade 
of Confederate cotton.  Egypt quickly became recognized for producing a long-staple cotton 
with high qualities of fineness and strength.4 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the newly formed U.S. Department of Agriculture 
examined this new, high quality Egyptian cotton to help restore a war-torn South.  In 1867 
and 1871 the USDA conducted more than fifty trials in every cotton-growing state from 
North Carolina to Texas but found the Egyptian cotton needed a longer growing season than 
that found in the American South.  Over twenty years passed before the USDA tried again to 
procure seeds for experiment stations and private growers.  Again, the results were 
discouraging and the attempts abandoned.5 
In the meantime, imports of Egyptian cotton steadily grew.  By 1907 the United States 
was averaging 54 million pounds a year with a market value of over $16 million.  With such 
a strong demand and value not being met by American producers, the USDA renewed its 
efforts to “develop Egyptian cotton culture in the United States in order to supply our own 
market with a home-grown product.”6 
The USDA ordered new tests between 1898 and 1902 through the newly organized 
Office of Foreign Seed and Plant Introduction.  Results from humid South Carolina and 
Texas tests again proved less than encouraging.  Another batch of seeds sent to the American 
Southwest showed much greater promise, especially near the Pecos and Rio Grande rivers in 
New Mexico and Texas and along the Colorado River valley, whose long, dry summers, 
irrigation, and deep alluvial soils most closely mimicked Egypt.  In 1903 the USDA decided 
to concentrate its Egyptian tests at its new experiment station at Yuma, Arizona.7 
As discussed in Chapter Two, southern California and Arizona were climatically 
similar to Egypt.  Both shared characteristics of a long, dry summer, deep alluvial soils, and 
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controlled irrigation.  Further, the region was free of the boll weevil.  Writing in 1913, USDA 
researcher O. F. Cook stated that “There is every reason to expect that long-staple cotton will 
become one of the chief products of irrigation farming in the Southwest.”  As a result, the 
USDA directed a great deal of its efforts into developing long-staple cottons for the region.8 
According to Thomas Kearney, who directed much of the research on Egyptian cotton 
in the Southwest between 1902 and 1944, “It was desired from the outset to secure a type of 
cotton … that would be distinctive” from other cotton-growing areas of the U.S.  Of the three 
Egyptian varieties initially tested in 1902—Mit Afifi, Jannovitch, and Abbasi—Abbasi was 
believed to too closely resemble Sea Island cotton, which was still being grown along the 
East Coast.  Through experiments and accidents, the Mit Afifi variety became the variety 
from which scientists drew new selections as they acclimatized and propagated the first 
American-Egyptian cottons.9 
As much as the variety itself, USDA researchers looked at every aspect of cotton 
production in the arid Southwest.  One of the major areas was the entire concept of irrigating 
cotton.  Kearney defined the “almost perfect regulation of the water supply” as the principal 
difference between the Cotton South and the new fields of the arid Southwest.  They also 
reexamined basic growing practices, including different methods of planting and cultivating 
fields.  Kearney indicated that, after a field is leveled to aid in irrigation, “no expensive field 
machinery is necessary” other than those implements typical on an average irrigated farm.10 
The improvement of Egyptian cotton proved to be a slow, drawn-out process.  It was 
not until 1908 that Kearney and his colleagues identified and isolated the first three 
American-Egyptian cotton varieties, all named for the locales where they originated.  They 
discarded Somerton quickly because it matured later and produced excessive foliage.  They 
retained Gila cotton, from a farm on the Gila Indian reservation at Sacaton, Arizona, for 
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planting by the Indians.  The Yuma variety was well favored in both field and spinning 
manufacturing tests.  For the first time in 1912, the year the Salt River Project opened its 
operations, the USDA furnished this Yuma variety seed to farmers for commercial 
production.  The early plantings in the Salt River Valley of Arizona and the Imperial Valley 
of California quickly increased to where annual production five years later was about 16,000 
bales.11 
In the meantime, the experiments continued.  In 1909 the USDA expanded its cotton 
testing facilities at Sacaton.  The next year, the chief of the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry 
established a “Committee on Southwest Cotton Culture” to coordinate efforts among several 
scientists, which included Kearney, Carl Scofield, and O. F. Cook.  During the 1910 harvest, 
staff at Sacaton identified a single plant from the year’s Yuma variety tests that was a finer 
fiber, lighter colored, and 1/8” longer in fiber length.  The seed from the plant was 
propagated and rechristened as a new variety—Pima, named for the nearby Indian tribe.  
After several years of developing a seed stock, the USDA introduced Pima as the 
replacement for Yuma in the Salt River Valley in 1918.12 
The industry managed a successful transition, in large part, because farmers there had 
organized a series of growers’ cooperatives that carefully managed local production.  More 
importantly, the start of World War I and the reduction of cotton available from Egypt caused 
market prices for long-staple cotton to rise sharply.  Between 1915 and 1917 the production 
of American-Egyptian cotton rose fifteen-fold, with the cash value of the crop increasing 
from $129,660 to over $6 million.  The new variety became so popular that, despite later 
improvements, the term “Pima” became universally known as the generic term for all extra-
long staple cotton.13 
One of the significant players in this new Pima cotton industry must be introduced 
here.  One of the byproducts of cotton was the pneumatic tire.  While the inner tube was all 
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rubber, the outer casing used a fabric harness with several layers of strong and resilient 
cotton coated with rubber to protect it from moisture and abrasion.  Paul Litchfield, the man 
who developed Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company’s pneumatic truck tire, saw great 
possibilities for its production with the emergence of World War I if it could find an 
alternative source for cotton.14 
In the 1910s the principle sources of suitable material were Egyptian cotton and 
American Sea Island cotton.  As World War I expanded, England diverted Egyptian harvests 
for its war effort.  In the meantime the boll weevil, a recent newcomer to the Carolinas 
having completed its decade-long trek across the South, threatened to bring the production of 
Sea Island cotton to an abrupt end.  Litchfield, now a vice president and factory manager for 
Goodyear, felt that the USDA’s experiments with American-Egyptian cotton in Arizona was 
the answer.15 
In late 1916 Litchfield made arrangements for Goodyear to purchase or lease about 
22,000 acres in the Salt River Valley outside of Phoenix and established the Southwest 
Cotton Company.16  Within a few months Goodyear had brought in a fleet of tractors and a 
labor force of two thousand men and a thousand mules to clear the barren desert landscape 
and transform it into a farm, complete with irrigation wells, cement-lined canals, and its first 
1,500 bale crop of long-staple cotton.  By 1921 Goodyear’s holdings had reached 38,000 
acres, about half of which was in cotton production, with its own network of twenty-four 
cotton gins and the Phoenix Cotton Oil Company mill.17 
Goodyear’s bold move spurred the Arizona cotton industry.  Arizona cotton acreage 
expanded from 6,800 acres in 1916 to 180,000 acres at its peak in 1920.  Other American tire 
companies like Firestone sent their buyers to the Salt River Valley, driving prices up and 
causing most everyone in the region to switch to cotton production.  The regional Phoenix 
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population doubled in almost a decade, causing a vast network of modern highways to be 
built to accommodate all the people and the cotton being produced.18 
The post-war depression hit in 1920.  The peak year of long-staple cotton production 
occurred just when the market bottomed out.  At the same time, cotton mills had developed 
new spinning techniques that could spin short fiber cotton into the cords and fabrics needed 
for tires.  Thus on two fronts the demand for Pima cotton suddenly plunged.  The difficult 
market caused most contract farmers to drop out of cotton production, and the Southwest 
Cotton Company reorganized its operations.  While it remained a major player in the Salt 
River Valley cotton community, the shine of American-Egyptian cotton lost its luster as new 
varieties of Upland Acala cotton emerged to a prominent new role in the Cotton West.19 
Unseen Influence of the Boll Weevil in Developing Western Cotton 
In the early twentieth century cotton was one of the largest segments of American 
agriculture, yielding approximately $600 million in 1904.  Second only to corn production, 
this figure did not include any subsequent economic impacts from buying machinery, 
fertilizer, or other farm accessories.  Thus, observers viewed the arrival of the Mexican boll 
weevil, which entered Texas in the early 1890s, as more than just “some pest;” it represented 
a vital threat to the cotton and agricultural economy.  Over about a decade the boll weevil 
quickly moved into Louisiana and the rest of the Cotton Belt, leading one entomologist to 
note that “in less than twenty years [the boll weevil went] from a most obscure species to 
undoubtedly one of the most important economically in the world.”20 
One of the first agencies to react to the boll weevil was the USDA Department of 
Entomology, which began field studies in 1894.  The researchers immediately recommended 
the establishment of a cotton-free region to block the weevil’s migration, but the State of 
Texas declined to create one.  Four years later, however, seeing the boll weevil quickly 
spreading through its largest agricultural industry, Texas created an entomology agency and 
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began its own efforts to both research and combat the boll weevil.  Though scientists learned 
more about the boll weevil, they did not halt its advance.21 
The United States Congress joined the fray in 1901.  Congressmen were displeased by 
the failures of Texas’ efforts and its refusals to enact several USDA suggestions.  They also 
saw the fast moving weevil, then starting to encroach upon Louisiana, as a growing threat to 
the national agricultural economy.  Starting in 1901 and for several years thereafter, 
Congress appropriated funding for research and development to combat the boll weevil 
threat.  By 1904 about 32 percent of the total cotton acreage was affected, with damage 
estimated at about $22 million.  The USDA, Texas, and Louisiana diverted numerous 
resources, but Congress made a specific, additional appropriation of $250,000 for the boll 
weevil emergency.22 
The USDA split the funds between the Bureaus of Entomology and Plant Industry, but 
they coordinated their plan of work in many of the same areas.  Plant Industry chief B. T. 
Galloway described several lines of work, including farm diversification, demonstration 
farms, and investigations of tropical cottons.  Much of the emphasis was on cotton breeding, 
selection, and improvement.23 
The “rediscovery” of Gregor Mendel’s research on plant genetics in the late 1890s and 
its introduction into American agricultural science was a major spark to begin research on 
plant breeding for all crops.  According to one article, “No organization played a more 
important role in the dissemination of Mendelism than the USDA.”  It was a convenient 
addition to USDA’s policy since the 1870s of increasing variation and producing stable plant 
hybrids.  USDA scientists became new followers, readily embracing and spreading breeding 
concepts proposed by Mendel.  New developments became widely available to scientists and 
state experiment station personnel through USDA schools and publications.  This expansion 
of science became a major tool in social and economic reform, and the tremendous interest in 
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breeding became the principal tool to fight the boll weevil by developing new cotton 
varieties.24 
From Common Roots 
Leading the Bureau of Plant Industry’s efforts was biologist O. F. Cook.  Originally a 
specialist in tropical plants, Cook became one of the country’s leading cotton scientists and 
advocates, starting with a 1902 research trip to Central America to search for new tropical 
plants.  Among those that he sought was cotton that grew despite the presence of the boll 
weevil.  His team hoped to find a variety that had developed a natural resistance to the pest.25 
They found an intriguing crop of Upland cotton in northern Guatemala among fields 
cultivated by the Kekchi Indians.  The field attracted attention for its combination of small 
plant size and the lack of weevil destruction, even though perennial “tree” cottons nearby 
were clearly infested.  Cook returned in 1904 to specifically research this cotton culture.26 
Cook found two key reasons for the success of the Kekchi cotton.  The first was an ant-
like insect, locally called a kelep, which stung and fed upon the boll weevils.  Sensing a 
possible aid in controlling the boll weevil, USDA authorities cabled Cook to spare no 
expense to bring several colonies for introduction in Texas.  The American press 
subsequently described the “Guatemalan ant” as the solution to “exterminate the boll 
weevil,” but Cook clearly believed this not to be the case.  The keleps could do no better, he 
wrote, than to keep the weevil population in check, as they had not eliminated the pest in the 
fields of Guatemala.27 
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The more important trait in Kekchi cotton, Cook recognized, was a result of how the 
Indians managed the crop.  The Kekchis planted peppers and cotton together, removing the 
cotton shortly after the early bolls opened so the peppers could ripen to maturity.  As a result 
of years of unconscious selection, much of the Kekchi cotton matured several days earlier 
than American Upland varieties.  Cook also discovered that, as with several Texas varieties, 
bolls that had been damaged by weevils showed some ability to, in effect, poison the larvae 
and still produce normal fiber, a process that Cook and other researchers would not 
completely understand for several more years.28 
Starting in 1905 Cook and the USDA sent Kekchi seed to Texas for acclimatization 
and evaluation.  Researchers saw the new variety as promising because it offered some 
protection against the boll weevil and was a strong and remarkable plant producing good 
fiber.  Although clearly not the solution, Kekchi cotton did become part of the new breeding 
materials that would make up the cottons of the American West.29 
Still looking to improve American cotton in general and try to alleviate the growing 
boll weevil crisis, Cook returned to Guatemala and southern Mexico in 1906 in a new 
exploration for cotton.  At one stop, near Ocosingo, Chiapas, they found a single plant 
growing wild from discarded seed that was immediately recognized as being superior not 
only to the American Upland varieties but to the Kekchi as well.  The plant grew upright, had 
large bolls with unusually long fibers, and had the same resistance to weevil punctures and 
damage.  A second trip in late 1906 by C. B. Doyle tracked this cotton to an area near Acala, 
Chiapas, an area with a climate and elevation similar to western Texas and Oklahoma.  They 
acquired a sample of cotton ginned from a local field and returned it to the U.S.30 
Over the next couple of years the newly arrived Acala variety readily acclimatized in 
USDA fields at Victoria, Kerrville, and Del Rio, Texas.  The similarity between growing 
conditions there and its origins near Acala made it immediately productive, unlike the Kekchi 
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cotton, which was only then starting to produce after several years of adaptation.  USDA 
researchers at the San Antonio experiment station were impressed by its drought resistance, 
its earliness in maturing, and its good production even in the presence of the boll weevil.  By 
the early 1910s they were sharing Acala cottonseed with other USDA breeding researchers in 
North Texas and Oklahoma.  A long list of favorable characteristics and some careful 
selections by breeders soon made the Acala variety progenies popular throughout the 
American cotton-breeding program.31 
The Acala varieties, in general, were plants of medium height growing on a strong, 
upright main stem, making them both larger and sturdier than traditionally grown Texas big-
boll varieties of cotton.  Acala bolls were apparently comparable in size, producing fibers 1 
1/8” in length with good spinning characteristics.  Like its Texas “cousins,” Acala cotton had 
a “storm-proof” character where the fiber stayed in the boll after opening but yet opened 
widely so it was easy to pick by hand.  Compared to other American Upland varieties, Acala 
was superior for its earliness, productivity, better growth in cooler weather, better ripening of 
late bolls, and a greater resistance to unfavorable conditions.  Most importantly, Acala did 
favorably against the boll weevil, both because it matured earlier than most fall infestations 
and because when attacked, it exhibited resistant characteristics, similar to those described 
earlier in Kekchi cotton.32 
By the 1920s Acala cotton was being introduced and cross-bred throughout the United 
States.  Pure Mexican Acala did not perform well in the traditional Old South cotton belt 
because its drier-climate origins and a less-than-desired level of boll weevil resistance.  
Acala, however, was bred into other Upland varieties across the South in several experiments 
over the next several decades.33 
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Keystone Selections of Acala in Oklahoma 
One of the initial development sites for Acala cotton was in Okemah, Oklahoma, where 
C. N. Nunn was in charge of a USDA farmers’ cooperative demonstration project.  In 1914 
he received a bushel of Acala cottonseed and supervised its planting on a local farm.  That 
fall USDA cotton breeders, including O. F. Cook, visited the field and made plant selections 
for development the next year.  Two key strains emerged from these selections.  The fifth 
selection, favored by Nunn because its early maturity was ideal for Oklahoma growing 
conditions, became known as Acala 5 or Nunn’s Acala.34  The other outstanding row, Acala 
8, was almost identical to the original Mexican Acala cotton.  Acala 8 had longer fruiting 
branches, somewhat larger bolls, and a little bit longer fiber than Acala 5.  The USDA 
returned the row of Acala 8 to its Clarksville, Texas, research farm for further development 
with other Acala breeding stocks, all of which a few years later became foundation stock for 
California Acala cottons, to be described below.35 
Nunn continued working with Acala 5, making it available to farmers as commercial 
seed starting in 1918.  It became very popular throughout Oklahoma, Arkansas, and parts of 
North Texas—on both sides of the dividing line between Cotton South and Cotton West.  
Nunn subsequently developed a new strain called Acala 5-37, which replaced its parent type 
about 1927.  Just before his death in 1934, Nunn developed a later strain that he called 
Nucala.  Nunn’s influential work with Acala 5, however, was not limited to his commercial 
seed business.  Breeders used Acala 5-type stocks in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Tennessee 
experiment stations in their public breeding work, while private cottonseed companies in 
Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arkansas purchased Acala 5 foundation material to establish 
commercial seed varieties for customers in those areas.36 
Nunn’s Acala, however, was not the only seed used in western Oklahoma.  The Lawton 
Field Station of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station (OAES) was the site of joint 
testing of cotton varieties by OAES and the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry.  In a description 
of sixteen years of testing at that station, W. M. Osborn reported that four varieties had been 
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the most popular.  Acala 5 and Mebane Triumph, a popular variety from the family-owned 
firm of the same name in Lockhart, Texas, were similar plants with average size bolls, 
medium earliness, and fiber (staple) length of 15/16 to 1 inch.  Rowden and Lone Star, both 
from more traditional Texas and Southern big-boll types of cotton, were later maturing with 
good fiber length but lower overall yields than Acala 5 and Mebane.  They also noted the 
recent popularity of Half and Half, a short-staple cotton that originated in Georgia.37 
Since 1914 the OAES had developed some of its own cotton breeding material.  At the 
Stillwater station, researchers selected a very early emergent plant from a field of Mebane 
Triumph that was christened Oklahoma Triumph 44 in the mid-1920s; interestingly, the 
Mebane Triumph remained more popular in the western part of the state, while the Oklahoma 
Triumph replaced it in the eastern part.  In 1924 the Stillwater station designated an earlier 
maturing type of Acala 5 as Acala 44, which apparently did not reach commercial status but 
may have been used in further breeding tests.  Meanwhile, breeders named another selection 
from Acala 5 made at the Lawton station “Lawton Acala,” which had numerous favored 
characteristics; however, it also never became a commercial cotton variety.38 
A 1933 OAES report indicated that, while Mebane, Half and Half, Acala, and 
Oklahoma Triumph 44 accounted for the plants in three-fourths of the state’s cotton fields, 
farmers did not clearly favor any one type in any area of the state, and the most common type 
changed annually.  This wide array of cotton varieties perhaps is indicative of Oklahoma’s 
location on the fringes of the Cotton West and South.  The variety characteristics likely did 
not stabilize until after the introduction of West Texas stormproof cotton characteristics 
(described later) and the early mechanical stripper harvesters in the 1930s and 1940s.39 
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Evolution of California Acala Cotton and the System Behind It 
USDA researchers in California were not always satisfied with the American-Egyptian 
cotton varieties developed in Arizona.  In part from scientific curiosity, and perhaps seeing 
that the long-staple cotton industry could collapse after World War I, researchers began 
testing several varieties of Upland cottons.  Among these were several cultivars of the 
Oklahoma and North Texas-grown Acala, most notably the so-called Acala 8, which the 
USDA shipped to California in 1919.  From those plants came the basis for what became 
known simply as Acala cotton in the certified one-variety cotton production of that state, all 
of it bred and developed at the USDA experiment station at Shafter. 40 
The first field planting of Acala in California occurred under the supervision of 
Wofford Camp, who since 1917 had been planting test plots of several varieties of Upland 
and American-Egyptian cotton in the San Joaquin Valley to see which—if any—could grow 
there.  The initial Acala seed that Camp planted in 1919 came from Acala-8 stock from the 
USDA facility at Clarksville, Texas.  The next year Camp expanded from the first planting of 
eight acres to several USDA-cooperator fields totaling a few hundred acres.  The block 
planted at the U.S. Experiment Date Garden in the Coachella Valley in 1920 attracted 
considerable interest.41 
Farmers in the relatively isolated Coachella Valley had been planting cotton since 
1909.  Between 1910-14 and 1918-20 growers had planted various fields of the Texas big-
boll type varieties Rowden and Mebane.  They also attempted to raise American-Egyptian 
cottons, but they had to transport the harvested cotton to the Imperial Valley for ginning.  
The 1920 debut of the Acala variety was stunning—a harvest equivalent to two-and-a-half 
bales per acre—and attracted numerous visitors to see the new crop.42 
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Several cotton growers wanted to try Acala for the next growing season, but USDA 
representatives suggested that everyone in the valley would need to grow it to avoid any 
cross-pollination from other “lesser” varieties.  As a result, the growers immediately formed 
the Acala Cotton Growers’ Association of the Coachella Valley in December 1920.  For the 
1921 season the association purchased seven tons of seed for its members to plant from the 
original USDA cooperative grower who started the 1918 tests with Camp.43 
Camp’s cotton variety trials had included a little of everything—Durango, Lone Star, 
Meade, Mebane, Gila, Pima, and Acala.  Some of the choices, no doubt, were made because 
some new settlers to the area were familiar with the Texas types (Lone Star, Mebane, Meade) 
from their previous locales.  While most of the cotton tests showed decent fiber production, 
only the Pima and the Acala seemed climatically adapted to the San Joaquin Valley.  While 
Pima cotton had been successfully grown around Bakersfield and Fresno for a couple of 
years, Camp suggested that Acala cotton would be better adapted to a larger area than the 
Pima, which needed a lengthy growing season.  He also suggested that Acala produced bolls 
that opened wide for easy picking, that it had higher fiber yields than any other variety, and 
that it could better stand adverse weather or poor growing (cultural) conditions than other 
cottons.  The uniform fiber length of 1 1/8” to 1 3/16” also was netting growers a premium 
price that other varieties did not yield.  Thus, Camp recommended pursuing Acala as the 
primary cotton to grow in the San Joaquin Valley.44 
In his recollections, Camp noted that having all these test plots scattered about 
California and the Southwest not only “was running me to death,” but also the lack of control 
of cooperative farmers’ planting methods made many experiments about cotton production 
virtually impossible.  This, combined with the surge of interest in Acala cotton, demonstrated 
a need for a dedicated cotton research facility in the San Joaquin Valley.  Working with 
individuals and companies in Kern County, Camp persuaded the USDA to establish the U.S. 
Cotton Field Station at Shafter, California, in November 1921.  The Shafter Station quickly 
became a knowledge base for the growers of the region, who eagerly sought advice on every 
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aspect of cotton production, from growing practices to marketing.  But its significance for the 
next several decades was that it bred California’s official one-variety Acala cotton.45 
One-Variety is Good For Everyone 
Coinciding with the effort to bring permanent cotton cultivation to California was an 
attempt to alter the cultural practice of raising cotton.  As early as 1909 O. F. Cook and other 
government officials advocated cotton improvement on a community basis, instead of 
farmers making their own, individual decisions.  “Many important advantages are not 
realized by farmers working alone, but require the united action of entire cotton-growing 
communities.  Only in this way can improved varieties and other results of scientific 
investigation be effectively utilized.”46  California seemed a natural place to implement 
community cotton growing.  Refinements and improvements for production and handling of 
California fruits and other specialty crops had already seen great success.47 
Put simply, a one-variety cotton community is a group of growers in a gin district, 
county, or other contained region who organize to improve cotton crop quality through 
standardized production by growing one superior variety of cotton.  The chosen variety is 
determined by extensive testing by state or federal experiment stations in the region.  It is one 
best adapted to local conditions based on yield, quality of staple, market demand, and 
financial return.  Members of such a community can also share with each other the latest 
methods of production to increase output and improve the fiber quality and purity of seed.  
The resulting output would have a more uniform staple length and quality that could be sold 
for a premium price.  “Standardization of cotton production in one-variety communities 
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promotes cooperative effort in all lines of agriculture, business, and social development in 
the community, to the mutual benefit of every grower and citizen in the community.”48 
In the minds of many people, “cotton is a community crop.”  Large cotton gins 
required many farmers to bring their harvest to one facility for processing, resulting in cotton 
bales to sell and cottonseed for the next year’s planting.  Neighboring farmers also share 
similar climate, soil, and growing conditions each year.  Cook went so far as to suggest that 
the old plantation complexes of the antebellum South were the original cotton communities.  
Each estate was large and isolated and had its own gin and community of farmers.  Further, 
they could maintain a good stock of seed from year to year.  These communities, though, had 
broken down after the Civil War for reasons unrelated to improved crop science.49 
Scientists viewed pure seed as the most critical issue and the most important reason for 
one-variety communities.  In a mixed-variety community, seed varieties easily cross-
pollinated in the fields.  Later, after harvesting, different seed varieties became mixed in the 
seed box at the gin because gin operators did not bother to clean the stands after each 
farmer’s run, thus ensuring further mixing of different seed varieties.50  The widespread 
belief that farmers must “change the seed” annually to maintain good varieties prevailed.  
Cook pointed out that seed dealers, gins, and oil mill owners and managers propagated this 
myth as a means of ensuring annual sales of “fresh seed” to farmers.  By getting an entire 
community to agree on a single variety, many of these problems could be eliminated in order 
to maintain the major traits of the selected variety.  Further, with proper isolation and local 
acclimatization, breeders could improve the seed to give better results than seed brought in 
from other areas.51 
USDA researchers also cited other, lesser benefits of one-variety communities.  They 
advocated common marketing of the crop, but from the aspect of improved seed rather than 
as a marketing cooperative.  If all farmers grew the same, improved variety they could at 
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least individually receive premium prices for their production.  If marketed as a group, the 
price paid might increase further.52  Proponents also felt that one-variety communities would 
increase the pride and competitiveness of individual farmers.  Instead of blaming a “poor 
variety” for poor performance, a farmer would be judged strictly on his farming abilities 
since he and his neighbors would be planting the same seed under approximately the same 
conditions.  “Community production does not mean that the individual farmers are any less 
responsible for the careful handling of their crops, but the underlying conditions are 
improved.”  All farmers would discuss their common problems for their common benefit.  
Skills would increase, production would become more uniform, crops would become larger, 
and the product would become more valuable.  Farmers would not waste time or money 
buying and experimenting with unproved varieties and would not be swayed by the often-
unfounded claims of seed dealers.  Most importantly, the familiar relationships in a 
community would establish a closer and more sympathetic contact with the local agricultural 
agencies, whether they were bankers and businessmen or state and federal agricultural 
scientists and officials.53 
The strongest advocates of one-variety communities appear to have been the USDA 
researchers and scientists.  They viewed this as “an essential step in the progress of the 
American cotton industry.”  Farmers might be persuaded to plant improved seed and avoid 
inferior varieties, but USDA officials felt that they would not benefit from the best intentions 
and possibilities of these improvements on an individual basis.  It seemed natural that 
communities could do many things that were impractical for individual farmers.  With 
centralized communities, the several involved branches of the Department of Agriculture 
could establish more effective cooperation and sharing of information.54  The implications of 
these developments have not been lost on later researchers: 
In reviewing the early history of cotton in California, one is struck by the crucial role of 
government policies during an era when farming was generally free of government 
intervention.  [Wofford B.] Camp’s educational campaigns, the Shafter [experiment] 
station’s research program, and the political organization of the industry were followed 
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by massive government investments in water development. The single-variety 
community and centralized sources of seed, besides facilitating marketing and 
improving yields, brought farmers together with important consequences for labor 
relations, lobbying activities, and the spread of new techniques.55 
Cook believed that the USDA was the proper vehicle for determining and creating 
community-farming efforts.  Like industrial companies, irrigation districts, and other 
cooperative ventures, all that was needed was to establish some one-variety communities, 
study their flaws, and revise and perfect them.56 
The first areas to effectively practice one-variety cotton farming were in the Imperial 
Valley of southern California and in the Salt River Valley of Arizona, where the USDA-
developed Durango, Yuma, and Pima varieties originated.  These efforts dated back to almost 
the original mention of the concept by Cook in 1912.  A 1915 report indicated that many 
critical problems with the community concept still needed work.  However, many positive 
aspects of community production had already been realized, particularly in the cooperation 
and communication of researchers, farmers, bankers, buyers, and manufacturers.57 
When cotton farming resumed in the San Joaquin Valley of Central California in the 
late 1910s, it was based on a community farming approach adopted from the Salt River 
Valley.  Researchers found that growing conditions were less extreme and the cultural 
requirements for growing in the San Joaquin Valley simpler than in regions where one-
variety communities had been attempted.  Farmers initially utilized the long-staple Pima 
cotton developed around 1920 at experiment stations in Arizona.  After 1921, though, 
farmers shifted production to the further evolved and selected Acala variety cotton.  A couple 
of years of additional experimentation and practice resulted in much of the valley producing 
Acala-variety cotton on a community basis.58 
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As discussed earlier, from the onset of cotton growing in the Coachella Valley in 1920, 
community production was the practice, so it always functioned on the basis of raising a 
single variety.  By 1923 nearly all the valley was using the new Acala variety, to the point 
where gins were refusing stock from any other variety.  “It was felt, however, that the 
community needed some sort of protection from newcomers who might not understand the 
valley situation, from the reactionary element who could not understand the advantages of 
one-variety production, and from those who might maliciously plant some other variety.”  
Thus in January 1924, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors passed a one-variety 
ordinance for the Coachella Valley.  A county one-variety ordinance was not entirely 
unheard of.  Wofford Camp reported that Kern, Kings, Tulare, and possibly Fresno counties 
all had one-variety ordinances passed late in World War I as a “war measure.”  These statutes 
named Egyptian cotton as the single variety and were to ensure an ample production for the 
war effort.59 
No one person or agency is mentioned as the instigator of the idea of protecting one-
variety communities in law.  The earliest remark, though, comes from one of its strongest 
proponents: the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  In 1922 Cook reported that someone 
suggested that cotton farmers in Arizona and California could use their local-option laws to 
create districts to establish a single-variety culture and to secure legal protection against the 
planting of other varieties that would hurt the community.60  This was seen as analogous to 
the systems already in place for farmers to organize irrigation districts to build dams or 
canals for water improvements.  Similarly, other states had districts to control weeds, plant 
diseases, insect pests, and other nuisances.  “The underlying principle of such regulations is 
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to assert the right of the community to agree upon and carry through such general community 
improvements.”61 
County officials immediately recognized, though, that they might not have the 
authority to protect one-variety communities.  In March 1924 a statewide conference 
convened to hear papers on the advantages of one-variety communities.  By the end of the 
conference the members had created the California Cotton Growers’ Association (CCGA) to 
investigate the issue and, if necessary, bring about enacting legislation.62 
In late 1924 the CCGA had arranged for the filing of the one-variety bill in the state 
legislature.  They also had the support and assistance of all the local Farm Bureau 
associations in the affected areas.  Nearly all the farmers in Riverside County (including the 
Coachella and Palo Verde valleys) and the San Joaquin Valley were growing Acala variety 
cotton and wished to be included in the districting provisions.  Imperial Valley growers from 
the south, however, felt that one-variety communities had not developed to a point where 
they could be incorporated.  Proponents only wanted areas where the concept was already 
popular and the law could be easily enforced.  In May 1925 the legislature passed and the 
governor signed the one-variety law.  “The enactment of this legislation by the State of 
California gave added stability to the one-variety district and constituted the first recognition 
by State legislation of the fact that the growing of more than one variety of cotton is injurious 
to the community welfare.”63 
Shortly after passage of the one-variety law, the state legislature followed up with a bill 
authorizing the certification of seed distributors to produce and distribute the selected variety 
bred at the USDA’s Shafter Experiment Station.  These organizations were to sell seed to 
farmers at near-cost to save farmers money.  “In that way it is a completely co-operative 
organization by the University [of California], the Department of Agriculture [through the 
Shafter Experiment Station], and cotton growers.”  The Kern County Farm Bureau, where the 
station was located, took the lead by establishing the Farm Bureau Planting Cotton Seed 
Distributors.  After about four years the Kern County Farm Bureau gave up the 
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distributorship to the renamed California Planting Cotton Seed Distributors (CPCSD), which 
became the exclusive distributor of seed for one-variety farmers statewide.64 
The CPCSD distribution process was relatively simple.  They contracted with ginners 
to sell seed to growers and ensure the seed would remain pure in the field and in the gin.  In 
turn they contracted with farmers to see that fields were kept clean and weed-free, to abide 
by the CPCSD rules, and to maintain the single-variety strain.65 
CPCSD managed a very careful seed production program.  Scientists at the Shafter 
station selected seed the first year to produce an “increase block” the next year.  Those plants 
produced the “foundation seed.”  In the third year contracted farmers planted 4,000 acres of 
the foundation seed to produce the “parent seed.”  In the fourth year of development, that 
seed was raised on 70,000 acres to make reproduction seed labeled as “purple tag.”  This 
became the premium pure seed available for sale to farmers.  The seeds from purple tag 
plantings produced 30,000 tons of marketable “green tag” pure seed, which was even more 
widely available and cheaper to farmers.66 
Within just a few years California established in practice and in law a complete one-
variety community cotton farming system.  “The industry has now been reestablished on the 
basis of new cultural and community production ideas not originating in the eastern Cotton 
Belt, but developed in this and other irrigated valleys of the Southwest.”  Many residents, 
including Wofford Camp, believed California was able to do this because cotton farming had 
not become entrenched in a certain subset of ideas or “way of doing things.”  Rather, many 
individuals were interested in cotton experiments.  This led to an extensive use of committees 
with representatives from USDA, the University of California, the California Department of 
Agriculture, county agencies, growers, processors, buyers, and textile mills.  These types of 
committees, themselves a symbol of community notions, became the backbone of the one-
variety program in California.67 
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Researchers and cotton farmers in other areas of the country recognized the advances 
made in California and some of the benefits that one-variety communities offered.  However, 
except for sporadic attempts in very small areas, nowhere else in the traditional cotton belt 
could government officials overcome the political difficulties and stigmas of individual 
farmers to establish a similar system.68 
Many farmers opposed cooperative efforts such as community farming, seeing them as 
a waste of time and an interference with their personal business.  Some liked organization, 
particularly for the marketing advantages, but did not appreciate the difference between 
superior seed varieties and inferior types.  Oklahoma cotton farmers, likely representative of 
farmers in other states, believed one-variety cotton communities offered too many 
disadvantages.  Soils and climates varied too widely to have a single, superior cotton variety.  
Different types were needed for different conditions.  Extreme weather conditions, such as 
hailstorms, wind, or drought, forced some farmers to replant every year.  If limited to one 
variety that had to be grown under near-perfect conditions, what were these farmers supposed 
to do?  Few were interested, or could even afford, to become a seed breeder instead of a 
cotton farmer.  Cotton buyers often refused to pay premium prices to farmers who did 
organize to take advantage of community-based notions.  Some farmers were obligated, by 
contract or by debt, to buyers, bankers, and merchants who objected to shipping cotton 
through an organization rather than through them.  Finally because of the small, sporadic 
nature of these efforts in other regions, community farmers often ended up competing with 
inferior cotton brought from neighboring areas passed off as just as good or superior to the 
community-grown cotton.69 
Even in California everyone was not satisfied with the legal protection offered in the 
one-variety law.  Periodically someone brought in outside seed and planted it.  When local 
agents discovered these plants, they quarantined the field and sent the cotton (if they allowed 
it to produce) out of state for ginning.  In 1938 some oil mill operators sought waivers to 
grow any variety of seed for use exclusively in the mill.  These owner-operators also 
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expected to benefit from increased payments from the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) for their increased cotton acreage.  The most serious threat, though, 
historically came from the Imperial Valley and southern California, which were exempted 
from the one-variety district legislation in the 1920s.  Mississippi seed breeders established 
some of their “improved” seed stocks developed in the South in the Imperial Valley.  They 
then tried to expand northward into Madera County, a marginal cotton farming area at the 
southern end of the San Joaquin Valley one-variety cotton district.  They called for private 
tests conducted by “non-partisan public agencies” to demonstrate the use of the new southern 
varieties.  All the participants in the one-variety cotton program, however, strongly rebuked 
these efforts.70 
USDA officials also did not give up on converting southern cotton farmers into one-
variety communities.  Low cotton prices in 1931 marked a fresh effort to establish new 
communities by USDA’s Bureau of Plant Industry and the Agricultural Extension Service.71  
These groups, along with county agricultural agents, teachers hired under the Smith-Hughes 
program, and state and federal experiment station employees, sponsored a general cotton-
improvement plan generally known as the one-variety community program.  Congress made 
some appropriations for agents specifically dedicated to this task.  Under this program about 
a thousand one-variety communities organized across the Cotton Belt.  Their effectiveness, 
as previously indicated, was limited.72 
One-variety proponents in California supported the USDA efforts by crafting a federal 
enabling law that would permit any county or area to create their own one-variety district.  
The act would likely have been more an educational model than a working law, as the federal 
government could not empower state or local governments to create such districts.  The plan 
enjoyed good support from President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration, particularly from 
his Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace.  However, the effort eventually died after an 
influential southern cotton breeder raised many objections to the plan.  He felt that such an 
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act, even as a federally encouraged model, would eventually hurt his business and his 
pocketbook.73 
It is fairly clear that the United States Department of Agriculture strongly favored the 
creation of one-variety cotton communities.  However, despite widespread efforts and 
promotion, only California adopted community cotton-farming on a large-scale basis.  This 
resulted in its own bureaucratic organization of certified seed and legal enforcement—a 
practice that was not seriously threatened until the 1990s.  Many other areas of the Cotton 
West, though, eventually developed a single-variety philosophy that was economically, 
scientifically, or climatically-based.  These varieties, such as New Mexico’s Acala 1517 and 
the West Texas-evolved storm-proof cotton varieties, offered some of the same advantages as 
California’s “superior” one-variety system. 
California’s Certified One-Variety Cotton 
Having been designated the official originating breeder for California’s cotton variety 
by the one-variety law, the USDA Shafter Experiment Station had a focused, primary 
mission after 1925.  In test fields at Shafter and nearby Indio, the USDA continued to work 
with descendants of the Acala-8 type cotton for several years.  The new lines had a variety of 
names—California Acala, Shafter Acala, Date Garden Acala, Acala S5, and Acala P12.  The 
Acala S5 and the P-numbered lines, several of which were eventually released for 
commercial production, came from fields at Indio that were transferred to the Shafter 
breeding program in the late 1920s.74 
The Shafter breeding program began to focus on two changing needs of the San 
Joaquin Valley in the 1930s.  Verticillium wilt, a soil-borne fungus, began to infect fields and 
spread through the valley by 1930.  The USDA identified wilt tolerance characteristics in 
several varieties, including Kekchi and other southern cotton varieties, and began to cross-
breed this into new seed lines.  At the same time, as western cotton production volume 
increased, California’s Acala crops gained a reputation as having inferior fiber quality and 
strength as compared to southern cottons of similar fiber length.  Breeders began lab test and 
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new variety crosses in an attempt to improve the spinning characteristics of the Shafter 
Acala. 
Using new breeding methods utilized by director George Harrison (1934-1949), the 
Shafter Station developed Acala P18C, which became the standard variety from 1944 to 
1948.  This new line included only some of the identified wilt tolerance and fiber quality 
characteristics that was of concern to breeders.  Harrison began bringing in Acala strains 
from New Mexico, Arizona, and Mississippi to pick up more of these characteristics.  The 
eventual result was Acala 4-42—labeled by some as “the finest short staple [cotton variety] 
in the United States”—which the CPCSD released to farmers in 1949.75 
When John Turner took over the Shafter breeding program in 1953, he instituted new 
tests to improve the existing Acala 4-42 variety and to pioneer new strains that might succeed 
it someday.  It took a decade for the latter to begin to emerge in field plots.  In 1967 the 
USDA replaced Acala 4-42 with this newly christened Acala SJ-1, which became the new 
parent line for four subsequent USDA releases.  The Acala SJ line was the last developed by 
the USDA Shafter Experiment Station.  In 1979 California amended its one-variety law to 
permit private breeding companies to develop certified Acala cottons for the San Joaquin 
Valley.  The USDA decided to release its Shafter germplasm to private breeders and shut 
down the experiment station, ending the longest-running impact of USDA’s efforts to 
establish a cotton industry in the San Joaquin Valley and ending its extensive involvement in 
breeding the valley’s only official cotton variety.76 
Acala Cotton in Arizona 
As noted earlier, the largest cotton-growing areas of Arizona are the Salt River Valley 
(including the Sacaton station in the adjacent Casa Grande Valley), the lower Colorado 
Valley (Yuma station), and the upper Gila Valley in Graham County.  The Sacaton and 
Yuma areas were where many of the original USDA cotton tests began with American-
Egyptian cotton, and several producers in those regions grew Pima almost exclusively until 
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the post-World War I falloff in long-staple cotton prices.  It was in the late 1910s and early 
1920s that many farmers began switching to Upland cotton varieties.77 
As in other regions, growers planted a little of everything—Delfos, Lone Star, Mebane, 
Hartsville, and Durango—but they soon replaced these with Acala-8 types, which were better 
adapted to local growing conditions than any of the others.  Increasingly, farmers got their 
Acala seed from California stocks.  Meanwhile, some producers continued to plant Pima 
cottons.78 
Demonstrating the influence of the USDA Shafter Experiment Station, many Arizona 
cotton growers opted to plant the same variety of Acala P-line seed as their colleagues in the 
San Joaquin Valley.  This generally lasted until 1949 when Acala 4-42 came out.  The new 
variety was so customized for the San Joaquin Valley that it did not do well in Arizona.  Left 
without a good source for quality and consistent seed, Arizona scientists and farmers met to 
create the Arizona Cotton Planting Seed Distributors (ACPSD), an organization that would 
serve a similar function as the California Planting Cotton Seed Distributors did for that 
state’s producers.  Instead of the USDA, however, the ACPSD got its foundation seed from 
the Arizona Agricultural Experiment Station.  ACPSD used the A-44 [Arizona Acala 44] 
family as its primary variety, later supplementing that with the wilt resistant WR-44 
variety.79 
Unlike California, Arizona never chose to implement any kind of one-variety cotton 
system.  Thus, Arizona’s cotton culture evolved to accommodate an array of cotton varieties.  
California Acala cottons and the ACPSD successors became popular in Maricopa, Pinal, 
Pima, and Yuma counties.  Throughout the state, individual farmers and extension 
researchers continued to experiment with other Upland varieties that were “premium staple” 
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or short-growing season varieties.  At the higher elevations, in Graham and Greenlee 
counties, the Arizona AES recommended that farmers order New Mexico Acala.80 
By 1947 Upland cotton was Arizona’s major cash crop, occupying one-fourth of the 
state’s cultivated fields.  Improvements continued after 1950 as mechanization and 
insecticides became more commonplace.  In the meantime, the Pima cotton industry slowly 
collapsed.  Whereas Arizona Pima production averaged over 20,000 bales a year from 1912 
to 1937, the total grown in 1947 was 163 bales, prompting predictions that the era of 
American-Egyptian cotton was over.  The modern Pima/SuPima cotton industry of the 
Southwest emerged in a market revival in the 1950s that falls beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  But with both types of cotton—Pima and Acala—Arizona cotton producers 
would probably agree with G. E. Thompson’s and C. J. Wood’s statement: “We are indebted 
wholly to the United States Department of Agriculture for the selection and development of 
the varieties now used in Arizona.”81 
New Mexico’s Upland Cotton Developments 
For many years researchers at the New Mexico Agricultural Experiment Station 
(NMAES) grew, tested, and developed several Upland cotton varieties, including progenies 
of Acala and Kekchi, many of which were furnished by the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry.  
The first result was a reselection from one of the initial California Acala fields, Acala P12.  
Researchers released this initial New Mexico variety in 1920 as College Acala, which 
became popular in both the Rio Grande and Pecos valleys as New Mexico’s cotton 
agriculture began to take shape.  In 1926 the USDA established a cotton field station at Las 
Cruces in conjunction with the NMAES.  Together, they developed Acala cultivars for New 
Mexico and Far West Texas under the direction of agronomist G. N. Stroman.82 
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The next major release was Acala 1064, selected in 1935 from plantings of Young’s 
Acala variety, a direct descendent of the original Acala brought from Mexico.  Acala 1064 
produced higher yields and longer fibers with earlier maturity than College Acala.  Acala 
1064 quickly replaced College Acala throughout the region.83 
Stroman quickly followed this with three significant selections: 1517, 1517A, and 
1450.  Acala 1517A had even earlier maturity that made it highly adaptable to the shorter 
growing season in the Pecos Valley.  Acala 1450 produced longer cotton fibers, but NMAES 
elected not to release it.  Instead, a Las Cruces cotton and pecan operation, Stahmann Farms, 
acquired 1450 and developed it in a private breeding program.  This produced the locally 
known Mesa Acala and Mesilla Valley Acala varieties, some of the longest fiber-length 
cottons derived from Acala stock.84 
The major 1517 selection in 1940 by Stroman became the germplasm foundation for all 
future lines of New Mexico cultivars, all of which have carried the Acala 1517 label in its 
title.  The initial 1517 was better suited to the Rio Grande Valley than its 1517A cousin; it 
was largely on this premise that researchers developed subsequent 1517 types.  The next 
selection was Acala 1517WR, as NMAES improved wilt resistance.  Later breeding 
developed 1517s with stronger fiber strength, blight resistance, and bolls suitable for the new 
spindle-picker mechanical harvester.85 
The significance of the New Mexico breeding program extends well beyond the 
immediate Las Cruces-El Paso region.  The selection of Acala 1517 proved to have great 
genetic diversity.  With its favorable fiber quality and verticillium wilt tolerance, the 1517 
germplasm spread throughout the U.S. cotton industry.  According to a 1996 study, over 45 
percent of the cultivars issued between 1970 and 1990 in the U.S. included Acala 1517 
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germplasm in their genetic pedigree.  Thus Acala 1517 became the largest genetic contributor 
coming from public breeding programs in the U.S. and was second only to the private Coker 
breeding lines from South Carolina.86  
West Texas Goes a Different Way 
As mentioned earlier, the Acala variety did not prove to be the savior against the boll 
weevil menace in Texas.  Though widely hailed for all the positive traits discussed 
previously, many of the cotton varieties developed largely from careful selection and 
breeding of the existing Texas big-boll cultivars.  The Texas Agricultural Experiment Station 
(TAES) system carried on most of this work, with some collaboration from USDA and 
several private breeders, many of whose names were put on the major varieties.  The earliest 
varieties were Rowden, Mebane Triumph (so named for its “triumph” over the boll weevil), 
and Lone Star.  Private breeding programs produced Lankart, Lightning Express, Lockett, 
Stoneville, and Deltapine.  TAES developed its own Mexican hybrids, first Westex in 1921 
and then Ducona in 1927, based in part from cotton found in Durango, Mexico, about 1905.87 
One of Texas’ most popular commercial cotton varieties, though, includes nearly all of 
the common roots discussed to this point.  Though a private company, Paymaster Seed 
Company made wide use of a large number of early varieties developed by USDA or state 
experiment stations.  Paymaster Seed Company has developed numerous cultivars, to the 
point where 24 percent of U.S. cotton planted in 1995 was a Paymaster variety.  One of its 
first bred varieties, the Paymaster 54 (selected in 1944) is a direct descendent of the USDA-
located Kekchi type.  Half of the original Stormmaster line, also started in 1944, descends 
from Acala.  The other key ingredient to Stormmaster comes from an independently derived 
variety originating on the Texas South Plains and advanced by the Lubbock Substation of the 
TAES in the 1930s and 1940s.88 
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One of the major problems on the South Plains in late fall and winter are large 
windstorms.  This was brought home in November 1926 when much of that year’s bumper 
cotton crop was literally blown out of the bolls just as harvesting was beginning in earnest.  
Nearly everyone lost their crop, and what little cotton survived was full of sand and not 
worth hiring people to hand pick it.89  Up to that point the Lubbock Substation had 
concentrated on developing cotton varieties with increased yield, as the region to that point 
was largely devoid of disease and pests, particularly the boll weevil.90 
The 1926 storm led station director Don L. Jones to shift his entire research program to 
breed a “stormproof boll.”  Over the next eight years he bred numerous test varieties, 
including several he had imported or cross-pollinated from around the world, including 
Mexico and India.  The Lubbock Substation was nearing completion of its first stormproof 
varieties when a fire destroyed all the station’s breeding material.  Jones turned to an area 
farmer to get the program back on track.91 
After the 1926 storm, farmer H. A. Macha walked through his field of Half and Half 
variety cotton to see what was left.92  He found a single plant—a mutant—that had retained 
all its cotton in the boll.  While open, the boll had remained fairly compact, thus keeping the 
cotton inside undamaged.  Macha removed the plant and used the seeds as base material for 
developing his own stormproof cotton.  He soon became well known for his home-grown 
Macha variety cotton.  When the fire struck the Lubbock Substation in 1934, Macha donated 
some of his stormproof seed to help restart the experiment station’s breeding program.93 
Through the continuing breeding program of the TAES, Macha quickly became the 
dominant and standard cotton variety on the South Plains.  In the 1930s and 1940s the Macha 
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variety itself disappeared, except for the amounts produced by Macha himself until he retired 
in the early 1950s.  Instead, TAES and other breeders used Macha as a parent cultivar.  
Paymaster Seed Company crossed it with Acala to create its Stormmaster variety in 1944.  
Macha has been one of the most widely utilized varieties in breeding programs, becoming the 
primary ancestor for nearly every modern cotton variety planted in West Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Eastern New Mexico.94 
As the NMAES had done for New Mexico, the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station 
in Lubbock promoted and further developed one of the nation’s most important cotton 
varieties.  The 1996 study mentioned earlier found that 24 percent of the cultivars issued 
between 1970 and 1990 include genetic material first developed in Lubbock.  The findings 
are even more impressive if one combines the work of the TAES from both Lubbock and 
College Station; about 46 percent of the cultivars for the same period resulted from the 
experiment stations’ research.95 
Conclusion 
The western cotton industry owes its existence to the government agencies and 
scientists who oversaw the research and creation of these cotton varieties.96  Driven by 
economic concerns about the boll weevil and great scientific interest in breeding theory, the 
USDA and cooperating state agricultural experiment stations developed critically important 
programs to locate, create, and improve new cultivars of cotton.  Many of those derived from 
the Central American Kekchi and Acala cottons and became the foundation for the modern 
cotton agriculture of the American West. 
USDA scientists, particularly O. F. Cook, influenced the development of one-variety 
concepts of cotton farming.  In California their efforts resulted in state laws and a complete 
production bureaucracy based entirely on one-variety of cotton—that produced at the USDA 
Shafter Experiment Station. 
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Thus, when it came to what kind of cottonseed a farmer planted and often how he got 
it, the role of the USDA and state experiment station scientists cannot be understated.  A 
major goal of these men’s work was to develop specific types of cotton best suited to the 
growing conditions and methods of a particular region.  Their goals often included directing 
farmers toward either short-staple or long-staple cotton productions.  As this chapter shows, 
one can trace these goals back to the original behest of USDA secretaries and the leading 
scientists of the Bureau of Plant Industry to establish cotton farming in the West.  While the 
outcomes necessarily vary from region to region, the principles guiding the USDA and state 
experiment stations and the methodologies of enacting them are virtually identical 
throughout the Cotton West. 
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CHAPTER IV   
MACHINES, PRACTICES, AND 
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION 
The last chapter outlined the development of cotton varieties used across the West.  In 
order to explore issues about labor and labor requirements from season to season, one needs 
some understanding of cotton farming practices and how they changed during the early 
twentieth century.  The process of raising cotton was the same across the Cotton West, 
irrespective of region.  The differences between regions were more a question of whether a 
particular practice was necessary and of how the work was performed or mechanized. 
The Cotton Farming Year 
Regardless of what part of the United States one is in and of what time frame one is 
looking at historically, raising a cotton crop is a year-round process.  Figure 9 depicts the 
amount of human labor needed by task and time of the year for a Central Texas farm in about 
1932.  The relative amounts of labor needed at different times of the year will be considered 
in the next chapter.  Of interest here is the notation about what tasks are occurring.  The 
timing of each task is what varies the most from region to region throughout the American 
cotton producing areas.  The basic tasks—plowing and preparing fields, planting, irrigating, 
cultivating (including chopping cotton), and harvesting—have been virtually identical for 
every American cotton farmer.1 
The farmer started his cotton each year with general field preparation, a process that 
saw the most variation depending on local conditions.  Field preparation might include 
clearing trees or sprouts, cleaning ditches, forming terraces, breaking out land, cutting down 
stalks, plowing or harrowing, forming rows, and distributing fertilizer.  Mechanical stalk 
cutting to reduce the previous year’s plant residue was one of the earliest substantial labor-
saving measures, replacing hand clearing.  The western cotton farming regions likely had 
stalk cutters from the outset, largely because of the use of larger (multiple-row) machines 
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Figure 9.  Typical Distribution of Field Labor by Task and Time of Year 
Source: Free, Seasonal Employment in Agriculture, 50. 
operated by one man on a tractor. By World War II, though, stalk cutters came to be replaced 
by other plowing implements used under different field conservation practices.2 
After his field was prepared and the time was right, the next task for the farmer was 
planting his cottonseed, which started in mid-March in warmer areas and was completed by 
late May.  Farmers used a planter implement, often a combination corn-cotton unit, that one 
laborer could easily operate.  Western farmers initially utilized one-row planters but quickly 
shifted to two- and four-row implements by the 1930s, cutting the labor hours for planting in 
half.  Use of commercial fertilizer as a separate process in the West was negligible.  Most 
farmers applied fertilizer, using a unit built onto their planters if they used any at all.3 
A critical variable across the regions was the amount of seed planted per acre, which 
reflected how “thick” the plants were.  The typical Mississippi Delta region farmer planted 
thirty-six pounds of seed per acre in 1936, while western region farmers only sowed sixteen 
pounds.  Many western farmers did not follow the traditional southern practice of planting a 
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thick stand, only to thin them out after the plants had grown three to five inches high.  
Instead, they only planted enough seed to ensure a good stand and to eliminate much of the 
thinning, thus reducing the labor need as well.  Advancing technology on multiple-row seed 
planters used in the West also reduced the amount of seed used.  Seed plates in planter boxes 
carefully regulated the amount of seed dispensed.  Further, various chute mechanisms, in 
particular the “trip” valve used on “check-row” systems, spaced out seeds exactly and usually 
produced a plant at every drop point, resulting in a perfect grid of cotton plants.  Thus, 
western cotton practices and improved machinery substantially reduced, but did not 
eliminate, the need for chopping out excess cotton.4 
The next seasonal task was cultivation, which included both general cultivating and 
hoeing to remove or kill weeds and chopping cotton to thin it out to an even stand.  
Cultivation also assisted in opening soils so irrigation water could better penetrate the surface 
or to clear rows to prevent debris from collecting.  Chopping cotton was almost a science 
unto itself, as a laborer had to reduce the number of plants so the remaining ones could reach 
maturity, trying to ensure that spacing between plants was even, and to eliminate weak or 
sickly plants in favor of stronger, healthier ones.  Outside of harvesting, chopping was the 
most time-consuming and labor-intensive operation, accounting for half of the pre-harvest 
labor in raising cotton (see fig. 9).  While chopping cotton, between May and July, the 
laborer also expected to hoe any weeds that might have grown.  Because this process was 
largely unmechanized until about World War II, the average time spent chopping cotton 
remained almost constant.  In some areas of the West, producers increasingly utilized 
mechanical cultivator implements in lieu of hand laborers to remove weeds and stray plants 
from cotton fields.5 
A crucial task for western cotton growers, though one of the least-often considered by 
labor historians, was irrigation.  As discussed in Chapter Two, most cotton agriculture could 
not be practiced in the arid West if it were not for local irrigation projects.  Many 
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contemporary sources failed to account for this all-important task as part of the growing 
process.6  When and how often to irrigate was one of the areas that marked some of the 
distinctions between different regions.  In some areas, farmers irrigated just before they 
planted their fields, both to help prepare the soil and to provide some moisture so seeds 
would germinate.  In other areas farmers needed to irrigate during the growing period.  
Whether one did it regularly, say weekly, or only in a couple of larger waterings, was a 
matter of debate and often depended on weather conditions in a given year and the 
availability of irrigation water.  Whatever the timing, almost every Cotton West farmer had 
to irrigate at some point during the growing cycle.  Equally important in field preparations 
was leveling the field to control irrigation water.  Agricultural writers particularly 
emphasized this point in several California and Arizona publications.7 
After plants matured and produced fibrous bolls, the final stage of cotton raising was 
the harvest.  This by far marked the largest labor-use of any stage of production (see fig. 9).  
In the early to mid-twentieth century in all cotton-producing areas of the nation, cotton 
harvesting occurred three times each season, beginning shortly after the first bolls matured in 
late summer or early fall until the field was cleared out in the winter.  In most of the United 
States, the harvest method was picking cotton—the long-traditional means of snatching 
cotton fiber clean out of the boll.  Western Oklahoma and High Plains Texas cotton farmers 
developed a new means of harvesting called snapping or pulling cotton—where one pulled 
the entire boll off the stalk.  As will be discussed below, pulling cotton was the principle in 
the initial mechanization step using fences or slot harvesters.  Local producers called this 
“stripping cotton.”  In the ensuing discussion, the terms “picking” or “harvesting” cotton are 
inclusive of this alternative method of harvesting as well as the traditional method.  Specific 
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references to the High Plains area of the country will call the harvest method “stripping” 
cotton.8 
Once the harvest was complete—which could be as early as October or as late as 
January or February, depending on the area of the country and how bountiful the crop—the 
cotton farming cycle could start over again.  With this understanding of the typical pattern of 
annual cotton farming tasks, one can review the evolutionary development and 
mechanization of each task in different regions of the Cotton West. 
Implements and Machinery in the Fields 
A discussion of farm implements must necessarily start with motive power.  Prior to 
the introduction of tractors, the power source was animals—horses, oxen, or mules.  With 
additional pairs of animals, the equipment could be larger or wide, but in most cases was 
limited in size to two rows.  One-row, horse-drawn equipment was very common into the 
1920s, about the time manufacturers introduced the row-crop tractor.9 
The concept of using an internal combustion engine on wheels for farm work had been 
around for a number of years before producers applied it in a newer practical form on cotton 
farms.  The Hart-Parr Gasoline Engine Company produced the first commercially successful 
tractors in 1907, quickly becoming a leading manufacturer alongside International Harvester 
and Deere & Company.  These early machines, known as standard-wheel or wheatland 
tractors, were popular only in the Great Plains.  They were large with a low base and a wide 
wheel-width.  Farmers in other regions of the country did not readily accept the standard-
wheel tractors; they were too awkward to use in row-crop applications like corn and cotton.  
In fact, they could only be used for about 38 percent of the overall work—mostly plowing.  
A more suitable design could do as much as 77 percent of the job—nearly everything except 
the harvest.10 
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International Harvester Company’s (IHC) McCormick-Deering division developed the 
first mass-produced tractor specifically for row crops—the “Farmall.”  The machine was 
taller and narrower than its “squat, fat, clumsy” predecessors.  The increased height allowed 
it to drive over growing corn or cotton plants.  The narrow size permitted the operator 
maximum visibility of the crop rows.  The Farmall’s front wheels were paired together at the 
center of the machine, rather than out on the corners as on the standard-wheel tractors.  This 
tricycle design allowed the tractor to make very tight turns at the ends of rows.11 
IHC turned out a small handful of Farmalls in 1924 but was not really ready to 
advertise it.  Instead, the company sent several Farmalls to Corpus Christi and San Angelo 
for extensive testing by the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station.  Texas farmers observing 
the tests expressed so much excitement about the new design that IHC released the Farmall 
for commercial sale in Texas in 1925.  IHC extended it to the rest of the country over the 
next year as their production increased.12 
One of the original design features of the Farmall was to accommodate front and side-
mounted cultivator attachments.  The Farmall’s frame was wide enough to mount a two-row 
cultivator between the rear wheels, while later attachments covered four rows.  Interest 
intensified with the introduction of other implements designed specifically for the new row-
crop tractors.  An Oklahoma study reported that a farmer with two-row, horse-drawn 
equipment needed almost seven hours of human labor per acre to produce a cotton crop.  
With new two-row tractor equipment, the time dropped to five hours.  IHC competitor Deere 
& Company quickly introduced their first General Purpose row-crop tractor in 1927, 
featuring an innovative power-lift feature for its tractor-mounted implements.  Other 
manufacturers followed suit as well.  By 1937 three-fourths of all the tractors sold in the U.S. 
were row-crop units.13 
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In his major study of the process and impact of cotton mechanization, economist James 
Street reviewed how the tractor was often the measuring stick of the degree of farm 
mechanization in a particular area, while also noting that tractors represented an ability to 
only partially mechanize cotton production.  In reporting on his research, he suggested that 
tractor acquisition began in the west and moved eastward.  Much of this initially took place 
in Texas and Oklahoma, mainly in the 1930s, though it was also happening in California.  
With tractors, producers could consolidate into larger farms and operate them cheaper with 
seasonal labor than under any other arrangement, including the tenant farming system that 
had evolved in much of the South.14 
Street’s study compared the uses of tractors in mechanizing the basic farming 
operations of plowing, planting, and cultivating (table 1).  By 1939 at least 70 percent of the 
cotton-farming process involved a tractor in California and Arizona, with the rest of the 
Cotton West at around 40 percent.  In contrast, southern farmers did as little as 2 percent of 
their planting and cultivating with a tractor.  By the end of World War II, the Far West was 
passing 90 percent “power farming,” as described by Street, with California’s cotton acreage 
alone having increased 160 percent during this period alone.15 
Some of the extension publications give more specific examples of this transition.  The 
Arizona Agricultural Experiment Station noted the shift away from horse power—57 percent 
of cotton farming work was done with horses in 1929, a percentage that plummeted to less 
than 5 percent by 1941.  In New Mexico between 1930 and 1940, the number of irrigated 
cotton farmers owning tractors increased from 9 percent to 29 percent.  A study from the 
Texas High Plains reported that the number of farms depending on tractor power (and multi-
row equipment) increased from 26 percent in 1931 to 79 percent six years later.  In the hub of 
the plains, Lubbock County, 41 of 43 cotton farmers (95 percent) indicated they were using 
tractors in 1938.16 
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Table 1.  Tractor Power Use for Plowing, Planting, and Cultivating in Cotton-Producing Areas of the 
United States, 1939 and 1946 
State Breaking  
1939           1946 
Harrowing 
1939           1946 
Planting 
1939           1946 
Cultivating 
1939           1946 
California 85 97 71 95 71 85 73 90 
Arizona 89 94 77 88 65 80 76 85 
New Mexico 49 86 34 70 39 70 41 80 
Texas 49 85 40 82 45 80 43 83 
Oklahoma 44 81 38 78 28 69 25 73 
         
Far West 81 94 67 89 64 81 69 87 
Southwest 49 84 40 81 42 78 40 82 
Mid-South 16 42 13 37 4 16 6 18 
Southeast 10 38 8 29 2 13 2 11 
Nat’l. Avg. 30 60 25 54 21 43 21 45 
Source: Based on table 6 from Street, New Revolution in the Cotton Economy, 164. 
Notes: The USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics study that Street cites separated plowing into breaking 
(general turning of the soil, an old term used for unfarmed land) or harrowing (a finishing of the field prior to 
planting).  Region groupings in the report were: Far West—Calif., Ariz., N.Mex.; Southwest—Tex., Okla.; 
Mid-South—Miss., La., Ark., Tenn., Mo.; Southeast—Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Ala.  The defined Southwest 
states would be almost evenly split between the Cotton West and South, with tractor use in the eastern halves of 
those areas probably closer to that of the Southeast and in the western halves to that of the Far West. 
The widespread introduction of tractors in western cotton farming well exceeded the 
transition in the South.  The same 1938 Texas report stated that there were more tractors in 
Texas than in eight southern cotton belt states combined at that time.  Similarly, economic 
historians Musoke and Olmstead said that in 1929 a California farm was almost twenty times 
more likely to have a tractor than a farm in Mississippi.17 
The transition to multi-row equipment closely paralleled the transition to the 
introduction and use of tractors in many areas of the Cotton West.  A 1940 report by the 
Texas Agricultural Experiment Station on mechanization in the High Plains details an 
example of this.  In 1931 the surveyed group of West Texas farmers included a mixed 
assemblage using both horse-drawn and tractor-drawn equipment.  Thirty-one percent 
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reported using one-row horse-drawn implements, while 43 percent were pulling two-row 
equipment with their horses.  Already almost 26 percent had acquired tractors with two-row 
attachments.  Six years later the numbers had shifted radically.  Only about 21 percent were 
using any horse-drawn equipment.  About 82 percent were now using two-row equipment 
(with either horse or tractor), while 11 percent were operating tractors with four-row 
implements.18 
The implications of this on average farm size are clear in this report as well.  Based on 
data from 1936, farms with one-row, horse-drawn equipment averaged only 98 acres in size; 
two-row, horse-drawn operator farms were 182 acres.  Just introducing the tractor with 
similar two-row equipment increased the average size to 233 acres.  Those farms with four-
row, tractor-drawn equipment averaged 408 acres.  A similar but less detailed assessment 
from Oklahoma reported that a family-sized farm in the older (e.g., Cotton South) cotton belt, 
using one mule and probably one-row equipment, averaged 10 to 20 acres.  At the same time, 
a typical family with two-row equipment drawn by at least four mules operated a farm of 100 
to 150 acres, with tractors starting to supplant the horse-drawn implements.  The difference 
in time between one-row, horse-drawn equipment of five labor days per acre versus five 
hours per acre with tractors was truly remarkable.19 
An anecdotal story provides some insight on the importance of getting a tractor to 
make a bigger farm operation.  The Vocale family owned a small farm near Deming, New 
Mexico.  Son Emanuel related how he threatened to leave the farm to take up another 
occupation if his father did not get a tractor.  Not only would it make their lives easier, he 
argued, but it would allow them to buy some neighboring properties and expand their 
operations, including areas where they were raising livestock feed.  His mother chimed in 
agreement, causing a reluctant Mr. Vocale to agree to see the local tractor dealer.  He soon 
traded in some of his old equipment and mules for a new tractor and all the related 
attachments, but he held back a cultivator and two mules “in case that tractor don’t work 
out.”  So important was making a sale that many dealers kept an animal buyer on retainer to 
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handle trade-ins for new equipment.  It was not uncommon early in this transition period that 
dealers shipped the mules and horses, as well as some of the horse-drawn equipment, to be 
sold to producers in the Cotton Belt South.20 
A 1938 article provides some statistical evidence of this transition from horses to 
tractors in the Texas High Plains.  In 1931 farmers reported owning an average of 6.2 
workstock animals for their operation—a figure that well might be higher if the 25.5 percent 
of farms with tractors were excluded.  By 1937 this number had dropped to 2.7 animals per 
farm.  The authors suggest a two-fold reason influencing this shift.  By the mid-1930s the 
credit situation during the Great Depression had improved, making it possible for more 
farmers to finance the purchase of tractors and larger equipment.  At the same time, crop 
failures and low yields caused feed prices to rise, thus sharply increasing the overall cost of 
animal power versus tractors.21 
By Task 
For most cotton producers, the point of mechanizing—or at least the effect of it—was 
to reduce the amount of time it took to complete routine tasks and to reduce the number of 
total laborers needed at any given time.  This increased the efficiency of an existing operation 
and permitted the farmer to expand his production acreage using the same resources.  
Chapter Five will focus attention on farm workers and the impacts of mechanization on them.  
This section will explore how mechanization choices affected time management and 
practices for each task in cotton growing each year, from plowing and field preparation 
through the harvest. 
Plowing practices widely varied based on local custom, with all types of plowing in the 
West averaging 2.9 hours per acre in 1909.  This rate fell to 1.3 hours per acre by 1936, aided 
largely by the use of tractors and multiple-row implements, thus reducing some need for 
                                                 
20
 Emanuel Vocale, Interview with Nigel Holman, 22 June 2000 (New Mexico Farm & Ranch Heritage 
Museum Oral History Program, Las Cruces, N.Mex.), Tape Three, Side One; Saffell, “Working in the Cotton 
Fields,” 50-51.  The Vocales got rid of the other two mules the next year.  The power and popularity of horse-
drawn implements is reflected in the fact that Deere and Company included them in their catalogs through 
1954—presumably for reluctant converts in the Cotton South.  
21
 C. A. Bonnen and A. C. Magee, “Some Technological Changes in the High Plains Cotton Area of 
Texas,” Journal of Farm Economics 20(3) (August 1938): 605-9. 
 101 
laborers. 22  A 1939 WPA National Research Project report commented on the shift from 
horse-drawn to tractor-drawn moldboard plows.  Increasing from a one-bottom to a two-
bottom plow reduced man-hours per acre by about 75 percent.  Upgrading from horse power 
to tractor power, even with the same size plow, reduced labor needs by 25 to 45 percent 
because of greater speed.  Investigators found similar results for lister plows, with time per 
acre being only about half that required for a moldboard plow.  An Arizona study cited that 
both disk and moldboard plows were suitable, but operating a disk plow was less expensive 
and was better adapted to tractor use.23 
Farmers used a planter, often a combination corn-cotton planter, from one to four rows 
across operated by one laborer.  After 1919 a majority of western cotton farmers used two-
row or larger planters.  The required time decreased from 1.2 hours per acre to 0.6 hours per 
acre between 1909 and 1936, largely because of the increased use of tractors and two-, then 
four-row cotton planters.  With this setup, a farmer needed only one or two laborers 
(including himself).  Observers said that two-row planters were better than one-row units to 
create more uniform depth of planting, making straight rows (to aid later cultivation), and 
saving overall time.  One might assume that a similar assertion could be offered for going 
from two-row to four-row equipment, but an Arizona study reported that the speed was only 
one and a half times as fast as when using two-row implements.24 
Planting practices related to equipment use and design was an important issue.  If 
placing the seeds did not generate a good stand of plants, then the whole process was futile.  
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Thus, this subject was discussed considerably in extension publications.  Most planters had 
some kind of furrow opener—either a small shovel, a runner blade, or sometimes a disc 
opener—which opened up the soil immediately in front of the chute where a seed dropped.  
The simplest planting placement was called flat planting, where the opener simply inserted a 
gap in an otherwise level field to insert the seed.  For some types of soil or irrigation 
situations, growers thought it advisable to build up rows and plant the seed on top of the 
ridges of soil.  With this, a farmer could irrigate immediately after planting and not be 
concerned that a seedling would be unable to break through any dry crust that developed 
after irrigation.  In sandy soils, windier conditions, or for certain irrigation methods, 
producers thought it best to plant the seed in the bottom of a furrow, as would be the case 
when using a lister planter—a lister plow with a planter unit in the back.  With this method 
the seed is in firmer and moister soil, and the plant is better watered at times of irrigation 
later in the season. 
Figure 10.  Diagrams of Furrow Types 
(a) Traditional Deep V-furrow.  (b) Hudspeth-style Shallow V-furrow.  (c) W-furrow. 
Source:  Drawing by the author based on Matthews, “History of the Lubbock Experiment Station,” 72, 76. 
The depth of these furrows (fig. 10) was the subject of a Texas research project after 
World War II, where investigators found that shallow furrows resulted in earlier, more 
complete seed germination and harvester efficiency improved because the lowest plant 
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branches were elevated to reach the machine.  A subsequent Oklahoma A&M research 
project combined the benefits of planting in the furrow bottom by creating a small ridge 
down the center—called a W furrow (fig. 10c)—to provide ample moisture but avoid the 
problems with crusted soil.  All of these methods were common throughout the Cotton 
West.25 
Many planter units included some type of covering shovel or press wheel to put soil 
back over the freshly planted seed.  Farmers later found that implements with press-rim 
wheels behind the chutes, instead of the earlier shovels and single-rim wheels, were more 
effective.  The wheel pressed the seed firmly into the ground, insuring that it was indeed 
beneath the surface.  USDA researchers had recognized as early as 1905 that the use of a 
press wheel sometimes resulted in poor stands of growth because either the soil dried out too 
soon, causing a failure to germinate, or the wheel created a compacted surface that a seedling 
could not break through.  In the mid-1920s USDA researchers developed a new device with a 
heavy roller to press the seed into wet soils, followed by a chain or shovel that left a lighter 
soil mulch on the top.  Farmers in the San Joaquin Valley reportedly began using this 
modification on the planters in 1925.  Texas researchers reported that a rubber-covered wheel 
offered better results than earlier steel or wood wheels and vigorously pursued improvements 
to the design in studies that were part of the Regional Cotton Mechanization Project studies 
after World War II.26 
Western cotton laborers spent about six hours per acre each season chopping cotton, as 
opposed to twenty-three to thirty-four hours per acre in regions in the Old South cotton belt.  
Again, this disparity was largely because of regional variations in planting practices.  USDA 
researchers presented the arguments both ways.  Planting relatively close together was 
advantageous as a means of controlling weeds and vegetative growth of the cotton plants 
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themselves, which resulted in more leaves and less fruiting bolls.  The greater density with 
more plants made up the difference in lost yield.  A 1925 report from California, though, 
suggested that the best fields had resulted from spacing cotton rows as much as four feet 
apart.  The higher the density of planted seeds, the more likely some kind of thinning or 
chopping was needed.  The lower the density (within and between rows), the less likely a 
producer would need to chop his cotton.  Manufacturers developed a variety of mechanical 
cotton choppers for use with tractors prior to 1940, but as western growers seldom chopped 
their cotton, few of them purchased or used these machines in the West.27 
Two- and four-row cultivators became particularly common after the introduction of 
the row-crop tractor in the late 1920s.  Prior to that time the only tractors available were large 
machines with a low base and a wide wheel-width.  The increased height on the row-crop 
tractor allowed the operator to drive above growing plants.  Designers made the McCormick-
Deering Farmall Regular tractor specifically to accommodate a four-row cultivator 
attachment and required only one laborer—the driver.  Thus, these new cultivators further 
replaced laborers.  Where one cultivation by hand took approximately 3.6 hours per acre, 
four mechanized cultivations over the course of the season could be accomplished at a rate of 
2.3 to 3 hours per acre total.28 
Cultivators came in a variety of forms, which farmers might employ at different times 
of the year.  The traditional type had sets of shovels or sweeps that straddled the plant row.  
These ranged from the one-horse, one-half row walking cultivator up to two-row riding units 
and the four-row, tractor-mounted cultivator.  A variation replaced some or all of the shovels 
with disks, either individually or in gangs of three or more.  Operators turned their gang disks 
at an angle to control the amount of dirt thrown to or from around the plant.  Combinations of 
the two were also common.  In either case, many units had “fenders” or hoods to protect the 
plants as the implement passed by.  A near variant classified as its own type of cultivator was 
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a rotary hoe—a rimless wheel with curved spokes or teeth which cut into the ground surface.  
Rotary hoes were better for managing the soil than killing anything but the smallest of weeds.  
Rotary hoes, used at a high rate of speed, were ideal for breaking a crusty soil after a rain to 
help cotton seedlings emerge.  Because of this, western cotton producers were more likely to 
use a shovel or disk cultivator than a rotary hoe.29 
A somewhat curious development in field cultivation after World War II that elicited 
much testing and discussion throughout southern and western cotton production was flame 
cultivators.  Traditional cultivators killed weeds by cutting them apart.  A flame cultivator 
killed weeds by burning them, leaving no plant or seed residue that could regerminate.  The 
government granted the first patents for flame cultivators in 1900, but they were unpopular 
because of the higher potential for damaging cotton plants until the labor shortages of World 
War II emerged and interest revived.  A new type of burner used with LP (propane or butane) 
gas in 1948 had a smaller and flatter flame.  Extension researchers found that when properly 
adjusted, these units were effective at eliminating small weeds and grasses in early season 
cotton without affecting the young plants or soil.  Some publications suggested flame 
cultivation could be employed up to the time that bolls emerged.  Flame cultivators reached 
the height of popularity in the early 1960s.  They presumably fell out of favor as fuel prices 
skyrocketed during the oil crises of the late 1960s and 1970s.  In addition Elanco Products 
introduced the commercial herbicide chemical Treflan in 1964.  Where flame cultivation was 
used, most extension publications advocated supplementing it with traditional cultivators.  
The traditional cultivator, although more time-consuming, performed just as effective a job at 
less cost.30 
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Mechanical equipment for irrigation was more a matter of how a field was prepared 
prior to planting rather than some device used during the growing season.  Thus, the time 
needed for irrigation was frequently how long additional laborers moved pipes, opened gates, 
or ran pumps.  In the heavily irrigated areas of California (San Joaquin and Imperial 
Valleys), Arizona (Salt River Valley), New Mexico, and Far West Texas (Rio Grande and 
Pecos River valleys), farmers took anywhere from forty-seven to seventy-seven labor hours 
per acre just to water crops.  The wide range of variation was likely due to year-to-year 
changes in precipitation.31 
The two most common means of irrigation were flooding between borders and 
watering in furrows.  Borders might consist of small temporary ridges or more permanent 
levees.  Either could be formed with disk cultivators or plows and finished with a V ditcher.  
The use of furrows and the implications in planting were discussed earlier, with the furrows 
being created by plows prior to or as part of the planting process.  Another innovation was 
using a special attachment called a damming lister or basin lister to create small dams in a 
furrow while plowing.  The dams, spaced eight to ten feet apart, retained water from rainfall 
or irrigation without allowing much runoff.  It is unknown where the damming lister 
originated, but descriptions of it appear in experiment station bulletins around the country 
(for several row crops) starting in the 1930s.  There is little evidence to prove that they were 
commonly used in the Cotton West, though, until several Texas studies reported on “diked 
fields” in the 1970s.  Furrow diking eventually became a popular water conservation tool 
extensively advocated by the High Plains Underground Water Conservation District, which 
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reported that for every inch of water retained by the dikes an inch of underground aquifer 
irrigation water was saved.32 
The use of tractors helped western cotton farmers by almost completely mechanizing 
plowing, planting, and cultivating, thus aiding in the increase of farm size and reducing pre-
harvest labor needs.  The labor hours required to raise cotton during these stages of 
production decreased from around 18 hours per acre around 1910 to about 4.5 hours per acre 
by the mid-1930s.  Mechanization of the pre-harvest stages of cotton growing, though, 
resulted in even greater amounts of cotton to harvest, thus making harvest-time problems 
worse and requiring many more laborers. 
Measuring harvesting by labor hours, as was done with the other stages, was very 
problematic; the number of hours involved per acre varied widely depending on crop yield 
and the cotton variety planted.  The preferred measuring stick was pounds of seed cotton 
harvested per person per day.  Most experienced harvesters, men and women, picked two to 
three hundred pounds a day.33 
Over the decades, inventors and scientists made many attempts to create a mechanical 
means of harvesting cotton and reduce the labor needs of the harvest period.  Nearly all 
prototype mechanical harvesters, however, were technically impractical, too costly, and 
produced markedly inferior-quality cotton as compared to hand-harvested.  Thus, hand 
harvesting of cotton remained the only economically viable option for most cotton farmers 
until World War II—the point at which commercial-production cotton harvesters became 
widely available and used.34 
Mechanization of Cotton Harvesting 
Economist James Street wrote in 1957 that if the tractor was the symbol of partial 
mechanization in cotton production, then the mechanical harvester is the symbol of complete 
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mechanization.35  Even after the introduction of tractors and larger implements, cotton 
harvesting still had to be done by hand.  For decades, innovators working with cotton were 
unable to find the “technological breakthrough” to make a feasible mechanical harvester.  
Between 1850 and 1931 the U.S. Patent Office granted over 750 patents for mechanical 
harvesters or their components.36 
Of all the patents issued by World War II for any number of machines, only six 
prototype harvesters seemed feasible.  Of those only two—pickers and strippers—wound up 
in mass production.  Picker-type machines pluck the cotton from the bolls (as one would by 
hand) using spindles, fingers, or prongs.  Farmers could use these machines at any time in the 
season without damaging either plant foliage or unopened bolls, so they could operate them 
as soon as bolls began opening.  Cotton pickers emerged as the harvester choice for all of the 
southern and western cotton belts except for the plains of Texas and western Oklahoma.37 
The mechanical cotton picker and its use in the Cotton West are one of the unusual 
contrasts in comparison with the South.  Where state or federal experiment stations 
developed or heavily influenced almost every aspect of production and machinery in the 
West, the mechanical cotton picker is one of the only items from the traditional Cotton 
South, developed largely by private manufacturers, that was subsequently adopted in the 
Cotton West prior to 1950. 
Historians have traced the basis of the cotton picker back to the work of Angus 
Campbell, an engineer for Deering Harvester Company.  In 1885 he began experimenting 
with designs of spindles with rotating fingers to twist and pull cotton from the boll.  
Campbell and numerous other inventors throughout the South worked on significant spindle-
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type picker designs from the 1890s to the 1920s.  Notable among these was P. P. Haring of 
Texas, who over thirty years developed several prototypes that he demonstrated for Deering 
and subsequently the International Harvester Company to no avail.  In 1912 Campbell and 
Theodore Price, another private inventor like Haring, combined elements from both their 
designs into what was called the Price-Campbell cotton picker.  The machine never reached 
commercial production, however, because of its complexity, high cost to build, and 
difficulties in damaging cotton plants or breaking down in the fields.38 
International Harvester Company (IHC) very much wanted to produce a mechanical 
cotton harvester.  Starting from its formation in 1902 from the merger of several companies, 
including Deering Harvester Company, IHC spent an estimated $5,250,000 on developing a 
commercially feasible mechanical cotton picker over the next four decades.  After 
investigating all the patents available and using its previous experience, IHC bought the 
Price-Campbell patents for a machine with rotating barbed spindles in 1924.  Over the next 
six years, IHC engineers developed seven different prototypes with variations in shape, size, 
and arrangement of the spindles.  They field-tested the machines, starting in the Rio Grande 
Valley and working their way north and east across Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee.39 
At the same time, Texas brothers John and Mack Rust were developing and testing 
their own cotton picker.  Using some of the concepts from the Haring machines, the Rust 
Brothers improved the way a machine removed cotton.  For several years many engineers 
had figured out ways to get the cotton out of the boll with some sort of spindle but had been 
less successful getting the lint off the spindle.  John receives the credit for introducing 
moisture to the process.  He remembered from his youth how the morning dew would cause 
cotton to stick to his fingers.  He also recalled how his grandmother moistened the spindle of 
her spinning wheel to get the cotton to adhere and start threading.  He came up with a new 
design which incorporated dampened wire spindles to remove the cotton that, in turn, were 
stripped of the lint which was conveyed to a storage basket.  The 1928 patented Rust 
Harvester was soon demonstrating great effectiveness at mechanical harvesting in field trials 
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in Texas and Mississippi, drawing great praise from many farmers and agricultural engineers.  
The Rust brothers recognized that the machine would have to be mass produced to be 
affordable, but for many years they refused to license the design to an established implement 
manufacturer for fear they would lose control over the spread of the machine and the profits 
that would go with it.40 
The delays by the Rust Brothers ultimately worked to IHC’s advantage.  Their 
engineers applied Rust’s concept of moistened spindles in their testing.  They also made a 
critical decision in 1940 to invert the construction of the harvester.  For several years IHC 
had built harvester units that would mount to or be pulled behind their Farmall tractors, but 
the setup had resulted in plants getting knocked over or damaged prior to the cotton reaching 
the harvester unit.  The new design mounted the picking unit on the rear of the tractor, which 
was driven in reverse.  The operator had better vision of the rows, and the plants directly 
entered the picker before encountering any other parts of the machine.  The improved design 
also incorporated rubber doffers to remove the fibers from the spindles and an air conveyor 
to blow the lint into an overhead container.  By mid-1942 IHC executives believed they had a 
machine ready for commercial production.  Manufacturing restrictions resulting from World 
War II meant IHC limited their production.  Less than two hundred pickers were made, in the 
shop by hand, between 1941 and 1947.  In their first year of full production (1948), IHC built 
over a thousand new units at a retail cost of $5,985 (not including the tractor).  They 
continued improving the design and cutting the cost, assembling more than eight thousand 
cotton pickers for $2,800 each by 1952.  Their first two-row cotton picker came out in 1956.  
Most of these units ended up either in the Mississippi Delta region or California.41 
The Rust Brothers tried to make it on their own but could not raise the financing to 
build a manufacturing plant.  No doubt influenced by IHC’s announcement, they decided in 
the mid-1940s to license their design to Allis-Chalmers and a small Arkansas manufacturer 
named Ben Pearson, Inc.  In the 1950s J. I. Case Company and Massey-Harris-Ferguson 
introduced versions of the Rust harvester built by Pearson and mounted on their respective 
tractors.  The latecomer was Deere and Company, who finally introduced commercial 
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production with their No. 8 Cotton Picker in the early 1950s, bringing mechanical pickers to 
the implement lines of every American farm equipment company.42 
The mechanical harvester adopted in the High Plains region was the cotton stripper.  
Unlike the cotton picker, the evolution of the cotton stripper was heavily influenced by state 
agricultural experiment stations.  A cotton stripper removed all of the bolls off the cotton 
plant, including any “bollie cotton” which had failed to open or mature due to bad weather or 
an early freeze.  Patents for stripper harvesters dated back to as early as 1871, but no 
practical machine was made until the 1910s.43 
The 1914 cotton crop was one of the first “bumper crops” on the Texas South Plains.  
While yields were high, prices were low, meaning that hand-harvesting cost more than the 
crop was worth.  One farmer decided to use a picket fence pulled by a horse team to strip the 
bolls off the plant.  This situation marked the beginning of scattered attempts by farmers to 
make their own primitive “sled strippers” when prices were low over the next decade.  
Depending on materials and design, a sled cost from $10 to $30 to make and cost about $2.50 
a bale to operate.  This compared to $15.75 a bale for hand-harvesting in the region.44 
Conditions in 1926 motivated Texas Agricultural Experiment Station (TAES) 
researchers to develop a mechanical harvester for the High Plains.  That November the 
enormous windstorm occurred that was discussed in the preceding chapter about the 
beginnings of “stormproof” cottonseed.  The next year researchers at the Lubbock Substation 
began a comprehensive study of mechanical harvesting and the cotton best suited to harvest 
by machine in the region—a program that continued for fourteen years.45 
One of the program’s important discoveries was that plants of most cotton varieties 
tended to branch out too much to use with a mechanical harvester.  Thus, as TAES 
researchers worked to improve stormproof cotton characteristics, they did it hand-in-hand 
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while developing a suitable mechanical harvester.  As one historian put it, “Mechanical 
harvesters were not practical until cotton breeders could design the plant to fit the 
machine.”46 
The TAES had an extensive testing program for harvesting equipment.  However, with 
much of the interest nationally being placed on a mechanical picker, only a handful of 
commercially produced stripper units existed.  International Harvester Company briefly had a 
one- or two-row stripper attachment for their Farmall tractor but found it impractical and, 
instead, focused on developing a cotton picker.  Aside from the Smith-Conrad Cotton 
Stripper, produced for just a few years by a Fort Worth manufacturer, the only company that 
showed any interest in stripper technologies was Deere and Company.  They manufactured 
their first production-model stripper in 1929—the horse-drawn Model 30—a full two 
decades before they sold a picker harvester.  Not only did they send stripper prototypes for 
testing by the Lubbock Substation, they also sent their own team of engineers to observe the 
tests between 1927 and 1930.47 
Generally content with their commercial models, Deere discontinued sending 
prototypes for testing by TAES in 1930.  Still wanting to experiment and improve the 
concepts involved, TAES researchers opted to build their own cotton stripper.  They used the 
tractor-mounted Texas Station Cotton Harvester (fig. 11) each season and usually overhauled 
it completely each year between 1930 and 1945 to test various components and principles.  
The “Texas Harvester” usually opened the season with initial field tests at College Station 
before it was shipped to Lubbock for the bulk of the Plains cotton harvest.  Over the years, 
the TAES improved components for the rollers that pulled off cotton bolls, a new burr 
extractor and cleaning unit, and an auger design to move cotton back into a trailer.48 
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Figure 11.  Texas Station Cotton Harvester 
Source:  Smith et al., Mechanical Harvesting of Cotton, 6-7. 
The economic results were very favorable.  In early tests researchers reported that the 
Texas Station Cotton Harvester cleared a field at the rate of 1.75 hours per acre at a net cost 
of $3.08 per 500-pound bale of ginned cotton.  The comparable cost of hand-snapping the 
cotton came to $15.75 a bale.  Including the cost of ginning and labor costs, the hand-
harvested cotton was $26.25 a bale, while using the Texas Station Cotton Harvester cost only 
$14.08, a savings of over $12 per bale.  The savings increased as efficiency improved, 
commercial machines became available, and labor costs increased.  For the 1944 season the 
TAES estimated that machine-only harvested cotton cost around $7-8 per bale versus $29-42 
per bale for entirely hand-harvested cotton, a savings of up to $30 per bale.49 
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In 1943 the TAES began licensing the Texas Harvester design for commercial 
production, resulting in as many as 1,000 mechanical cotton strippers by 1945.  Deere and 
Company also had monitored the TAES testing and in 1942 resumed production of cotton 
strippers with their first tractor-mounted type, the John Deere No. 15 Cotton Harvester.  They 
quickly capitalized on their earlier stripper work and the TAES research to become the 
leading manufacturer of cotton strippers, producing 4,000 units between 1946 and 1948 at a 
retail price of $905.  By 1953 the National Cotton Council estimated that there were over 
18,000 cotton strippers available for harvesting work in the United States.50 
The cotton stripper continued to evolve over the next several years.  Manufacturers 
added overhead baskets to replace the trailing wagon to collect the cotton—a move that 
purportedly reduced labor needs by 40 percent in one-bale per acre cotton.  Mounted at the 
back of the stripper, the popular Fowler Air-Blast Attachment—a combination separator, 
distributor, cleaner, and blower unit—helped eliminate the laborer on the trailer who had 
manually raked cotton back as it came out of the stripper.  This accessory increased profits 
by $35 a bale.  The Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station also got involved when, in 
1949, they replaced the metal roller component with fiber nylon brushes.  In 1953 Johnson 
Manufacturing Company of Lubbock introduced what was not only one of the first four-row 
harvesters anywhere but one of the first self-propelled strippers ever produced—two 
innovations that other companies did not adopt until the 1970s.51 
Despite the existence of some commercial mechanical cotton harvesters prior to World 
War II, it took the introduction of the International Harvester’s cotton picker into the 
Mississippi Delta and California during the war years to alleviate the shortage of hand-
harvesting laborers to really kick off the final transition—one which mostly took place in the 
Cotton West.  In 1945 an estimated 3 percent of cotton was mechanically harvested in the 
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Southwest and about 1 percent in the Far West (table 2).  Within ten years farmers 
mechanically harvested 52 percent of Far Western and 24 percent of Southwestern (probably 
almost entirely in the High Plains region) fields.  California reported that machines picked 67 
percent of its cotton, leading all of the cotton-producing states of the country.  By 1970 
several states reported that producers harvested all of their cotton mechanically.  The lag in 
switching in some areas—throughout the United States, not just in the Cotton West—
probably can be attributed to the availability of laborers through the Bracero Program 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five) through 1964.  This allowed some traditionalists 
and smaller farms, particularly in the South, to use a cheaper labor source without buying 
new equipment.52 
Table 2.  Percentages of Cotton Crop Mechanically Harvested, 1945-1955 
State 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
California * * * * 13 34 53 59 59 62 67 
Arizona * * * * 4 9 26 46 54 44 39 
New Mexico * * * * 3 1 7 12 15 10 16 
Texas * * * * 11 12 19 22 24 21 24 
Oklahoma * * * * 2 6 13 17 19 15 20 
            
Far West N 1 N 6 9 23 41 50 53 50 52 
Southwest 3 2 6 6 10 12 18 22 24 21 24 
Mid-South 1 N N 2 2 2 5 6 13 15 22 
Southeast N N N 1 N N 2 2 5 3 2 
            
United States 1 N 2 3 6 8 15 18 22 22 23 
Source: Based on table 7 from Street, New Revolution in the Cotton Economy, 167. 
Notes: N – less than 0.5 percent.  * – not reported by state.  Region groupings in the report: Far West—Calif., 
Ariz., N.Mex.; Southwest—Tex., Okla.; Mid-South—Miss., La., Ark., Tenn., Mo.; Southeast—Va., N.C., S.C., 
Ga., Fla., Ala.  Almost all the mechanically harvested cotton reported in the Southwest is from the western 
halves of those states, which falls within the Cotton West.  The eastern halves of those two states probably had 
rates closer to that for the Southeast. 
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The process of mechanization and the transition from horse-drawn to tractor-drawn 
equipment ultimately represented an ability for western cotton farmers to increase their 
production and do it with fewer laborers than they had before World War II.  Oklahoma 
researcher P. H. Stephens noted this fact in 1930, even before mechanical harvesting began: 
One of the reasons for the recent rapid introduction of power machinery in the western 
cotton country was the lack of hindering customs and the progressive nature of a 
pioneering type of farmer.  Further, the change from large, mule-drawn equipment to 
tractor equipment in the western cotton country does not precipitate the revolution in 
farm organization and business methods that the institution of power equipment makes 
necessary in the areas of small farms or on plantations [of the South].53 
For these reasons, there was a general openness to adopt and alter cotton production methods 
in the Cotton West.  While they were not the only influence upon farmers, the newly 
established network of state and federal agricultural experiment stations and extension agents 
and their publications were a key element in researching and engineering the expansion of 
western cotton production. 
The Role of Extension Research and Publications 
As discussed in previous chapters, the agricultural experiment stations and the federal 
government were primarily responsible for much of the development of western cotton 
varieties.  Similarly, I have referred earlier in this chapter to the work of state agricultural 
experiment stations to improve (or invent) cotton equipment—most notably in the 
development of the mechanical cotton stripper. 
As noted in earlier chapters, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its array of 
scientists and experiment stations played a major role in researching and instituting a new 
cotton industry in the West, particularly in California and Arizona up to 1930.  They issued 
dozens of publications under the main USDA serials—USDA Bulletins, USDA Circulars, 
Department Circulars, Farmers’ Bulletins, Miscellaneous Publications, and Technical 
Bulletins.  The Bureau of Plant Industry played a key role in development of cotton varieties 
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and recommendations on planting practices, starting from its first publications on western 
cotton in 1906 up to the 1920s.  
Since the USDA played such an important role in research, especially in California, it 
is perhaps not unexpected to find that the Arizona and California agricultural experiment 
stations did not publish extensively about cotton on their own.  As the USDA focused its 
work at the Shafter Experiment Station in California, the Arizona Agricultural Experiment 
Station increased its output of bulletins, starting about the 1930s.  Among California’s two 
dozen bulletins, the most significant began appearing in the 1940s as mechanization of cotton 
harvesting and adjustments in farm practices emerged in the San Joaquin Valley. 
As described in an earlier section, the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station (TAES) 
played a critical role in developing and disseminating knowledge on, first, cotton varieties 
and, later, on mechanical cotton strippers.  Since Texas was the largest cotton producing 
state, it is not surprising to know TAES published more on cotton than any of the other states 
in this study—well over two hundred bulletins, circulars, and progress reports starting in 
1888 up to 1960.  Between 1904 and 1934 staff from several substations and the main office 
at College Station published about twenty bulletins and progress reports specifically on 
variety experiments and evaluations of the best seed for particular areas of the state.  As the 
importance of breeding receded, attention shifted between 1932 and 1960 toward mechanical 
harvesters.  Most of the publications came out of the Lubbock substation, most about 
strippers with several making economic observations on hand versus mechanical harvesting.  
The results were important to farmers, manufacturers, and the overall development of the 
new cotton industry, particularly on the Texas High Plains.54 
Their influence was not limited to informing farmers on strippers; their work was 
equally important for other agricultural engineers working on mechanical harvester designs.  
Bulletin 452, The Mechanical Harvesting of Cotton, included major sections describing the 
evolutionary development of the major types of harvesters and included a list of all registered 
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patents from 1850 to 1931.  This bulletin became a key bibliographic item for contemporary 
work by other state experiment stations and private companies and in subsequent work by 
historians.55 
Did all these reports of agricultural experiments and extension work, whether through 
bulletins and circulars or through the local work of a county agent, really have a significant 
effect?  Study of the effectiveness of extension work began even before a fully established 
network of agricultural extension agents existed in the 1910s.  A 1913 study found that in a 
national sampling, 84 percent of the farmers who received extension bulletins read them; 48 
percent practiced some of the ideas they obtained from them.  Follow-up studies in the 
1920s, which examined a variety of methods, point out that demonstrations and visits by 
extension personnel to cotton farms were more significant factors than publications, but fully 
a third were influenced by indirect means such as hearing from other farmers and agricultural 
businesses.  Overall, the most effective means of communication as far as an extension 
worker’s time was news articles.  Several studies reported that the amount of farmers using 
extension bulletins and adopting practices they had read about ranged between 62 and 68 
percent.  Analysts attributed this increase to the development of the nationwide network of 
county agents, thus affirming (at least to the analysts) the effectiveness of bulletins in 
extension teaching.56 
A 1926 survey report asked farmers what they thought of extension services.  Sixty-six 
percent indicated they thought favorably of what experiment stations and extension agents 
did, with only 4 percent who outwardly opposed the work.  The same study indicated that 49 
percent had made changes based on what they had heard in the community.  A 1947 study in 
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Lubbock County, Texas, asked many similar questions in a small survey in the heart of a key 
cotton-growing area.  About 80 percent of respondents were familiar with the Extension 
Service; nearly as many could name the county agricultural agent.  Nine out of ten people 
thought favorably of extension work, and a majority of farmers had adopted extension-
recommended practices.  Lastly, 65 percent of survey participants believed that extension 
work benefited the community as a whole, not just farmers.57 
As radios became popular, the Extension Service examined how this communication 
form influenced farmers.  Nationwide, 94 percent of farmers had heard a county agent’s radio 
program, with about one-fourth being regular listeners.  Investigators believed that as many 
as half adopted practices described in these programs.  Analysts contended that radio took 
extension work to an entirely new group who had never participated in any extension activity 
before.  A 1950 article in Rural Sociology affirmed the increased importance of mass media 
in conjunction with extension publications and contacts.  However, it pointed out that 
increasingly farmers looked to well-established neighbors and businesses over other sources 
of information on farming practices.  This detail is significant to a study of the development 
of the Cotton West.  In the early decades of the twentieth century, when there were no 
established cotton farms, new producers would, of course, look to state and federal 
experiment stations and extension personnel for advice on how to grow cotton in these newly 
established areas.  By mid-century the western cotton industry was well established and 
extension publications were becoming less effective after World War II—a fact reflected in 
the decrease of extension materials after about 1950.58 
The research work of state agricultural experiment stations continued after World War 
II, even as the nature of extension work and reporting to the public changed.  In 1946 
Congress passed the Research and Marketing Act, which included additional appropriations 
for special research projects.  Emphasis was given to those projects where two or more state 
agricultural experiment stations cooperate “to solve problems that concern the agriculture of 
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more than one state.”  In one of the first endeavors to involve the entire U.S. cotton industry, 
representatives from fifteen states met to establish the National Cotton Mechanization 
Project.  Headquartered at the Delta Branch Experiment Station at Stoneville, Mississippi, 
research on various phases of production took place from South Carolina to California.59 
For example, the Texas and Oklahoma AES focused on the issues of cotton production 
in the “Southwest region” (Texas and Oklahoma).  The Lubbock Station concentrated on 
issues regarding planting.  Supported by testing assistance from Oklahoma A&M, 
investigators identified both mechanical factors and changes in farming practices which led 
to new alterations of mechanical equipment and planting methods. Similar testing was 
undertaken in other states for the Far West (Arizona, California, and New Mexico), 
investigating both local conditions and the role of irrigation and its relation to mechanization.  
The California AES and the Shafter Experiment Station coordinated at least one project to 
more closely match cotton breeding improvements with mechanization efforts.60 
S. P. Lyle reported in 1955 that state and federal extension officials played an integral 
role in spreading the knowledge about how to properly use the recently introduced 
mechanical harvesters.  They solicited assistance from manufacturers and local dealers to set 
up schools for picker operators.  In conjunction with the National Cotton Mechanization 
Project, state and federal agencies were critical in both improving and promoting new 
mechanical equipment for every stage of production.61  With so many new developments 
emerging, USDA officials, the National Cotton Council of America, representatives of farm 
machinery manufacturers, and agricultural engineers looked for new means to share their 
results with each other.  The outcome was the annual Beltwide Cotton Mechanization 
Conference, which began in 1947.  The conferences increased the sharing of machinery 
improvements throughout the American cotton industry, which in turn were tested and 
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reported to farmers through the traditional extension methods of experiment farms, special 
schools and field tours, and publications.62 
With the coordination of research and reporting throughout the Cotton West and South 
as exhibited by the National Cotton Mechanization Project and the beltwide cotton 
conferences, the mechanization of the South began catching up with that of the West from 
1950 through the 1970s.  While individual regions continued to improve upon production 
methods, the distinctions diminished as farm sizes increased, the use of large commercial 
equipment expanded, and national and international economic factors and policies became 
more and more influential.  Economist James Street suggested that the process of 
mechanization was irreversible.  He also acknowledged that there were great social 
implications, which would fall upon those groups who were the workers of the cotton fields. 
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CHAPTER V   
LABORERS OF THE COTTON FIELDS 
The rise of cotton farming in the Southwest is very different from the simple expansion 
story of the South, particularly as far as labor is concerned.  Producers in modern-day 
California dabbled in cotton farming as early as the 1790s.  Between 1854 and 1890, they 
made more serious efforts in the San Joaquin Valley to raise short-staple cotton for 
commercial sale using seed from the Old South cotton belt.  Few local people knew how to 
harvest cotton, so landowners brought in experienced African Americans from the South.  
These workers often were unemployed during the off-harvest months and subsequently 
disappeared, requiring new recruiting efforts and training each year.  By 1890 these earliest 
cotton farmers had given up trying to grow cotton commercially or for profit in California.  
Most observers agreed that labor and transportation costs were too high to grow cotton 
economically in the state.1 
As discussed to this point, the first decades of the twentieth century witnessed 
widespread expansion of the cotton-producing areas into the Southwest.  The government’s 
introduction and encouragement of cotton farming in western Texas and Oklahoma and 
irrigated areas of Arizona, California, and the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico and Texas 
increased the need for labor to raise and harvest the crop. By the 1930s farmers had become 
established with their particular varieties—long-staple Pima or Acala in California and 
Arizona and short-staple Uplands in Texas—and practices for raising cotton in their 
respective regions.  Mechanization and large farm sizes resulted in periods when additional, 
seasonal labor was needed, particularly for harvesting in the late fall and early winter.  Thus, 
laborers were in the fields year-round. 
This chapter examines the role of labor in the Cotton West during its establishment and 
formative development.  The use and type of various farming implements and means of 
harvesting, discussed in the previous chapter, are obviously linked to the people using—or 
being replaced by—mechanized equipment.  Over the course of the several decades 
considered here, the ethnic background of the laborers of the cotton fields went through 
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several dramatic shifts, affected in part by mechanization and in larger part by the 
government politics and policies of the day.  Combined, these factors affected the wages paid 
to laborers, which varied depending on who was available to work and in what quantities. 
Types and Amount of Cotton Labor 
As they became available, western cotton farmers used tractors to almost completely 
mechanize plowing, planting, and cultivating, thus aiding in the increase of farm size and 
reducing pre-harvest labor needs.  The labor hours required to raise cotton during these 
stages decreased from approximately 18 hours per acre around 1910 to about 4.5 hours per 
acre by the mid-1930s.  Mechanization of the pre-harvest stages of cotton growing, though, 
resulted in even greater amounts of cotton to harvest, thus making harvest-time problems 
worse and requiring many more laborers. 
Figure 12.  Seasonal Labor Employed on Arizona Cotton Farms, 1935 
Source:  Brown and Cassmore, Migratory Cotton Pickers, 54. 
Note:  This illustration does not include full-year wage laborers or family laborers.  However, as figure 13 
below shows, the number of regular laborers is a year-round constant that would uniformly raise the man-days 
of labor for each month. 
Figure 12 demonstrates the premise that cotton farms needed laborers throughout the 
year.  The peaks on this graphic, showing seasonal labor employed on Arizona cotton farms 
in 1935, came during the chopping and cultivating season (May–June, to a lesser extent 
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through August) and during the harvest (September through early January).  Farmers also 
needed laborers for every other stage of production, though in lesser numbers than during the 
peak periods. 
Since the majority of labor needs were at the peak periods—chopping in late-spring 
and particularly the end-of-year harvest—and in lesser amounts the rest of the time, then 
there must be other methods of categorizing laborers other than by their ethnic group, which 
most historians appear to prefer.  A 1940 USDA report provides one important classification, 
defining three major categories of cotton laborers.2 
The first group in the report was share laborers, people who worked for part of the 
cotton crop.  This included sharecroppers, who supplied the labor, used the owner’s 
equipment to work the owner’s land, and received half of the produced crop.  The category 
also encompassed share tenants, who owned their own equipment and rented the land of the 
owner in exchange for one-fourth of the cotton and one-third of any other crops produced.3 
Another category of workers was wage laborers, consisting of two divisions: regular 
and seasonal.  Regular laborers were typically stable, skilled workers who were hired by the 
month, crop season, year, or longer (fig. 13).  These were the “hired hands” that drove 
tractors or horse teams, repaired barns, fixed machinery, tended livestock, and performed 
regular farming tasks.  The latter included general plowing, planting, and cultivating, as well 
as chopping and harvesting cotton.  Often these “full-year” laborers, many of whom were 
“privileged” to be employed up to 360 days a year full-time, were heads of their households 
accompanied by their families.  Full-year laborers might be paid weekly, monthly, or after 
the harvest.  Part of their compensation might come in the form of perquisites such as owner-
supplied housing.  The whole family lived on or near the farm, and the wife and children 
were part-time, seasonal workers during peak-labor periods.4 
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Figure 13.  Full-Year (Regular) and Seasonal Labor on Arizona Irrigated Farms in All Crops 
Source:  Brown and Cassmore, Migratory Cotton Pickers in Arizona, 54. 
Note:  Notice that the number of man-days of full-year (regular) labor is almost exactly constant year-round, 
which correlates with the thirty percent of all agricultural labor man-hours noted in the text. 
Seasonal laborers were usually unskilled workers on short-term employment and were 
paid by the day, hour, or piece rate.  Sometimes they were local residents.  If not, officials 
labeled them as migrant laborers.  Seasonal laborers not only had to work at several locations 
doing a particular task, they likely had to work in several different crops or industries in 
order to earn income through the entire year.  In any given year for all agricultural crops, 
seasonal labor made up about 70 percent of all wage laborers.  The remaining 30 percent 
were regular, full-year wage laborers (fig. 13).5 
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The final group of laborers was family laborers (fig. 14).  These were the owner-
operators of their own land, together with their wives and children.  Figure 14 is a typical 
representation of how important family labor was throughout the year and how much it was 
supplemented by hired wage laborers.  The seasonal, migrant laborers of the harvest period, 
so often the focus of historians, actually constitutes only a small portion of the overall labor 
needs, not only during the harvest but also year-round.  While figure 14 includes all 
agricultural pursuits, one would have found a similar relationship in the percentage of family 
laborers versus hired laborers specifically for cotton farms on a year-round basis.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the seasonal nature of cotton farming meant that producers 
needed a relatively few year-round hired laborers with many more during peak periods of 
chopping and harvesting cotton. 
 
Figure 14.  Comparison of Family Labor and Wage Labor (All Agricultural Employment, 1936) 
Source:  Free, Seasonal Employment in Agriculture, 9. 
As with the simple USDA classifications, one can categorize cotton laborers by their 
gender or age and summarize their work experiences.  The vast majority of workers in all the 
laborer categories were men.  However, women and children made up significant portions of 
the labor pool, particularly in the seasonal wage labor and family labor categories.  Women 
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and children generally worked as cotton choppers and harvesters during the periods of 
greatest need. 
Women worked similar hours to those of men—eight to twelve hours a day.  A few 
also helped with plowing and cultivating, particularly in less-settled areas and on family-
owned farms.  In many areas, though, one researcher reported that women were ashamed to 
say they had ever done that kind of work because the farming community viewed plowing 
and cultivating as strictly men’s chores.  Outsiders viewed plowing or cultivating as easier 
work than chopping or harvesting because one rode implements or tractors.  The paradox of 
the women’s shame about plowing or cultivating, though, likely developed as part of the 
economics of cotton farming.  Women’s labor in the fields was generally not needed except 
during the rush periods around chopping and harvesting times.  The shame of plowing or 
cultivating developed into a chivalric protection myth of women.6 
A Texas study identified differences in the amount of total labor by women of different 
ethnic groups.  Anglo American women performed an average of 4.1 months of cotton field 
work a year, while Mexican women worked 4.3 months and African American women 
worked 5.67 months.  The figures for American and Mexican women seem plausible for 
female workers across the western cotton belt, as much of their work came during the three 
to four months of the harvest period each fall.7 
Like their mothers, children did much of their work during the cotton harvests.  “Child 
labor was a form of apprenticeship,” particularly among Mexican American laborers.  By age 
eight most children picked cotton in the fields beside their parents and older siblings.  The 
need for children’s labor during the harvest was sufficient enough in most years to cause 
officials to close school for several weeks during the peak period.  Many children also 
worked in the fields as part of their after-school chores, both during the harvest and 
performing other tasks.  Seventy percent of the children in a 1924 U. S. Department of Labor 
study indicated they had chopped cotton, 14 percent had helped plant, 15 percent had run a 
cultivator, and 10 percent had done some form of plowing.  Children’s labor typically added 
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up to about four months a year, with 60 to 75 percent of that time devoted to harvesting.  
Boys tended to work slightly more (4.5 months) than girls (3.7 months).8 
By 1951 a Presidential commission reported that child labor had virtually disappeared, 
except in agriculture.  Particularly in areas where wages were suppressed because of high 
numbers of migrant laborers, “the entire family must work in the fields in order to sustain 
life.”  This was such a pervasive problem that one contractor reported that if someone 
suggested that the children “have got to go to school,” many families simply packed up and 
moved on.  Congress attempted to limit this trouble in 1949 by amending the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to provide that no child under age sixteen could be employed during school 
hours.  This situation continued to be a point of contention with producers, particularly in 
times and places of peak seasonal labor need, such as the cotton harvest.9 
These categorizations, whether by age, gender, or annual employment status, remain 
relatively stable from the beginnings of the Cotton West to its maturity in the mid-twentieth 
century.  The workers that fall within these categories, particularly among seasonal laborers, 
however, see historical shifts as more people from a number of ethnic groups move through 
the cotton industry. 
Ethnic Groups Working in the Fields 
As cotton became better established, farmers in the western cotton belt needed more 
laborers to keep up with increasing production.  Their hired laborers, prior to and during 
World War II, represented many different ethnic groups, particularly in California and 
Arizona.  The vast majority, even after the war, were Mexican or Anglo-American migrants 
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or contract workers.  As the years passed, federal government policy often dictated which of 
these groups were working in the fields at any given time. 
Until the 1930s several Asian groups found employment in cotton fields in small 
numbers for brief periods in California.  Hindus were some of the earliest pickers in the 
Imperial Valley from 1910 until the Immigration Act of 1917 excluded their coming to the 
U.S.  Observers mention Chinese workers during approximately the same period, though no 
specific localities were given other than across the Mexican border in Lower California.  
Recruiters brought in Filipino workers starting in 1923 when some producers feared that the 
government would restrict Mexican immigration.  The Filipino population increased steadily 
until 1930, in part because Filipinos were paid the least of any ethnic group.  Possibly 
because they were not very good pickers or they tended to unionize, the Filipinos quickly fell 
into disfavor to the point where growers no longer wanted them for cotton work.10 
Early in Arizona’s cotton period, growers sometimes supplemented their labor force 
with American Indians.  Their numbers were few compared to the overall total labor force 
(five hundred Papago Indians in 1913), but sometimes producers specifically desired them.  
A 1914 USDA bulletin said, “Indians are the most satisfactory laborers that can be had in 
Arizona … and have done well wherever they are employed.  They are satisfied with fair 
returns for their labor and have learned to like the work, although until recently they were 
totally unfamiliar with it.  It is of the utmost importance that this labor supply be developed 
thoroughly and that the Indians be treated fairly.”  Thus, some growers established cotton 
fields either on or near Indian reservations to use its residents as regular and seasonal 
laborers.  The Pima Indians were among the tribes who had members that took up cotton 
farming.11 
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Farmers sometimes imported African Americans from the South to California to 
harvest crops.  The prospects for year-round agricultural employment were low for these 
workers since cotton was usually the only crop they knew how to work.  Thus, they often 
drifted away before the next harvest period.  As a result growers shifted their efforts to other 
ethnic groups that would stay.  However, there were pocket groups and settlements of 
African Americans throughout the Cotton West.  Some were brought in on contract to pick 
cotton on large California ranch-farms as late as 1937.  Historian Geta LeSeur documented 
accounts in Arizona of what she called “black Okies,” African Americans from the Southern 
Plains and Arkansas who migrated westward as cotton pickers at the time of the Dust Bowl 
Anglo migrations.  There is also documentation that significant numbers of African 
Americans worked on cotton farms in Central Texas.12 
In 1926 Arizona growers imported two shiploads of Puerto Ricans to their fields as 
low-wage laborers.  The outcome was a mild disaster because the recruited workers were not 
experienced agricultural laborers.  Reportedly they were unemployed “scum” that labor 
agents found wandering on the shoreline docks, rather than laborers working on inland farm 
areas.  The first group of five hundred, plucked from a swarming crowd of over six thousand 
on the dock at departure, immediately went on strike upon reaching Arizona because the 
facilities were not what the recruiters promised.  The trouble and expense were not worth the 
growers’ time, so the second shipment of five hundred became the last.13 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans became a major labor source for cotton work in the 
western cotton belt.14  They likely were a significant portion of the work forces in Central 
and Far West Texas and New Mexico from the onset of farming in those areas.  However, 
producers did not specifically seek them out as farm workers anywhere in the West until after 
the mid- to late 1910s, when new Asian immigration restrictions and the beginnings of the 
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first World War necessitated more labor.  Growers in the late 1910s and 1920s favored 
Mexicans for several reasons.  Observers viewed Mexicans as “docile,” unionization did not 
appeal to them (as it had to Asian workers), and they left the area when their task was 
finished to look for work elsewhere.  One California ranch foreman summed up growers’ 
attitudes with the statement made to a Mexican field hand that “When we want you, we’ll 
call you; when we don’t—git.”  Americans also threatened Mexicans with deportation as a 
means to keep wages depressed.  This was particularly true in the border areas of New 
Mexico and Texas where “wet” Mexicans had crossed illegally.  Growers also favored 
Mexicans because they tended to travel and work in family groups.  These groups were more 
than a nuclear family; they often included grandparents and other relatives, as well as close 
family friends.  This structure provided a very efficient social and economic unit in which all 
members, including children, contributed.15 
Migratory Mexicans often had previous experience as cotton pickers before they 
reached or were recruited to a particular area.  In the early twentieth century Arizona and 
California recruiters sought Mexicans from the cotton-growing areas of Laguna and Baja 
California, Mexico, and in the Imperial Valley of Southern California near the Mexican 
border.  These workers were well seasoned and accustomed to long-staple cotton varieties 
when first imported to the San Joaquin Valley of Central California after 1925.  Importation 
on a grand scale for the 1926 harvest in the valley resulted in Mexicans comprising over 80 
percent of the workforce—95 percent on ranch-farms of 300 or more acres.16 
The numbers of Mexican migrants brought to the western cotton belt each year was 
fairly steady from 1917 to the late 1920s, making them the dominant ethnic laborers in many 
of the cotton-producing regions.  Late in this period, however, anti-Mexican attitudes 
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emerged in many areas, resulting in new federal restrictions, imposed deportations, and 
repatriations of Mexicans in 1929 and 1930.  Texas and California enacted protectionist 
legislation to retain as much of the remaining labor force as possible in the early 1930s.  
Federal authorities did not lift legal restrictions until 1942, a result of the wartime 
agricultural labor shortage, whereupon Mexicans again became the dominant ethnic 
workforce.  In the interim they were replaced by the other major group of cotton laborer 
workers of the West, white Anglo-Americans.17 
Much attention, both past and present, has been devoted to a particular group of Anglo-
American migrant workers—the refugees leaving the depressed and drought-stricken areas of 
the Dust Bowl region.  The beginnings of the agricultural depression in the 1920s produced 
the first Anglo-American migrants who, by 1929 and 1930, became the replacement work 
force for the declining availability of Mexican laborers.  New Deal programs, particularly 
payments made under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) after 1933, resulted in owners 
replacing sharecroppers with new tractors and mechanized equipment.  Other sharecroppers 
incurred unmanageable debt because of low prices, poor crop production, and increasing 
rents, which forced them into bankruptcy.  Some workers tried to stay on as hired hands to 
run the new equipment, while others went to towns and cities looking for work.  Faced with 
few options, many migrated westward, lured by promises and rumors of work and good 
wages in the fields of the western cotton belt or other agricultural endeavors.  This flow of 
migrant Anglo-Americans slowed, but did not end, until after World War II began.18 
Neither contemporary observers nor modern writers explicitly mentioned a large 
portion of the Anglo-American workforce.  Many of the owners and operators of cotton 
farms were Anglo-Americans, and many of the laborers were members of the owner-operator 
families.19  These workers, along with true migrant Anglo-Americans, were the largest ethnic 
labor force in several areas until the 1920s.  Several accounts observe that Mexicans were 
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“replacing” Anglo-American workers in California after World War II, particularly in the 
San Joaquin Valley, as the latter moved into higher-paying wartime industrial jobs.  Anglo-
Americans were also an almost exclusive work force on the High Plains of Texas and in 
some counties in Central Texas in the early years of cotton production in those areas.20  For 
the period between 1900 and 1942, Mexicans and Anglo-Americans were the substantial 
majority of cotton laborers in the West. 
In the late 1930s it became evident to many people that the United States might be 
forced to enter World War II.  In many parts of the Cotton West, particularly in New Mexico 
and Arizona, the traditional patterns of local and migrant labor began disappearing.  Some 
rural workers answered the call of military service.  Other laborers who used to work in 
cotton fields, attracted by higher wages and steady work in large cities, instead began 
working in industrial and manufacturing jobs.  These events marked a sharp turning point in 
the sources of labor used in cotton. 
In 1941 and 1942 the USDA received conflicting reports about localized labor 
shortages and surpluses.  Officials attempted to redistribute the labor to make it more 
efficient, but their efforts were complicated by conflicting responsibilities assigned to the 
U.S. Employment Service, the War Manpower Commission, and other non-USDA federal 
agencies.  By March 1943 representatives of the American Farm Bureau Federation called 
for the entire responsibility for recruiting, transporting, and placing farm labor to be placed 
within the USDA and the Extension Service.  After debate and modifications, what emerged 
was the Emergency Farm Labor Program.21 
The overall mission of the Emergency Farm Labor Program was to recruit laborers and 
get them in the field to help farmers.  This program consisted of several different campaigns, 
some of which are already well recognized in current historiography.  The Victory Farm 
Volunteers sought non-farm youth between ages fourteen and seventeen to work on farms.  
Similarly, the Women’s Land Army recruited women, mostly living in their own homes and 
being trucked to and from the farm each day, generally for seasonal work.  In addition the 
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Emergency Farm Labor Program coordinated the placements of several groups of foreign 
workers.22 
An unusual coincidence of local need and a U.S. Army dilemma came in the form of 
German and Italian Prisoners of War (POWs).  Starting about the time of the successful 
Africa campaigns, the Allied powers suddenly had large numbers of POWs.  The U.S. Army 
decided to send many of their captured POWs to detention camps in the United States.  
According to the terms of the Geneva Convention, prisoners had to be housed in camps of a 
similar climate as where they were captured.  Thus, several large base camps were 
established across the American South and Southwest to hold the prisoners of the 
AfrikaKorps.23 
The Geneva Convention permitted the holding power—in this case the United States—
to make enlisted men available for work outside the camp under certain conditions.  With the 
shortage of agricultural labor, many areas of the country appealed to have POW camps 
placed in nearby areas so farmers could hire these men as workers when local labor was not 
available.  New Mexico and Arizona were particularly diligent in taking advantage of these 
opportunities.24 
Under the Emergency Farm Labor Program, New Mexico officials made 70.5 percent 
of its placements with POW laborers.  While this figure included all agricultural crops, a 
substantial number of these POWs worked specifically in cotton fields along the Rio Grande 
from Hatch to Anthony and in the Pecos Valley around Roswell and Artesia, as well as a 
smaller group along the Gila River in the southwestern corner of the state.25  The initial 
group around Las Cruces was Italian POWs from the large base camp at Lordsburg, while the 
base camp at Roswell supplied German POWs to farmers in Southeast New Mexico.  
Germans replaced the Italians in July 1944.26 
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The program in Arizona emerged in similar fashion.  Several large farms put up their 
own funds to build branch camps adjacent to their fields to ensure that they could utilize 
POW laborers.  Nearly all the workers were Germans dispatched from the large base camps 
at Papago Park (near Phoenix) and Florence.  Most of the branch camps were in central 
Arizona near the state’s traditional cotton communities: Eloy, Litchfield Park, Buckeye, 
Mesa, and Cortaro.27 
The lack of farm laborers was a concern even after the fall of the German Nazi 
government in Spring 1945.  Farmers and farm groups throughout the country aired their 
concerns to President Truman, asking that the German POWs be retained at least through the 
1945-46 harvest, if not through 1946 itself.  The political pressure was great, even though the 
United States appeared obligated to release the POWs shortly after hostilities in Europe 
concluded.  In the end Truman acceded to keeping the POWs until June 1946.  It was a 
blessing for cotton farmers who had relied on POWs to help harvest their crops.  Most were 
able to get everything out of their fields prior to the closure of most local branch camps in 
early spring 1946 as the United States began processing and shipping POWs back to 
Europe.28 
Another very significant group of foreign workers during World War II is the only 
source that really continues afterwards—the Mexican workers who became known as the 
Braceros.  During the Emergency Farm Labor Program period, this campaign imported 
foreign workers from Canada and the Caribbean islands as well, but by far the importation of 
workers from Mexico dominated cotton labor from the 1940s to the early 1960s.29 
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Following the government restrictions imposed on Mexican laborers in the early 1930s, 
cotton growers in Arizona and New Mexico were among the first to question their continued 
use in late 1941.  The Dona Ana County Farm and Livestock Bureau requested Congress 
modify or rescind immigration laws for their area specifically to permit Mexican laborers to 
chop or pick cotton.  Similar requests came from sugar beet producers in Montana and Idaho 
and the California USDA war board in Spring 1942.  A reluctant Mexico finally agreed to 
institute an agricultural labor importation program as part of its contribution to the Allied war 
effort in July 1942.  The international agreement was based on the initial Congressional 
legislation authorizing the Emergency Farm Labor Program—Public Law 45 (April 1943)—
which became the hallmark reference for what became the Bracero program for the next 
several years.30 
Despite the early interests expressed by New Mexican, Arizonan, and Texan cotton 
producers, Mexican farm workers saw minimal official use in these states.  Mexico 
specifically excluded Texas as a possible destination in the first several international labor 
agreements because the Mexican government was concerned by widespread reports of 
discrimination against its citizens in that state.  Perhaps because of its strong reliance on the 
use of POWs, New Mexico received only twenty-three Mexican workers during the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program period (in 1946), and Arizona only imported between about 
eight and sixteen hundred each year.  The lack of contracted workers probably does not mean 
that Mexican citizens were not laboring in cotton fields; more likely, growers in these states 
utilized “illegal entrants” or a group of 2,040 non-contract workers who were able to enter 
the United States to work for one year in New Mexico or Texas.31 
California, however, made liberal use of the Mexican labor program, bringing in an 
average of 25,000 Mexicans annually between 1943 and 1947 for all its agricultural crops.  
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How many of these Mexican laborers that worked in cotton fields is unknown, in part 
because the information was not specifically recorded and in part because some worked in 
multiple crops during their contract period.32 
The Bracero program to import Mexican workers continued in the post-war years after 
the 1947 termination of the Emergency Farm Labor Program.  At the federal level, the 
international agreements and accompanying laws were informally extended or renewed with 
minor changes up through 1951.  Not until 1949 did Mexico permit Bracero workers to work 
in Texas, although some individual communities in the state remained blacklisted for several 
more years.33 
In addition to the legalized Braceros came a large influx of illegal Mexican aliens, the 
so-called “wetbacks” because (at least in Texas) they had to swim across the Rio Grande to 
enter the U.S.  This traffic grew stronger as demand for labor in the Southwest rose after the 
war, and farmers encouraged it, as they needed the workers and did not mind that their 
presence helped keep wage rates they would have to pay down.34 
By 1951 Mexico questioned the continuation of informal agreements.  Negotiations in 
Congress redefined the Bracero Program in statute in Public Law 78.  This development 
generally coincided with public concerns and the work of a presidential commission on 
migratory labor.  In the end, few of the commission’s recommendations found their way into 
Public Law 78, which passed with little opposition.  The final legislation explicitly 
authorized importing contract laborers, officially and permanently overturning a legal 
prohibition in place since 1885.  To meet a concern of the Mexican government, the U.S. 
government agreed to be the official contractor and to guarantee that contract terms were 
fulfilled.  It also stipulated that Braceros would receive the “prevailing wage” of the area and 
that anyone who employed illegal aliens would become ineligible to receive Braceros. 
Supplemented by the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 with Mexico, Public Law 78 
set the new, but little altered, guidelines the Bracero program operated under for the next 
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decade.  Congress failed to extend Public Law 78 past 1964, thus bringing an end to the 
Bracero program and its foreign worker program.  Although growers feared its end—cotton 
had been responsible for 60 percent of Bracero employment—the successful mechanization 
of harvesting by the 1960s largely eliminated the need for seasonal laborers.35 
Although after World War II many of the seasonal workers in cotton fields were 
Mexican or Mexican-American, a number of the year-round and owner-workers remained 
Anglo.36 
This section only briefly describes the ethnic groups found in the fields of the Cotton 
West.  Historians need to more closely examine these groups and their role in the overall 
agricultural labor force of the American West, not just in the limited harvest-period that 
many historians have already explored.  At the same time, however, it is equally significant 
to examine labor needs and issues from the perspective of the agricultural producer—how 
much labor was needed, when and what it was needed for, and how much did it cost? 
Cotton Labor Wages 
With this understanding of who the laborers of the fields were, the final matter to 
consider is how much they were paid, their typical pattern of work during the year, and in 
some instances how farmers manipulated laborers and wages.  This issue is somewhat more 
tricky, as a general lack of sources makes it difficult to summarize this information for the 
Cotton West as a whole, for any of the smaller regions, or in particular to trace some changes 
over time.  Variations appear between the regions because of idiosyncrasies in state policies, 
local customs, and wage rates for harvesting cotton.  Most contemporary writers and 
historians focused only on the latter.  Thus one can say more about harvest wages than wages 
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at other times of the year.  What is clear is the increasing role the federal government played 
in attempting to influence or control cotton wages. 
From what few sources are available, one can reasonably propose that wages for 
chopping cotton and for other seasonal pre-harvest farm work (both paid by the hour) appear 
to have been fairly constant over time and across all parts of the western cotton belt.  They 
also seem to have had similar “adjustments” based on skill and ethnicity. 
The base wage rate prior to World War II appears to have been between twenty and 
thirty cents an hour.  Two Arizona reports (1928 and 1930) included crop production costs 
estimated at thirty cents, noting that this would be a few cents higher than what “Mexican 
help” would receive and a few cents lower than what “skilled men” could get.  A New 
Mexico report of the same period used twenty-five cents for general wages.  Another study 
corroborates a lower wage in New Mexico for Mexican workers than for other workers, 
reported as seventeen cents an hour.  Arizona tractor operators’ wages ranged from $2 to $3 a 
day (twenty-two to thirty-seven cents an hour, depending on the length of the workday).  
Finally, an Oklahoma costs study used rates of twenty-five cents and fifteen cents an hour for 
1929 and a depressed 1931 respectively, noting that overall wages had decreased 40 percent 
from 1929 to 1932 in this drought-stricken region.37 
The prevailing wage for chopping cotton in the San Joaquin Valley was a subject for 
debate during the 1930s New Deal relief programs.  The prevalent wage of twenty cents an 
hour was lower than what relief programs provided.  This circumstance created a situation 
where recipients were unwilling to get off welfare rolls and resulted in a labor pinch for 
growers.  In 1939 labor unions sought thirty cents an hour for field work, while the 
government asked for 27.5 cents.  Few growers budged from twenty cents throughout this 
period, though some growers did pay twenty-five cents during the 1938 season, still below 
the welfare rate.  Every year the chopping season would end before the government or labor 
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unions could gain any concessions.  Thus growers frequently got away with paying very low 
wages, usually even lower than the prevalent welfare rate during the New Deal.38 
Overall, reports of non-harvest work wages on cotton farms are few in number prior to 
World War II, although there is vast data on general agricultural laborer wages.39  Based on 
the extant information, one can generalize that most paid cotton laborers (but not family 
labor) received between twenty and thirty cents an hour.  Skilled hired hands received five to 
ten cents an hour more, and Mexican laborers (and likely other ethnic minorities) got five to 
ten cents an hour less than that. 
A simple summary of harvest wages or hiring practices and preferences in the West is 
not as easily accomplished, however.  The historical record shows wide variations each year 
and in each state and production region.  Table 3 presents statewide averages for wages for 
picking cotton and, as such, is subject to some inaccuracy when considering specific 
production regions.  The local variations, however, must be examined individually.40 
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 In California for example, the Agricultural Labor Bureau (ALB) rate, which was set and followed by 
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Table 3.  Average Wage Rates for Picking 100 Pounds of Seed Cotton, 1924-1942 (in dollars) 
State 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
California 
     ALB 
1.55 
-- 
1.65 
-- 
1.55 
1.25 
1.47 1.46 1.45 
1.45 
.89 .50 .45 
.45 
Arizona 1.60 1.75 1.45 1.53 1.50 1.50 .89 .58 .50 
New Mexico 1.40 1.40 1.16 1.30 1.22 1.25 .68 .43 .44 
Texas 1.48 1.33 1.20 1.24 1.21 1.11 .71 .44 .45 
Oklahoma 1.48 1.60 1.28 1.40 1.28 1.22 .73 .45 .48 
United States 1.25 1.27 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.06 .63 .41 .42 
 
State 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 
California 
     ALB 
.65 
.60/ 
.75 
.90 
.90 
.90 
.90 
1.00 
1.00 
.95 
.90 
.75 
.75 
.85 
.80 
.95 
.85 
1.30 
1.25 
1.90 
Arizona .67 .90 .90 1.10 .85 .80 .90 .93 1.45 2.45 
New Mexico .55 .65 .65 .70 .70 .60 .65 .68 1.20 1.75 
Texas .55 .60 .60 .65 .65 .55 .55 .58 1.10 1.45 
Oklahoma .65 .75 .70 .75 .75 .70 .65 .72 1.20 1.50 
United States .53 .60 .58 .69 .69 .57 .58 .62 1.09 1.41 
Sources:  State and U.S. averages compiled from: “Average Wage Rates for Picking 100 Pounds of Seed 
Cotton,” Crops and Markets 18 (November 1941): 257; and “Wage Rates: Average Rates for Picking 100 
Pounds of Seed Cotton, by states, up to November 1, 1933-51,” Crops and Markets 29 (1952).  Rates set by 
California’s Agricultural Labor Bureau (ALB) are from Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold, 41-42; Johns, “Field 
Workers in California Cotton,” 99; and Senate Committee, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, 502-
4, 515.  The 1933 California ALB rate of sixty cents was the initial agreement (see text), but an arbitration 
agreement during the cotton pickers strike ordered the rate raised to seventy-five cents (Senate Committee, 
Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, 210-11).  
Note: Wages for picking cotton were paid piece rate rather than by the acre, hour, or day, so pickers who could 
pick more, as much as two hundred pounds above average, could earn more each season.  The prevalent wage 
rate is measured as some number of cents per one hundred pounds of picked cotton.  Unless otherwise noted, 
the noted wage is against this standard.  This allows for some comparison of prices between different regions, 
though there were variations in price and the amount of cotton picked based on the variety being harvested or 
the method being utilized (picking or snapping).  Federal agencies did not collect data on cotton-picking wages 
for years prior to 1924. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Texas, the High Plains of West Texas, and the Rolling Plains), some of which are not in the scope of this paper 
and each of which had fairly distinct wages based on local conditions each year.  Wages in Oklahoma also saw 
similar disparities from east to west across the state. 
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The somewhat sporadic nature of early cotton farming in California when it did not 
have an established labor force made picking tricky and costly.  Nineteenth-century 
producers attempting to raise cotton commercially in California abandoned their efforts 
because of high labor costs.  The labor costs in early USDA tests in the Imperial Valley in 
the early 1910s almost stopped California cotton again before it started for the same reason.  
Traditional short-staple cotton in the Imperial Valley was picked for $1 to $1.25 per hundred 
pounds, about average for the industry.  The long-staple variety being tested, though, 
commanded $3 per one hundred pounds.  Until about 1917, with the importation of Mexican 
labor, picking wages in the Imperial Valley remained above $1.  The opening of the San 
Joaquin Valley to cotton in the 1920s increased the wage in that area to as high as $1.65, thus 
encouraging many Mexican migrants to move north.41 
Faced with the steadily increasing wages in the San Joaquin Valley, a devastating 
financial loss from the 1925 harvest, and seeking to centralize as many aspects of labor 
management as possible, California cotton producers gathered to create the Agricultural 
Labor Bureau (ALB) in 1926.  The ALB helped organize and manage labor for all the San 
Joaquin Valley crop needs.  Of particular interest to cotton farmers, the ALB met twice a 
year—just before the chopping and harvesting seasons—to set a standard rate to be followed 
throughout the valley.  Individual farmers could deviate a little bit based on local conditions.  
In the first year (1926), the ALB dropped harvest wages to $1.25 per hundred pounds.  It 
successfully maintained its set rate each year through 1949 except during the strike years of 
1933 and 1937.42 
The repatriation, deportation, and anti-Mexican immigration policies adopted in 1929 
set part of the backdrop for the massive 1933 cotton strike.  These policies caused much 
resentment among the remaining Mexican workers, leading more Mexicans to join the 
Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU) in the early 1930s.  The ALB 
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exacerbated the conflict by setting the standard wage for the 1933 harvest at sixty cents per 
hundred pounds.  The CAWIU sought, among its many conditions, a wage of $1.  With 
California growers unwilling to compromise, the CAWIU called a strike in September 1933.  
Depending on the area of the state, between 75 and 95 percent of the strikers were Mexican.  
The conflict lasted twenty-seven days; the Mexican, Californian, and American governments 
worked together to resolve it.  Growers were caught completely by surprise, expecting a short 
strike and an ability to easily replace the striking workers.  However, they were unable to 
import sufficient numbers of people to harvest the crop.  Violence ensued, as the growers 
became vigilantes.  A federal mediator, brought in after successfully settling a 1933 Arizona 
strike, convinced the CAWIU to resume work at sixty cents with the growers’ promise to 
raise the wage if market prices improved.  Eighty percent of the strikers agreed, but the 
remaining 20 percent continued to hold out, seeking at least eighty cents per hundred 
pounds.43 
The previously discussed debate about 1939 wages for cotton chopping helped set the 
stage for a strike later that year in the San Joaquin Valley.  The union, unhappy that growers 
would not meet even the government’s proposed wage, much less theirs, attempted to strike 
during the brief chopping season.  However, the 1939 season ended before anything could 
happen.  Later in the year the ALB set the fall harvest rate at eighty cents per hundred 
pounds.  The strikers demanded $1.25 and had moderate success for a few days.  Violent 
confrontations erupted, though, and police arrested many striker-picketers.  Growers broke 
the strike in late October after about six weeks, forcing workers to take eighty cents or 
nothing.  The failed strike sharply hurt remaining union interests and the rebellious strikers, 
forcing them to concede to the ALB rate of eighty-five cents in 1940 without protest.  The 
onset of World War II raised wages the next year to $1.25, the highest level since 1929.  
Wages in California continued to increase during the war, reaching as high as $3.50 as 
Mexican workers reentered the fields en masse.  The average wage rate for picking cotton 
was reported at $2.25 for 1945 in a summary of wartime wages and income.44 
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Arizona cotton growers were highly dependent on outside labor from the beginning of 
commercial farming in the twentieth century.  The sparse local population left a low natural 
labor reserve.  Many of the available workers, mostly unemployed industrial employees, did 
not have the skills to pick cotton.  Further, the low wage being offered was insufficient to 
encourage locals to work in cotton.  Thus, Arizona producers often advertised or recruited 
extensively to get their harvest labor.  They depended on the same sources of Mexican 
laborers as their California neighbors until restrictions were put in place in 1930.  The Anglo-
American migrant labor stream coming from Oklahoma and Texas replaced the Mexicans.  
Emigrants often viewed Arizona as a first stop on the way to the fields of California.  Fifty-
four percent of these migrants came from Oklahoma in 1937, and 17 percent came from 
Texas.  The most important factor in choosing to stop in Arizona, cited by 24 percent of 
respondents in a survey, was the extensive advertising by cotton growers that targeted 
Oklahoma and Texas residents.  Some had heard rumors of good cotton and good wages, 
particularly in letters from family or friends, while others simply stopped because of local 
billboards and signs advertising jobs.  Cotton growers’ associations also participated in the 
statewide Farm Labor Service, which helped recruit and shift workers around during the 
harvest period.  Unlike California, though, the associations did not set a prevailing wage each 
year.  The average wage in Arizona ranged from $1.50 per hundred pounds in 1928 and 1929 
to fifty cents three years later, recovering to eighty cents or higher after 1934 (see table 3).45 
The situation in New Mexico looked significantly different from that of Arizona and 
California, partly because there was a greater resident Mexican population in many of the 
cotton-producing areas.  Prior to World War II many of the migrant laborers in the state were 
Anglo Americans who worked in New Mexico, Northwest Texas, and Southwest Oklahoma.  
These migrant families were smaller, averaging 4.5 members.  Thus they were usually just 
nuclear families, with 70 percent of the children over age ten working at some point during 
the year.  Producers in the Mesilla Valley along the Rio Grande tended to use more Mexican 
workers, particularly from Mexico, either legally or illegally.  This area, as well as the lower 
Pecos River Valley near Carlsbad, saw lower wage rates, typically around sixty cents per 
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hundred pounds increasing to about seventy by 1940, because of the high numbers of 
Mexican laborers.  Further up the Pecos River in Chaves County, where there were fewer 
resident Mexicans and more migrant Anglo-Americans, wages were typically five cents—
and sometimes ten cents—higher.  These wages were likely for harvesting Acala variety 
long-staple cotton.  Pickers of Pima cotton, which had about twice the yield of Acala, 
received about twice as much, around $1.25.  The New Mexico Farm Labor Service provided 
placement and local advertising services for all agricultural growers in the state.46 
The years immediately leading up to World War II severely tightened the labor market 
in New Mexico.  Previous migrants plus local rural laborers moved into larger communities 
or out of state to take advantage of higher paying industrial jobs.  As a result, harvesting 
wage rates increased.  Average cotton-picking wages of sixty-five cents per hundred pounds 
in 1939 rose to $1.95 per hundred pounds in 1945.47 
Western Texas cotton growers came to rely heavily on Mexican migratory workers as 
their output increased.  As cotton production expanded across Central Texas into the High 
Plains and Trans-Pecos regions, Mexican workers extended their migration pattern.  Many 
started picking cotton in July around Corpus Christi on the Gulf Coast and moved north and 
west until they reached Lubbock or El Paso in October and November, where the picking 
season extended into January.  The family laborers of owner-operators in both regions also 
worked the harvest.  The average wage varied greatly from year to year, based on crop 
conditions.  In 1929 workers got an average of $1.11 per hundred pounds.  In 1932 they 
received forty-five cents.  The rate fluctuated between fifty-five and sixty five cents between 
1934 to 1938.  Workers along the Rio Grande, particularly in the El Paso area, had the same 
problems with depressed wages and illegal labor found in the Mesilla Valley of New 
Mexico.48 
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The Texas agricultural industry, like farmers in California, feared the possibility of 
restrictions on Mexican migrant immigration for the cotton harvests being considered by the 
federal government in the late 1920s.  Customarily Texan recruiters brought Mexicans into 
the state on contract to pick cotton.  With this avenue cut off by 1929, Texans moved to 
discourage native Mexican Texans and others from leaving to labor in agriculture in other 
states.  In 1929 the state passed the Emigrant Agent Act to discourage transportation of Texas 
labor out of state.  The law required recruiters from other states to post a $5,000 bond, pay an 
annual tax of $1,000, and pay a graduated tax in any county where they were recruiting.  
These requirements effectively terminated out-of-state labor contracting of Mexican and 
Anglo-American residents of Texas.  They did not block, however, the kind of advertising 
that drew many Anglo-Americans of their own accord to Arizona and California as the 
drought and depression of the 1930s deepened.  With this legislation Texas growers 
effectively developed their own “reserve army of labor,” supplemented by Mexicans illegally 
crossing the Rio Grande to work in the state.  This reserve kept cotton-picking wages very 
low—about fifty to fifty-five cents per hundred pounds through the 1930s, almost the lowest 
of any of the principal cotton-producing states.  The wage rates finally began to rise during 
World War II (see table 3), increasing to $1.90 per hundred by the end of World War II.49 
As the nation made the transition to war in the 1940s, the wages paid to cotton laborers 
were set less by market forces and more by a directed process.  The U.S. government 
organized an Agricultural Wage Stabilization Program as part of various price control 
programs instituted during World War II.  The objectives were to keep rates that would be 
adequate for retention and recruitment of farm labor, to encourage a general increase in 
agricultural wages, to reduce the disparities between agricultural and industrial wages, and to 
prevent agricultural wages from spiraling upwardly out of control because of inflation.  State 
wage boards partly managed wage rates.  Only in California did wages for cotton laborers 
reach a level where the wage board felt the rate needed to be capped—$3.00 per hundred 
pounds of cotton picked.50 
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Under the provisions of the federal Emergency Farm Labor Program, county farm 
wage boards, one member of which was the county agricultural extension agent, determined 
the wages for any agricultural work, transportation, and housing.  The most important 
numbers to cotton producers were the prevailing rates for chopping and harvesting cotton.  
The prevailing wage rate was a principle required in the agreements for using POW laborers 
and foreign workers.  In theory, the “prevailing wage” would ensure that all workers were 
paid fairly, regardless of who they were or from where they came.  The reality may have 
been the opposite.  Since the members of a wage board were drawn from farmers, farm 
organization representatives, the Farm Security Administration, and other local groups, the 
board determining the wages was sympathetic to keeping rates as low as possible.  Thus, the 
“prevailing wage rate” became a federally permissive tool in controlling wages and likely 
kept wages lower than what they otherwise would have been in a free market.51 
In the case of POW labor, farmers paid the prevailing wage rate to the U.S. Army.  
They retained most of the wages to cover the expenses of operating the POW labor program 
and the branch camps.  The POWs themselves received eighty cents a day in canteen 
coupons or credited to a savings program, regardless of the type or quantity of work 
performed.  There was little enticement for many cotton-picking POWs, so in 1944 the Army 
introduced an incentive of an additional forty cents a day to encourage German cotton 
pickers to increase their daily output.  While this seems to be very little pay compared to 
prevailing wages in some areas that might be as high as $3 per hundred pounds of cotton 
picked, many POWs noted in years since that they enjoyed getting out of their camps to work 
in the agricultural outdoors.52 
When Congress dissolved the Emergency Farm Labor Program, the local boards 
disappeared but the concept of the “prevailing wage rate” did not.  The Bracero program 
agreements required that laborers receive a stipulated minimum wage or the prevailing wage.  
A 1951 Presidential commission found that, typically, farmers met at the beginning of a work 
season and determined a rate that “they hope they won’t have to exceed” but not usually at a 
rate high enough to attract migrant laborers.  As the season got underway, the wage might go 
higher for domestic workers if a labor shortage emerged, but Braceros only received the 
                                                 
51
 Rasmussen, History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 71-72, 173-74. 
52
 Schlauch, “Harvesting the Crops,” 32; Hoza, PW, 99; POWs in New Mexico Agriculture Project. 
 148 
prevailing wage, which federal program officials had accepted and written into labor 
contracts at the beginning.53 
The impact of this practice, both during and immediately after the war, was clear in the 
presidential commission’s final report.  During the war, in cotton states (including Texas) 
where Braceros were not used, picking wages rose between 166 percent and 236 percent.  In 
California, however, where Braceros were used extensively, cotton wages had only increased 
136 percent.  Similarly in 1949 after the war, California was using only 8 percent of 
contracted Braceros nationwide and picking wages increased 15 percent, but Texas was using 
46 percent of the workers and cotton wages decreased 11 percent.  The commission 
concluded that the federal government had “not been successful in protecting domestic farm 
labor from detrimental effects of imported contract alien labor,” which had resulted in 
depressed farm wages.54 
Wage rates were influenced, in part, by the proximity to the Mexican border and the 
availability of “wetback” Mexican workers.  Farmers in cotton-growing areas across the 
border needed seasonal laborers in similar fashion to those in the United States.  Thus, there 
was a natural northward migration within Mexico.  At the same time, cotton acreage in the 
U.S. expanded; the Lower Rio Grande Valley went from having 250,000 acres of cotton in 
1945 to over 600,000 just four years later.  As a result, the wage for ten hours of chopping 
cotton in that area in 1947 was $2.25, but it was above $5 in the Rolling Plains and High 
Plains of Northwest Texas and between $4 and $7 a day in Arizona.  In 1950 cotton picking 
wages in the Lower Rio Grande Valley averaged $1.25 per hundred pounds, while the 
statewide average was $2.45.  At the same time Arizona cotton pickers earned $3.10 per 
hundred pounds.55 
There were similar discrepancies for general farm labor.  In South Texas and the El 
Paso area, field workers were paid as little as fifteen cents an hour, but those in southern New 
Mexico and the Imperial Valley of California received up to fifty cents for the same work.  
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Arizona workers averaged sixty-four cents, while northern California workers were paid 
eighty-eight cents an hour.56 
The Presidential commission heard that farm employers in areas where (mostly illegal) 
Mexican laborers were less widely available believed this “unequal access” was unfair.  A 
manager of an Arizona cotton co-op complained that if enforcement by the border patrol of 
illegal immigration “is going to be strict in Arizona, we want it strict in other states” to 
equalize the production costs of labor.57 
Opposition to the Bracero program—as embodied in Public Law 78—steadily grew for 
a number of reasons in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Early in his administration, President 
John Kennedy directed that Bracero wages should be increased.  For the first time, farmers 
(of all crops) were confronted with increasing labor costs that were starting to be beyond 
their control.  Many feared that agriculture as they knew it would be ruined.  Among cotton 
producers, however, the use of Braceros had been decreasing prior to the termination of the 
program in 1964, so cotton farmers ended up not being as severely affected financially as 
those in other crops.58 
Conclusion 
This discussion of cotton laborers suggests some vacancies in the historiography that 
need to be filled.  First is the obvious reminder that without all the different types of laborers, 
there would have been no cotton to harvest in the American West.  Previous studies of 
western laborers have touched on only part of the story of raising cotton, and few have done 
more than that for any other agricultural industry—wheat, truck crops, or even some 
processing.  Many stories can yet be told more completely. 
Second, this examination suggests that the alternative viewpoint from a crop-labor 
perspective, rather than an ethnic-labor perspective, is equally justified and important.  
Historians should pursue a similar analysis for other agricultural commodities in the 
American West.  Those individuals will find that, as with the cotton laborers, the labor story 
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of crop production is much deeper and more complicated than most people have previously 
considered. 
The transitional mechanization of cotton harvesting and the end of the Bracero program 
mark an end to the traditional discussions about cotton labor in the West.  From that point 
forward, the Cotton West became markedly different from its historical past.  With changes 
occurring in the culture of the traditional southern cotton belt, the development of the Cotton 
West and the Cotton South became a unified story. 
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CHAPTER VI   
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen to this point, the evolutionary development of the Cotton West in the 
early and mid-twentieth century resulted from many factors.  Nearly all of these are in direct 
contrast with what was occurring in the traditional Cotton South for the same period, 
particularly prior to the New Deal Era.  This chapter will first explore the differences and 
similarities in American cotton production between the two regions.  Once the Cotton West 
became well established, the differences begin to disappear and both West and South are 
equally affected by federal regulations, marketing needs, and world competition in cotton and 
synthetic fabrics after World War II—the signs of a unified, American cotton industry.  
Finally, I will briefly consider some of the connections between this history of the Cotton 
West and the studies of other areas of the American West. 
The Cotton West in Summary 
In this work I have called attention to several conditions that materially influenced the 
establishment and expansion of the Cotton West.  For nearly all of the areas where cotton 
was and is grown, the introduction of cotton farming often coincided with the establishment 
of Anglo settlement.  That is not to say that no residents lived in these areas previously—
often there were American Indian or Spanish communities that practiced forms of 
subsistence agriculture as much as several hundred years ago.  Likewise, one cannot suggest 
that when Anglos came, so did the cotton.  Instead, the new emigrants to an area in the mid- 
to late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often were inquisitive, seeking crops that they 
could produce and that had a market for them.  They often found that while they might be 
able to raise cotton, there were problems with growing, harvesting, or marketing it, thus 
making it impractical at the time. 
Water and irrigation are among the key ingredients in their farming efforts.  New 
settlers produced relatively little in areas like the Salt River Valley, the Yuma Valley, or the 
Rio Grande Valley until the federal government built a major irrigation system through 
reclamation programs.  Other areas, like portions of the San Joaquin Valley, the Casa Grande 
Valley of Arizona, and the High Plains of Texas depended on underground water to sustain 
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their crops.  Until it was economical to pump water from below, the cotton farming in these 
areas was somewhat limited unless they could make it as dryland farmers (as many did on the 
High Plains for the first thirty years). 
The key players in developing a western cotton industry were the researchers and 
scientists of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and their partners in state land-grant colleges 
and agricultural experiment stations.  As new settlers developed areas of the West and 
irrigation sources became available, the USDA and state experiment stations often followed 
in their wake.  As a general rule these government agencies investigated what the best crops 
were for a given locale, the best ways to raise and irrigate them, and how they could be 
marketed.  But as I have shown throughout this dissertation, the USDA was particularly 
eager to establish a new cotton industry in the West—one that would not duplicate but 
instead supplement that of the South and, in turn, contribute to the wealth of new settlers and 
the American economy.  State agricultural researchers may not have explicitly had the same 
goal, but they acted in concert with the USDA.  In the end their efforts proved successful. 
While researchers played many roles in investigating crop-growing practices, their 
most significant chore was the government-sponsored efforts to breed new varieties of cotton 
specifically suited to each region of the Cotton West.  As shown in Chapter Two, much of 
this involvement can be traced back to the USDA’s efforts investigating Mexican cotton 
plants to combat the boll weevil and introducing Egyptian varieties of long-staple cotton.  
The evolutionary development of California Acala varieties by federal scientists, along with 
the breeding work by state researchers behind New Mexico’s 1517 and High Plains 
stormproof stripper cottons, became the basis for much of the modern cotton industry 
throughout the entire American West. 
With stable varieties of western cotton available for farmers, the march toward 
mechanization became the next important area of study for farmers and researchers alike.  
Farmers were interested in any method or equipment that could allow them to expand 
production, cut their costs, and increase profits.  Scientists at USDA and state facilities 
examined every aspect—from economics to the best crop practices (like the ideal location in 
the ground to place that seed) to how emerging technologies could be applied to cotton 
farming.  Some of the most meaningful work involved the mechanization of harvesting 
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cotton.  At times this involved simultaneously improving the equipment while making 
genetic modifications to cotton plants so the two worked well together. 
Changes in technology and the available labor force were constant challenges for 
western cotton producers.  The nature of production meant that farmers needed seasonal, 
often migratory, labor at particular times of the year, especially at harvest time.  Federal 
immigration policy often affected which ethnic groups were available—Asians prior to the 
Exclusion Act and Mexicans before and after the period of mass deportations in the 1930s, 
for example.  During the Great Depression producer groups recruited Anglo emigrants 
fleeing the Great Plains, seeking better conditions in western industry as a labor source.  As 
these sources shifted again during World War II, they looked to emergency workers, 
including urban women and children and foreign Prisoners of War, for help before they 
increasingly shifted to mechanized harvesting equipment. 
Some Points of Comparison 
By mid-century much of the Cotton West had become firmly established and fairly 
stable.  But while the early twentieth century marked a period of industry building for the 
Cotton West, it was a period of industry instability and transition for the producers of the 
Cotton South.  As related in Chapter One, the South did not fundamentally transform from its 
post-Civil War cycle of sharecropping and tenant farming until the 1930s.  Only then did it 
slowly change and emerge in the post-World War II period as a new Cotton South.  These 
widely varying developments between the two ends of the American cotton industry offer 
many points for contrast and comparison. 
The fundamental difference between the South and the West is climate and irrigation.  
Temperatures in the South are more moderate, and the frost-free growing season is typically 
at or above 260 days.  In the West the season is typically shorter (closer to 200 days in most 
areas), but the temperatures particularly in summer are higher.  Where the typically average 
rainfall of much of the West is from ten to twenty inches, in the South it is between thirty and 
fifty inches.  For the humid cotton belt, “The best weather conditions for cotton production 
are found where a mild spring with light but frequent showers merges into a moderately 
moist summer, warm both day and night, followed by a dry, cool, and prolonged autumn.”  
In the arid West farmers had generally dry years with hot summer days and cool nights, and 
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applied irrigation just when cotton needed it.  This continues to be true, even today.  One 
writer cites that the widespread availability of aluminum pipe after World War II was taking 
an “increasing place in the agriculture of the humid areas.”  Pipe irrigation became common 
in many crops where cheap water was available in the United States, principally for berries 
and vegetable crops, but also to a lesser extent for cotton and other field crops.1 
Another fundamental difference resulting from geography prior to World War II was 
the relative lack of pests and disease affecting cotton in the West as compared to the South.  
The traditional cotton belt was substantially affected by the Mexican boll weevil, but it never 
became a factor in the West.2  Producers were not so lucky with the pink bollworm.  While it 
followed a similar track as the boll weevil early in its spread, state and federal officials 
successfully warded off the pink bollworm for several decades using a system of agricultural 
quarantines and eradication research.  Eventually the pink bollworm made its way into the 
Southwest via the cotton fields of northern and northwestern Mexico, causing similar actions 
and research to take place in the West after about 1940.3 
The roles and actions of the federal government in cotton agriculture in the West are 
vastly different from what they did in the South.  The USDA played a central role in 
establishing what they considered a new, long-staple cotton industry in the West—one that 
would not compete with the Upland cotton industry of the South.  They and their 
counterparts in state experiment stations developed that industry by extensive research and 
breeding work to introduce cotton varieties specifically suited to each region where they 
were encouraging farmers to grow cotton.  Similarly, scientific research in mechanization 
and equipment led to improved machinery and farming practices.  To a lesser extent, their 
involvement in irrigation projects is what made agriculture possible in so many areas of the 
Southwest.  Lastly, the federal government heavily influenced labor practices through the 
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exercise of various immigration policies and wage support systems; one can debate whether 
the efforts were intentional or beneficial. 
In contrast, Gilbert Fite suggests that the federal government played important roles in 
three aspects of southern agriculture: reducing cotton acreage, supporting soil conservation 
practices, and expanding rural credit.  New Deal policies on cotton production, he says, were 
the initial catalyst to altering the long-established relationships between land and people.  
Payments through the AAA and soil conservation programs provided needed cash but only to 
landowners, not their sharecroppers or tenant farmers.  These, in turn, helped stabilize credit 
and capital, which farm owners used to mechanize, diversify, and improve their farm 
practices.4 
One can attribute the actions of federal officials and the USDA to different motives.  In 
the West they looked to establish a new industry and expand the opportunities and wealth for 
new farmers to the region.  In the South the USDA sought to break a dangerous cycle of rural 
poverty and farming practices that proved harmful to soils, marginal lands, destitute 
residents, and market prices.  The problems and goals for each region simply had little to do 
with the other. 
There is also a marked contrast in the results and effectiveness of research and advice 
dispensed by agricultural colleges, experiment stations, and the USDA.  Producers on new 
western cotton farms appear to have been very interested, if not at times dependent, on what 
federal and state scientists and researchers learned and reported.  These researchers were 
heavily involved in cotton breeding activities that fundamentally shaped the form of the 
western cotton industry.  Their colleagues in the South, however, were less successful.  “The 
influence of these institutions on the practices of ordinary farmers prior to the 1940s had 
been meager at best,” wrote Fite.  Whether by choice or inability to change, most southern 
farmers had been unwilling to accept principles of scientific farming and management.  All 
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along, the recommendations and demonstrations of state and federal researchers were most 
useful to larger, more commercial operators, and of little help to the more typical small, 
inefficient cotton farmer.  By mid-century, whether by explicit intent or not, only the larger 
farm businesses operating on a larger scale of economy survived in the South.  Since there 
never were many small farmers in the West, the farms there had almost always been the 
same—larger outfits able to take advantage of the latest advancements in science and 
technology to maximize their production.  The producers of the Cotton South and the Cotton 
West had become very similar agricultural businessmen.5 
Mechanization is a topic that begins as an area of contrast between the West and the 
South.  Eventually, though, it slowly evolves to be a process common to both regions.  
Economists Moses Musoke and Alan Olmstead wrote a comparative analysis of the 
California and southern cotton industries in 1982.  Their results generally apply as a 
comparison of the Cotton West and the Cotton South.  Overall, they found that California 
cotton farms adopted tractors and mechanical equipment earlier and in greater numbers than 
did southern farms.  The larger size of cotton operations and more intensive use of tractors 
were fundamentally different forms of labor use and organization than the traditional system 
that dominated in the South.  The authors also noted that agricultural labor relations in 
California (but not usually the rest of the West) tended to be more frequent, widespread, and 
sometimes violent disputes.  The tenant-and-sharecropper system of the South probably 
caused most farmers there to acquiesce to the demands of landowners and merchants.  The 
scarcity of labor provided a reason for mechanization, likely in both areas.  In the end, 
California led the country in mechanizing cotton picking and was the first state to achieve 
total mechanization.  But at any level or type of mechanization, California’s “lead” was 
typically only five to ten years over other states, and never exceeded thirteen years.  By all 
accounts, “California offered an ideal setting for mechanization.”  While other historians and 
economists mention smaller production units, relatively cheap labor, and ignorance of 
farmers as reasons for the delay, Musoke and Olmstead point out that portions of the 
Mississippi Delta had many early adopters of mechanized technology.  Their findings, 
however, questioned the traditional notion that mechanization of southern cotton production 
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was substantially delayed.  They called for additional research into these issues.  This 
dissertation shows, at least in part, that the influences of state and federal agencies may have 
played an important role in helping advance mechanization and the general state of cotton 
agriculture in the West, one that was retarded for many years in the South by preexisting and 
continuing economic problems and conditions.6 
The availability of cheap workers for field labor is another common ingredient in both 
the Cotton West and the Cotton South, as were the racist overtones and treatment.  The ethnic 
groups were completely different, though.  In the South it was African Americans, a native 
remnant of the antebellum system of slavery.  With their freedom after the Civil War they 
became part of the sharecropper class of citizenry or unemployed farm workers of southern 
culture and rural life.  In the West the largest group of cheap laborers was Mexicans and 
Mexican Americans, either long-term immigrants or relative newcomers from the country 
neighboring many of the Cotton West regions to the south.  Cotton producers often 
discriminated against Mexicans, who were more often utilized as day laborers and harvesters, 
in the wages offered and in their attitudes toward the West’s version of second-class citizens. 
Both regions also had their share of labor migrations, although the patters were much 
more pronounced in the West.  At several times in the history of the South, notably the 1910s 
and before and after World War II, African Americans left southern farms for better 
opportunities in the North, frequently in industry.  The West is more noted for having its 
shifting patterns of migratory labor, often people who harvested cotton as the growing season 
shifted from one area to another.  Like the South, the West saw a large migration of people 
seeking better opportunities—the so-called “Okies,” Anglo-American emigrants from the 
Southern Plains headed west to California cities during the Great Depression.  In both 
regions the mechanization of cotton production both influenced and was influenced by the 
presence and departure of these laborers. 
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Common Problems for an American Cotton Industry 
A key tenet of the thesis and timeline of this dissertation is that similar practices and 
problems identify and differentiate the new Cotton West as a region from the traditional 
Cotton South.  As cotton farming in the West became a permanent institution and southern 
agriculture began transitioning from its entrenched sharecrop-and-tenant system of cotton 
production in the 1930s and 1940s, the problems and influences equally affected the industry 
of both regions—one that analysts and producers increasingly identified as an American 
cotton industry. 
In identifying the first matter that has an effect on the entire industry with uniformity, 
one likely would conclude that it was the national agricultural programs of the New Deal.  
Earlier I described how New Deal economic programs affected and even instigated many of 
the changes in the Cotton South.  Efforts made by federal authorities through the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, the Soil Erosion Service, and other agencies transformed cotton farmers 
everywhere; their immediate influence was more notable in the South, though crop-reduction 
and parity-pricing programs had long-term ramifications for farmers throughout the country. 
Overproduction, under-consumption, and low market prices influenced President 
Roosevelt and Congress to adopt the original Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933.  The law 
paid farmers to reduce their acreage and production of several commodities, including cotton.  
They could only receive commodity checks if they complied with the program’s full 
provisions.  Since the law was signed after the cotton planting period had passed, the first 
year saw 10.4 million acres of cotton plowed up, mostly in the South.  Congress soon 
modified the program through the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 
authorizing the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to pay farmers for enacting soil 
conservation or soil-building practices.  Subsequent amendments to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act provided crop insurance, marketing controls, and price-support loans.  These 
provisions became the foundation of American agricultural policy, largely unchanged until 
the Freedom to Farm Act in 1997.7 
The cotton reduction programs associated with the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration were more successful in the South than in the West.  Producers signed up 
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over 70 percent of cotton acreage in the South, whereas California came in last at 20 percent.  
Most individual growers only agreed to contract somewhere between 25 and 50 percent.  In 
1934 the Bankhead Act, more commonly referred to as the Cotton Control Act, authorized 
compulsory limitations of cotton crops and provided crop and marketing quotas for states and 
growers.  Any cotton grown in excess of the set allotment was taxed.  Although farmers took 
marginal cotton acreage out of production, improved methods of cotton culture meant that 
cotton production remained relatively high.  The onset of World War II and post-war 
marketing programs eventually helped alleviate and mitigate the problems of cotton 
surpluses and market prices.8 
In the 1940s synthetic fibers like rayon and nylon became a major competitor to the 
cotton industry.  Rayon is a manufactured fiber produced from the cellulose fiber of wood 
pulp or cotton linters, the small fragments of thread removed from cottonseed during the 
delinting process.  An extruded material can be formed into thread and fabric very similar to 
cotton.  Nylon is derived from chemicals in coal, water, petroleum, and agricultural by-
products.  Nylon, too, can be formed into fibers and fabrics, and many consider it superior to 
natural fabrics.  In 1942 world production of rayon alone was 3.4 billion pounds, the 
equivalent of over 8 million bales of cotton.  At that time American cotton production totaled 
about 1.7 million bales.  In 1943 rayon represented 10.6 percent of the fiber market.  The 
price per pound of synthetic fibers was constantly getting cheaper, so they were slowly 
taking over the textile fabrics market.  In the mid-1950s when rayon cost twenty-six cents to 
produce and cotton cost thirty-two cents, rayon had a six- to ten-cent market advantage in 
price.  At the same time the amount of research money being spent on development and 
expansion synthetic fibers (like nylon) exceeded research on cotton by more than four to one.  
Because of this shift, many textile mills switched from cotton to the man-made substitutes.9 
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American cotton producers were also concerned about their eroding position in world 
markets.  In 1911 the United States had supplied 72 percent of the world’s cotton production.  
By 1941 that had fallen to 38 percent.  India, Brazil, and China were becoming the larger and 
more significant cotton-growing countries.  While U.S. farmers grew more cotton per acre, 
foreign countries simply had more acreage.  At almost the same time, between 1932 and 
1938 American cotton consumption dropped 46 percent.  Thus, more of America’s cotton 
supply was going to world rather than domestic markets.  With production costs lower in 
foreign countries, American growers increasingly faced unfavorable competition.10 
Cotton growers began organizing to create a stronger voice in public policy and 
marketing.  They founded the National Cotton Council (NCC) in 1938 as their first 
nationwide trade association and political lobbying group, an organization which also 
included ginners and marketers.  In addition to funding research for mechanization and 
sponsoring the first Beltwide Cotton Mechanization Conference in 1947, the NCC supported 
fibers research and promotion.  They focused on three factors: price, promotion, and quality.  
Toward that end the NCC advertised extensively and pioneered the early campaigns touting 
cotton’s favorable characteristics and connotations compared to other fabrics.  The NCC also 
stepped up efforts to promote and improve foreign exports.  Marketing American cotton to 
domestic and foreign producers became a major focus of cotton producers throughout the 
country in the decades following World War II.11 
Concurrent to marketing efforts, American cotton producers sought to cut their 
production costs by completing the process of mechanization.  As discussed briefly late in 
Chapter Four, Congress aided the efforts through the passage of the Research and Marketing 
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Act in 1946.  The legislation provided special appropriations in addition to the regular 
appropriations to state agricultural experiment stations for a wide range of research projects.  
Further funding was available for endeavors involving more than two states.  For cotton 
representatives from fifteen states in the fields of agricultural engineering, soil science, and 
plant science met to develop a research program called the National Cotton Mechanization 
Project.  The headquarters for the program was at the Delta Branch Experiment Station in 
Stoneville, Mississippi, which oversaw specific research projects in every cotton state from 
California to South Carolina on every phase of cotton mechanization.  Supported by the 
National Cotton Council, cotton researchers began meeting annually in 1947 in the Beltwide 
Cotton Mechanization Conferences to share and review their findings.12 
Although the South continued to progress and improve on mechanization, it lagged 
behind the West until the 1960s.  Weed control was a particular problem in the South, where 
producers also tried using flame cultivation (as discussed in Chapter Four).  Cotton farmers 
nationwide began utilizing chemicals to increase production and to control insects and 
weeds.  Somewhat hindered by its need to transform an old system, the South’s total cotton 
production continued to fall until it was surpassed by that of the West in the early 1970s.  By 
that time cotton production was so efficient that backlogs built up at the gin, leading to the 
development and implementation of the cotton moduling system in the mid-1970s.  The 
nationwide adoption of moduling marked the final step in mechanizing American cotton 
production.13 
Cotton in Western History 
In the opening chapter I suggested that this comprehensive history of the western 
cotton industry fills a void left by the array of smaller, mostly state-based accounts of cotton 
growing.  Building upon those secondary works and filling in details from numerous 
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agricultural extension publications and histories in other subject areas, we can now better 
understand the introduction and spread of cotton agriculture in the West. 
In the preface to Trails: Toward a New Western History, the editors state that the New 
Western History offers a balanced view of the western past, its failures and successes, its 
defeats and victories, and the varied ethnic groups and perspectives on settlement and 
development.  In the book’s opening essay, Donald Worster goes on to say that the New 
Western History seeks to confront and understand the radical defects of past histories.  While 
I did not seek to openly challenge particular notions of western history, I contend that this 
work does offer a broad, comprehensive view of this agricultural slice of the past.  Some 
might criticize western history as being too specific or specialized in a given area of social, 
political, or economic history, knowing the variety of “new” histories that have emerged 
since the 1980s.  This dissertation transcends those areas by looking at all of them through 
the lens of cotton farming.  The activities surrounding cotton production touch on so many 
areas of western history—labor, irrigation, federal involvement, and mechanization.14 
This dissertation did not seek to delve deeply into these areas.  Instead it builds a 
comprehensive view of the establishment and evolution of farming in the Cotton West, 
crisscrossing these topics using many of the same secondary sources and incorporating 
additional information from first-hand accounts, extension publications, and government 
reports.  The key point is that these areas are closely related to each other.  I suggest that 
additional research is needed to explore other relationships of these subjects in relation to 
other crops or areas of the American West. 
Of course geographically this dissertation is a contribution to western history.  While I 
do not want to engage in a deep discussion of its association or lack thereof with the “New 
Western History”, one can offer some contrasts to a couple of points in the debates and 
evolution of the field. 
In his 1991 essay, “Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward a New Approach to Western 
History,” historian Michael Malone suggests four “fundamental bonds of regional identity” 
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for western histories.  They are the fundamental aridity of the West; an exceptional reliance 
on the federal government; the recentness of its frontier experience; and its heavy 
dependence on extractive industries (including agriculture).  Through this study, one can see 
that the evolution of the Cotton West certainly fulfills all of Malone’s bonds of identity, with 
the possible exception of the frontier experience.  The concept of frontier is a keystone in 
debating the New Western History versus earlier interpretations.  I suggest that it simply is 
not a factor in the development of the Cotton West, unless one considers the “conquest” of 
new farming areas by Anglo emigrants to the region to start cotton farming as being part of 
that frontier experience.  The settlement of these farmers does not need to be cloaked in 
mythic stories of conquest or expansion.  They simply arrived and sought out a farm crop 
that suited their needs and the climate of the region.  Malone states that little has been done 
on modern western agriculture; this dissertation contributes to filling that need.15 
Several western historians describe the West as having a colonial relationship to the 
East.  In an essay addressing the subject, Brian Dippie describes Gerald Nash’s body of 
works as contending that World War II, specifically the year 1945, was a new dividing line in 
western history.  That was when the West was freed from its colonialist shackles and its 
political, economic, and cultural dependency on the East.  Certainly the Cotton West owes 
much to its connections to the East—specifically to the federal government in Washington, 
D.C.  However, I see little in the Cotton West that is politically, economically, or culturally 
dependent on the East, or on the South for that matter.  One could reasonably surmise that if 
the USDA helped institute the western cotton industry in order to procure national wealth, 
then indeed its origins are colonial in nature.  The very nature of the scientific work by the 
USDA and state researchers, however, runs counter to the idea of the East controlling a 
colonial Cotton West.  The idea was to create a self-sustaining agricultural industry.  Only 
through the continued involvement of the USDA in cotton-breeding operations in California, 
which did not end until the 1970s, or in the Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of western 
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water projects can we see elements of potential control or colonialism.  I believe that, at least 
in this example, there is no colonialist relationship between the West and the East.16 
Instead of a colonialist approach, some western history scholars are pursuing 
comparative regional studies.  Ultimately that is where my work falls.  There is a need to 
contrast the development of the Cotton West and the Cotton South.  The comparisons and 
analysis offered earlier provides an insight, but further work may be required.  The first need, 
however, was for a basic history of the western cotton industry.  This dissertation opens 
doors of insight into cotton agriculture, western history, irrigation, labor, science, 
mechanization, and federal roles in any or all of these areas. 
Conclusions 
This study provides the first broad overview of the emergence and development of 
cotton farming in the American West.  Throughout the Cotton West, producers dealt with the 
same common sets of variables—irrigation and aridity, cotton varieties bred specific to the 
area, technology and mechanization, and labor issues.  While the solution applied in 
California may not have been the same as in West Texas for a given problem, taken as a 
whole, all these areas put the Cotton West in stark contrast to the contemporary 
developments of the Cotton South. 
In addition this dissertation demonstrates the critical role played by federal and state 
agricultural officials in introducing and expanding the western cotton industry.  Other 
historians have profiled the federal government’s role in the American West, mainly through 
western irrigation and reclamation projects.  This study suggests that, while probably not 
through an intended, coordinated fashion, federal workers were significant players in at least 
this agricultural industry (cotton farming), very much supported by their colleagues at state 
land-grant colleges and experiment stations.  This finding suggests that additional 
examination is needed in other agricultural industries to see if similar intervention can be 
found for other crops, particularly in the western U.S. 
Finally, this study shows there are many interrelated connections between irrigation, 
agricultural science, labor, and technology.  Many historians, particularly of the American 
                                                 
16
 Brian W. Dippie, “American Wests: Historiographical Perspectives,” in Trails: Toward a New 
Western History, 123. 
 165 
West, have examined these subjects within a near vacuum of a single topic.  While this is a 
valid approach, the findings published here indicate that there is still much room to 
reexamine and explore the interconnections between these topics, particularly from the 
perspective of a single agricultural industry like cotton farming. 
The American cotton industry has deep roots that extend from one coast to the other.  
This exploration of the introduction and expansion of the Cotton West shows that there is 
much more work to be done in profiling the history of this fundamental part of American 
agricultural history. 
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